关于「原典考辨:《韩非子·二柄》的赏罚之柄与麦凯笔下的群体狂热」,《合规分销与佣金斜率》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第七章考辨《韩非子·二柄》与麦凯笔下的群体狂热:同样预算下,二级计酬让早入会者所得份额从 0.0650 升到 0.1085;每人拉 6 人时最后一层占全体 0.8333。

数据口径:最优的线性佣金斜率由努力成本、风险厌恶与噪音决定,示意基准下是 0.5263;给上线按下线业绩分成的二级佣金,主要买到的是拉人头而不是真实零售;按本书采用的最保守读法,以下线业绩给上线计酬本身落在 2005 年《禁止传销条例》列举的行为之内,合规方案的二级斜率应取零,转介绍改由只为真实购买、退货期满才发放的单层顾客推荐奖励来争取。 书中参数为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化法律、税务或理财建议,法规只述大意,以上架前人工复核的现行文本为准。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.0650, 0.1085

members 18284, early joiners (round <9) 1160
same-budget one-tier rate k0.5499
plan total gini top 1 % top 10 % early share
A one-tier20185.4 0.5020 0.0562 0.3330 0.0650
B override20185.4 0.4399 0.0458 0.2879 0.1085
members paid more under B0.3712
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 7. p71: who holds the handle of reward. Overrides hand part
# of every seller's pay to the people above him, and pay concentrates.
# Tree: the recruiting process of p32 (20,000 households, 10 initial
# members, 3 contacts a round for 3 rounds, join probability 0.3, same
# seed), with parent links kept. Each member's own retail margin is
# exponential with mean 2 thousand yuan a month (fixed seed).
# Plan A (one tier): pay = k * own margin, k set so that plan A pays
#   the same total as plan B (same budget).
# Plan B (overrides): pay = 0.4 * own + 0.1 * children's own margin
#   + 0.05 * grandchildren's own margin.
# Gini and top shares of pay; illustrative numbers.
import math
import random

N, SEEDS, CONTACTS, ACTIVE, P_JOIN = 20000, 10, 3, 3, 0.3
rng = random.Random(20261113)
joined, parent = [-1] * N, [-1] * N
for i in range(SEEDS):
    joined[i] = 0
members = list(range(SEEDS))
rnd = 0
while True:
    rnd += 1
    new = []
    for m in members:
        if rnd - joined[m] > ACTIVE:
            continue
        for _ in range(CONTACTS):
            x = rng.randrange(N)
            if joined[x] < 0 and rng.random() < P_JOIN:
                joined[x], parent[x] = rnd, m
                new.append(x)
    members.extend(new)
    if not new and all(rnd - joined[m] >= ACTIVE for m in members):
        break
own = {m: rng.expovariate(1.0 / 2.0) for m in members}
kids = {m: [] for m in members}
for m in members:
    if parent[m] >= 0:
        kids[parent[m]].append(m)


def pay_b(m):
    c = [own[k] for k in kids[m]]
    g = [own[j] for k in kids[m] for j in kids[k]]
    return 0.4 * own[m] + 0.1 * math.fsum(c) + 0.05 * math.fsum(g)


def gini(xs):
    xs = sorted(xs)
    n = len(xs)
    w = math.fsum((i + 1) * x for i, x in enumerate(xs))
    return 2.0 * w / (n * math.fsum(xs)) - (n + 1.0) / n


def top(xs, frac):
    xs = sorted(xs, reverse=True)
    k = max(1, int(len(xs) * frac))
    return math.fsum(xs[:k]) / math.fsum(xs)


pb = [pay_b(m) for m in members]
k = math.fsum(pb) / math.fsum(own[m] for m in members)
pa = [k * own[m] for m in members]
early = [i for i, m in enumerate(members) if joined[m] <= 9]
print("members {}, early joiners (round <= 9) {}".format(
    len(members), len(early)))
print("same-budget one-tier rate k = {:.4f}".format(k))
print("plan       total    gini   top 1 %  top 10 %  early share")
for name, ps in (("A one-tier", pa), ("B override", pb)):
    es = math.fsum(ps[i] for i in early) / math.fsum(ps)
    print("{:10s} {:8.1f} {:6.4f} {:8.4f} {:9.4f} {:12.4f}".format(
        name, math.fsum(ps), gini(ps), top(ps, 0.01), top(ps, 0.10), es))
more = len([i for i in range(len(pa)) if pb[i] > pa[i]])
print("members paid more under B: {:.4f}".format(more / len(pa)))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《合规分销激励相容、二级佣金斜率委托代理模型与反传销层级红线内转介绍最大化母典》第 7 章「原典考辨:《韩非子·二柄》的赏罚之柄与麦凯笔下的群体狂热」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-279 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026279,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论