What does Cross-Cultural Contracts and Market Entry conclude, in numbers, about “Practice and a Pre-registered Trial”?
Answer: With a smallest effect of interest of 0.30 standard deviations, two-sided \(\alpha = 0.025\) for each co-primary outcome and 90 % power, each arm needs 277 analysable participants; the power to detect both outcomes together is at least 80 %. Allowing for about 20 % of participants to be excluded for failing attention or manipulation checks, each arm recruits 347, 694 in all, about 139 in each of the five countries. The sample within each country is too small to test differences between countries, which are reported only as exploratory.
Scope of the numbers: This book is not legal, financial or investment advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (15 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.30, 139, 20, 277, 347, 694
| standardised effect 0.20: | 477 per arm for 80 % power, | 622 for 90 % |
| standardised effect 0.25: | 306 per arm for 80 % power, | 399 for 90 % |
| standardised effect 0.30: | 213 per arm for 80 % power, | 277 for 90 % |
| standardised effect 0.40: | 120 per arm for 80 % power, | 157 for 90 % |
| chosen: smallest effect of interest 0.30, 90 % power -> 277 analysable per arm | ||
| power for each outcome 0.901; for both together at least 0.80 | ||
| allow 20 % exclusions (failed attention or manipulation checks): recruit 347 per arm, 694 in all, about 139 per country |
Show the full program
# Sample size for the pre-registered vignette experiment. Two arms (fixed-target contract vs
# state-contingent contract with a written 90-day exploration period and stopping rules), randomised
# within each of five countries. Two co-primary outcomes measured after the same day-90 exit event:
# trust in the foreign partner, and perceived risk of breach. Each tested at two-sided alpha 0.025
# (Bonferroni for two outcomes). Effects in SD units; normal approximation for a t-test.
import math
COUNTRIES = 5 # Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore
from statistics import NormalDist
N = NormalDist()
def n_per_arm(d, alpha=0.025, power=0.90):
za, zb = N.inv_cdf(1 - alpha / 2), N.inv_cdf(power)
return math.ceil(2 * (za + zb) ** 2 / d ** 2) + 1
def power(n, d, alpha=0.025):
return N.cdf(d / math.sqrt(2 / n) - N.inv_cdf(1 - alpha / 2))
for d in (0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.40):
print(f"standardised effect {d:.2f}: {n_per_arm(d, power=0.80):4d} per arm for 80 % power, "
f"{n_per_arm(d):4d} for 90 %")
n = n_per_arm(0.30)
print(f"chosen: smallest effect of interest 0.30, 90 % power -> {n} analysable per arm")
# Both outcomes must be powered; with correlated outcomes the chance of detecting BOTH true effects
# of 0.30 is at least 1 - 2 * (1 - power) by the union bound:
print(f"power for each outcome {power(n, 0.30):.3f}; for both together at least {1 - 2 * (1 - power(n, 0.30)):.2f}")
recruit = math.ceil(n / 0.80)
print(f"allow 20 % exclusions (failed attention or manipulation checks): recruit {recruit} per arm,"
f" {2 * recruit} in all, about {math.ceil(2 * recruit / COUNTRIES)} per country")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Cross-Cultural Contracts, Real Options and Game Theory of Southeast Asian Market Entry (Version 1.0.1), Chapter 8: Practice and a Pre-registered Trial. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765345
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765345 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-016 · v1.0.1 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026016,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Cross-Cultural Contracts, Real Options and Game Theory of Southeast Asian Market Entry},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.1},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23765345},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765345}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Two Business Operating Systems: the Commitment Game and Adaptive Search
- Chapter 2 · Real Options and Optimal Stopping: the Value of a Stop-Loss and the Signal It Sends
- Chapter 3 · Incomplete Contracts and Relational Contracts
- Chapter 4 · The Control Theory of Iteration Speed: Feedback Delay, Gain and Transaction Costs
- Chapter 5 · Institutional Distance, Religious Ethics and Southeast Asia's Plural Markets
- Chapter 6 · The Principal-Agent Problem and Incentives for Local Teams