What does Cross-Cultural Contracts and Market Entry conclude, in numbers, about “The Principal-Agent Problem and Incentives for Local Teams”?
Answer: Each type chooses the contract designed for it: the long-horizon partner takes the partner contract (worth 378.9 against 318.0), the short-horizon partner the salary contract (103.7 against 79.2). The deferred payment and the higher share appeal more to long-horizon partners, who are more likely to collect the deferred payment and mind monthly fluctuations less. The cost is that, for a long-horizon partner, the partner contract costs more in total (474.0) than the salary contract (360.0). That extra cost is the price headquarters pays to separate the types and keep long-term partners; whether it is worth paying depends on how much more value a long-term partner creates, which the model does not compute.
Scope of the numbers: This book is not legal, financial or investment advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (15 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 103.7, 318.0, 360.0, 378.9, 474.0, 79.2
| long-horizon : A salary 318.0, B partner 378.9 -> picks B partner | |
| short-horizon: A salary 103.7, B partner 79.2 -> picks A salary | |
| cost of A salary for a long-horizon partner: | 360.0 over 36 months (still there at month 36: 100%) |
| cost of A salary for a short-horizon partner: | 139.8 over 36 months (still there at month 36: 11%) |
| cost of B partner for a long-horizon partner: | 474.0 over 36 months (still there at month 36: 100%) |
| cost of B partner for a short-horizon partner: | 142.0 over 36 months (still there at month 36: 11%) |
Show the full program
# A contract menu that lets local partners sort themselves (screening). Two kinds of partner apply:
# long-horizon - expects to stay 3+ years, monthly discount factor 0.995, risk aversion 1.0
# short-horizon - may leave within a year (leaves with probability 0.06 a month), discount 0.98,
# risk aversion 2.0
# Monthly revenue the partner influences: mean 100, SD 40 (illustrative units, e.g. thousand MYR).
# Menu, 36 months:
# A 'salary' : fixed 8 a month + 2 % of revenue
# B 'partner' : fixed 5 a month + 4 % of revenue + a deferred tranche of 150 paid at month 36
# to a partner who is still there (forfeited on leaving)
# Each type's value = expected discounted pay - risk premium (CARA, r/2 * variance of monthly pay).
def value(contract, beta, leave, r):
fixed, share, tranche = contract
v, alive = 0.0, 1.0
for m in range(1, 37):
alive *= 1 - leave
monthly = fixed + share * 100 - r / 2 * (share * 40) ** 2
v += alive * beta ** m * monthly
return v + alive * beta ** 36 * tranche
MENU = {"A salary": (8, 0.02, 0), "B partner": (5, 0.04, 150)}
TYPES = {"long-horizon": (0.995, 0.0, 1.0), "short-horizon": (0.98, 0.06, 2.0)}
for t, (beta, leave, r) in TYPES.items():
vals = {c: value(k, beta, leave, r) for c, k in MENU.items()}
pick = max(vals, key=vals.get)
print(f"{t:13s}: " + ", ".join(f"{c} {v:6.1f}" for c, v in vals.items()) + f" -> picks {pick}")
# Expected cost to headquarters per hire (undiscounted, with each type's chance of staying):
for c, (fixed, share, tranche) in MENU.items():
for t, (beta, leave, r) in TYPES.items():
stay = sum((1 - leave) ** m for m in range(1, 37))
cost = stay * (fixed + share * 100) + (1 - leave) ** 36 * tranche
print(f"cost of {c} for a {t} partner: {cost:6.1f} over 36 months "
f"(still there at month 36: {(1 - leave) ** 36:.0%})")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Cross-Cultural Contracts, Real Options and Game Theory of Southeast Asian Market Entry (Version 1.0.1), Chapter 6: The Principal-Agent Problem and Incentives for Local Teams. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765345
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23765345 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-016 · v1.0.1 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026016,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Cross-Cultural Contracts, Real Options and Game Theory of Southeast Asian Market Entry},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.1},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23765345},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23765345}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Two Business Operating Systems: the Commitment Game and Adaptive Search
- Chapter 2 · Real Options and Optimal Stopping: the Value of a Stop-Loss and the Signal It Sends
- Chapter 3 · Incomplete Contracts and Relational Contracts
- Chapter 4 · The Control Theory of Iteration Speed: Feedback Delay, Gain and Transaction Costs
- Chapter 5 · Institutional Distance, Religious Ethics and Southeast Asia's Plural Markets
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-registered Trial