What does Compliant Referral Commissions conclude, in numbers, about “Classical Sources: the Two Handles of the Han Feizi and Mackay's Crowds”?
Answer: Chapter 7 examines "The Two Handles" of the Han Feizi and Mackay's crowds: with the same budget, second-tier pay raises early joiners' share from 0.0650 to 0.1085, and with 6 recruits each the last tier holds 0.8333 of everyone.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not individual legal, tax or financial advice, and regulations are given only in gist, subject to human review of the text in force before publication. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (17 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.0650, 0.1085
| members 18284, early joiners (round < | 9) 1160 |
| same-budget one-tier rate k | 0.5499 |
| plan total gini top 1 % top 10 % early share | |
| A one-tier | 20185.4 0.5020 0.0562 0.3330 0.0650 |
| B override | 20185.4 0.4399 0.0458 0.2879 0.1085 |
| members paid more under B | 0.3712 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 7. p71: who holds the handle of reward. Overrides hand part
# of every seller's pay to the people above him, and pay concentrates.
# Tree: the recruiting process of p32 (20,000 households, 10 initial
# members, 3 contacts a round for 3 rounds, join probability 0.3, same
# seed), with parent links kept. Each member's own retail margin is
# exponential with mean 2 thousand yuan a month (fixed seed).
# Plan A (one tier): pay = k * own margin, k set so that plan A pays
# the same total as plan B (same budget).
# Plan B (overrides): pay = 0.4 * own + 0.1 * children's own margin
# + 0.05 * grandchildren's own margin.
# Gini and top shares of pay; illustrative numbers.
import math
import random
N, SEEDS, CONTACTS, ACTIVE, P_JOIN = 20000, 10, 3, 3, 0.3
rng = random.Random(20261113)
joined, parent = [-1] * N, [-1] * N
for i in range(SEEDS):
joined[i] = 0
members = list(range(SEEDS))
rnd = 0
while True:
rnd += 1
new = []
for m in members:
if rnd - joined[m] > ACTIVE:
continue
for _ in range(CONTACTS):
x = rng.randrange(N)
if joined[x] < 0 and rng.random() < P_JOIN:
joined[x], parent[x] = rnd, m
new.append(x)
members.extend(new)
if not new and all(rnd - joined[m] >= ACTIVE for m in members):
break
own = {m: rng.expovariate(1.0 / 2.0) for m in members}
kids = {m: [] for m in members}
for m in members:
if parent[m] >= 0:
kids[parent[m]].append(m)
def pay_b(m):
c = [own[k] for k in kids[m]]
g = [own[j] for k in kids[m] for j in kids[k]]
return 0.4 * own[m] + 0.1 * math.fsum(c) + 0.05 * math.fsum(g)
def gini(xs):
xs = sorted(xs)
n = len(xs)
w = math.fsum((i + 1) * x for i, x in enumerate(xs))
return 2.0 * w / (n * math.fsum(xs)) - (n + 1.0) / n
def top(xs, frac):
xs = sorted(xs, reverse=True)
k = max(1, int(len(xs) * frac))
return math.fsum(xs[:k]) / math.fsum(xs)
pb = [pay_b(m) for m in members]
k = math.fsum(pb) / math.fsum(own[m] for m in members)
pa = [k * own[m] for m in members]
early = [i for i, m in enumerate(members) if joined[m] <= 9]
print("members {}, early joiners (round <= 9) {}".format(
len(members), len(early)))
print("same-budget one-tier rate k = {:.4f}".format(k))
print("plan total gini top 1 % top 10 % early share")
for name, ps in (("A one-tier", pa), ("B override", pb)):
es = math.fsum(ps[i] for i in early) / math.fsum(ps)
print("{:10s} {:8.1f} {:6.4f} {:8.4f} {:9.4f} {:12.4f}".format(
name, math.fsum(ps), gini(ps), top(ps, 0.01), top(ps, 0.10), es))
more = len([i for i in range(len(pa)) if pb[i] > pa[i]])
print("members paid more under B: {:.4f}".format(more / len(pa)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 7: Classical Sources: the Two Handles of the Han Feizi and Mackay's Crowds. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-279 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026279,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Linear Contracts: Cost, Risk and Noise Set the Optimal Commission Slope
- Chapter 2 · Multitasking: a Second-Tier Slope Pushes Effort from Selling to Recruiting
- Chapter 3 · Referral Trees: Expected Size in a Branching Process and Saturation in a Finite Market
- Chapter 4 · Maximising Referrals: a Bonus Paid Once, Only for a Real Purchase
- Chapter 5 · The Compliance Boundary: Constrained Optimisation and a Screen for Commission Plans
- Chapter 6 · Estimating the Parameters and a Robust Slope: When Unsure, Err Low
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Compliance Review Sheet, the Commission Slope Calculator and Pre-Registered Tests