What does Cross-Cultural Contracts and Market Entry conclude, in numbers, about “Two Business Operating Systems: the Commitment Game and Adaptive Search”?
Answer: In case A the 4 changes almost rule out the committed type (0.45 falls to 0.01), but they raise the probability of the opportunist type from 0.10 to 0.18, nearly doubling it. The reason is not that the partner is suspicious; it is that, to an observer who cannot see reasons, the adaptive and the opportunist behave alike. In case B the same 4 changes become strong evidence that the team really is adapting to the market as agreed. Case C shows that this judgement tolerates error: one deviation brings the opportunist probability back only to 0.12 and does not make trust collapse.
Scope of the numbers: This book is not legal, financial or investment advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (15 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.01, 0.10, 0.12, 0.18, 0.45
| A | 4 changes, reason not verifiable |
| committed 0.45 | 0.01 adaptive 0.45 -> 0.81 opportunist 0.10 -> 0.18 |
| B | 4 changes, each with the agreed state indicator |
| committed 0.45 | 0.00 adaptive 0.45 -> 1.00 opportunist 0.10 -> 0.00 |
| C as B, but one change came without the indicator | |
| committed 0.45 | 0.00 adaptive 0.45 -> 0.87 opportunist 0.10 -> 0.12 |
Show the full program
# How a local partner decodes a plan change. Three types of foreign team, as the partner sees them:
# committed - changes plan in 5 % of months, whatever happens;
# adaptive - changes plan when the market state shifts (95 %), almost never otherwise (2 %);
# opportunist - changes plan in 35 % of months, whenever it privately pays, ignoring the state.
# The state shifts in 30 % of months, so the adaptive team also changes plan in about 30 % of months.
# The partner starts with prior 0.45 / 0.45 / 0.10 and watches 12 months.
PRIOR = {"committed": 0.45, "adaptive": 0.45, "opportunist": 0.10}
def p_change(team, shift):
if team == "committed":
return 0.05
if team == "adaptive":
return 0.95 if shift else 0.02
return 0.35
def posterior(months, sees_state):
"""months: list of (shift, change). If the state is not verifiable, the partner averages over it."""
post = dict(PRIOR)
for shift, change in months:
for t in post:
if sees_state:
p = p_change(t, shift)
else:
p = 0.3 * p_change(t, True) + 0.7 * p_change(t, False)
post[t] *= p if change else 1 - p
z = sum(post.values())
return {t: v / z for t, v in post.items()}
year = [(True, True)] * 4 + [(False, False)] * 8 # 4 shifts, 4 changes, all in shift months
odd = [(True, True)] * 3 + [(True, False)] + [(False, True)] + [(False, False)] * 7
cases = (("A 4 changes, reason not verifiable", year, False),
("B 4 changes, each with the agreed state indicator", year, True),
("C as B, but one change came without the indicator", odd, True))
for label, months, sees in cases:
post = posterior(months, sees)
print(label)
print(" " + " ".join(f"{t} {PRIOR[t]:.2f} -> {post[t]:.2f}" for t in PRIOR))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Cross-Cultural Contracts, Real Options and Game Theory of Southeast Asian Market Entry (Version 1.0.1), Chapter 1: Two Business Operating Systems: the Commitment Game and Adaptive Search. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765345
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765345 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-016 · v1.0.1 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026016,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Cross-Cultural Contracts, Real Options and Game Theory of Southeast Asian Market Entry},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.1},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23765345},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765345}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · Real Options and Optimal Stopping: the Value of a Stop-Loss and the Signal It Sends
- Chapter 3 · Incomplete Contracts and Relational Contracts
- Chapter 4 · The Control Theory of Iteration Speed: Feedback Delay, Gain and Transaction Costs
- Chapter 5 · Institutional Distance, Religious Ethics and Southeast Asia's Plural Markets
- Chapter 6 · The Principal-Agent Problem and Incentives for Local Teams
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-registered Trial