What does Cross-Cultural Contracts and Market Entry conclude, in numbers, about “Institutional Distance, Religious Ethics and Southeast Asia's Plural Markets”?
Answer: Under these assumptions, the referral network, even when it can reach only 20 candidates, gives a better expected result than screening 30 on the open market, and cuts the chance of an unreliable partner from about 16 % to about 5 %. But the last lines of the program show where the network's advantage comes from and where it ends: its value comes from the low reliable share on the open market. Once better courts, credit bureaus and platform ratings raise that share to 90 %, screening 30 candidates on the open market is already slightly better than the network. As business registries, electronic payments and platform ratings improve across Southeast Asia, the network's relative advantage may be shrinking, but that needs to be tested with data.
Scope of the numbers: This book is not legal, financial or investment advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (15 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 20, 30, 90
| route | candidates screened | mean value | P(unreliable partner) | |
| open market | | 5 | 6.93 | 15.7% |
| open market | | 30 | 9.31 | 15.9% |
| referral network | | 5 | 11.44 | 4.5% |
| referral network | | 20 | 13.46 | 4.8% |
| open market with reliable share 70%, 30 screened: mean value 9.31, P(unreliable) 15.9% | |
| open market with reliable share 80%, 30 screened: mean value 11.68, P(unreliable) 10.2% | |
| open market with reliable share 90%, 30 screened: mean value 13.95, P(unreliable) 4.9% |
Show the full program
# Finding a local partner: the open market versus a referral network (a 'bamboo network' of
# co-ethnic business ties; Weidenbaum & Hughes 1996). Stylised; numbers are assumptions.
# Open market: 200 candidates; 70 % are reliable. A due-diligence check flags an unreliable firm
# with probability 0.6 (and wrongly flags a reliable one with probability 0.1). Partner quality
# (the value created if the partner is reliable) varies across candidates, ~ Normal(10, 3); the
# firm picks the best-looking unflagged candidate it can find among those it screens.
# Network: only 20 candidates are reachable, but each comes vouched for by a contact who loses
# standing in the network if the referral cheats, so the share of reliable candidates is 90 %.
# An unreliable partner destroys 25 (the firm's specific investments, plus lost time).
import random
def search(pool, reliable_share, screened, rng, flag_bad=0.6, flag_good=0.1, loss=25.0):
best = None
for _ in range(min(screened, pool)):
good = rng.random() < reliable_share
quality = rng.gauss(10, 3)
flagged = rng.random() < (flag_good if good else flag_bad)
if flagged: continue
if best is None or quality > best[0]: best = (quality, good)
if best is None: return 0.0, None
return (best[0] if best[1] else -loss), best[1]
def mean_outcome(pool, share, screened, runs=20000):
rng = random.Random(7); tot = bad = 0
for _ in range(runs):
v, good = search(pool, share, screened, rng)
tot += v; bad += good is False
return tot / runs, bad / runs
print("route | candidates screened | mean value | P(unreliable partner)")
for label, pool, share, screened in (("open market", 200, 0.70, 5), ("open market", 200, 0.70, 30),
("referral network", 20, 0.90, 5), ("referral network", 20, 0.90, 20)):
v, b = mean_outcome(pool, share, screened)
print(f"{label:39s} | {screened:19d} | {v:10.2f} | {b:21.1%}")
# The network's closure is also its limit (Uzzi 1997): once the reliable share in the open market
# rises - say, with better courts, credit bureaus and platform ratings - its advantage shrinks.
for share in (0.70, 0.80, 0.90):
v, b = mean_outcome(200, share, 30)
print(f"open market with reliable share {share:.0%}, 30 screened: mean value {v:.2f}, P(unreliable) {b:.1%}")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Cross-Cultural Contracts, Real Options and Game Theory of Southeast Asian Market Entry (Version 1.0.1), Chapter 5: Institutional Distance, Religious Ethics and Southeast Asia's Plural Markets. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765345
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765345 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-016 · v1.0.1 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026016,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Cross-Cultural Contracts, Real Options and Game Theory of Southeast Asian Market Entry},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.1},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23765345},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765345}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Two Business Operating Systems: the Commitment Game and Adaptive Search
- Chapter 2 · Real Options and Optimal Stopping: the Value of a Stop-Loss and the Signal It Sends
- Chapter 3 · Incomplete Contracts and Relational Contracts
- Chapter 4 · The Control Theory of Iteration Speed: Feedback Delay, Gain and Transaction Costs
- Chapter 6 · The Principal-Agent Problem and Incentives for Local Teams
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-registered Trial