关于「合规边界:约束优化与佣金方案筛查表」,《合规分销与佣金斜率》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第五章把合规边界写成约束:下线报表多为自购与挤占时守住边界几乎没有代价,大半真实时代价约为 0.1104,可改由顾客推荐补回。

数据口径:最优的线性佣金斜率由努力成本、风险厌恶与噪音决定,示意基准下是 0.5263;给上线按下线业绩分成的二级佣金,主要买到的是拉人头而不是真实零售;按本书采用的最保守读法,以下线业绩给上线计酬本身落在 2005 年《禁止传销条例》列举的行为之内,合规方案的二级斜率应取零,转介绍改由只为真实购买、退货期满才发放的单层顾客推荐奖励来争取。 书中参数为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化法律、税务或理财建议,法规只述大意,以上架前人工复核的现行文本为准。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 0.1104

free optimum vs boundary (b20, b1 * g <= 0.30)
r s2 V2 | b1 b2 S free | b1 S bound loss h
0.536 0.15 | 0.525 0.000 5.263 | 0.525 5.263 0.0000 0.00
0.536 0.80 | 0.480 0.275 5.916 | 0.525 5.263 0.1104 3.73
0.19 0.15 | 0.955 0.000 9.569 | 0.750 9.122 0.0468 0.00
0.19 0.80 | 0.920 0.600 11.800 | 0.750 9.122 0.2270 8.67
1.081 0.15 | 0.200 0.000 1.980 | 0.200 1.980 0.0000 0.00
0.19 1.00 | 0.910 0.750 13.852 | 0.750 9.122 0.3415 11.83
revenue rate at b10.5263: 0.2105 (cap 0.30 not binding)
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 5. p51: what the compliance boundary costs in real surplus.
# Multitask model of p21/p22 (c = 0.05, d = 0.01). Boundary (the most
# conservative reading used in this book, to be checked by a person
# before publication): no second-tier pay, b2 = 0; pay only on the
# seller's own direct sales to consumers; total pay at most 0.30 of
# those sales, i.e. b1 * g <= 0.30 with gross margin ratio g = 0.4,
# so b1 <= 0.75 on margin. Scenarios vary risk aversion r, noise s2
# and the real value V2 of recruit-reported margin (Var 64).
# Grid step 0.005. All values illustrative.

C, D, G, CAP, S2B = 0.05, 0.01, 0.4, 0.30, 64.0


def effort(b1, b2):
    det = C * C - D * D
    s = (C * b1 - D * b2) / det
    h = (C * b2 - D * b1) / det
    if h < 0.0:
        return b1 / C, 0.0
    if s < 0.0:
        return 0.0, b2 / C
    return s, h


def surplus(b1, b2, r, s2, v2):
    s, h = effort(b1, b2)
    c = C * (s * s + h * h) / 2.0 + D * s * h
    return s + v2 * h - c - r * (b1 * b1 * s2 + b2 * b2 * S2B) / 2.0


def best(r, s2, v2, bound):
    top = None
    b1max = int(round(CAP / G / 0.005)) if bound else 200
    for i in range(b1max + 1):
        for j in (range(1) if bound else range(201)):
            b1, b2 = i * 0.005, j * 0.005
            v = surplus(b1, b2, r, s2, v2)
            if top is None or v > top[0] + 1e-12:
                top = (v, b1, b2)
    return top


print("free optimum vs boundary (b2 = 0, b1 * g <= 0.30)")
print("   r   s2    V2 | b1    b2   S free | b1   S bound  loss   h")
for r, s2, v2 in ((0.5, 36.0, 0.15), (0.5, 36.0, 0.8), (0.1, 9.0, 0.15),
                  (0.1, 9.0, 0.8), (1.0, 81.0, 0.15), (0.1, 9.0, 1.0)):
    vf, b1f, b2f = best(r, s2, v2, False)
    vb, b1b, _ = best(r, s2, v2, True)
    h = effort(b1f, b2f)[1]
    print("{:4.1f} {:4.0f} {:5.2f} | {:5.3f} {:5.3f} {:6.3f} | {:5.3f}"
          " {:6.3f} {:6.4f} {:4.2f}".format(r, s2, v2, b1f, b2f, vf, b1b,
                                            vb, 1.0 - vb / vf, h))
print("revenue rate at b1 = 0.5263: {:.4f} (cap 0.30 not binding)".format(
    0.5263 * G))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《合规分销激励相容、二级佣金斜率委托代理模型与反传销层级红线内转介绍最大化母典》第 5 章「合规边界:约束优化与佣金方案筛查表」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-279 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026279,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论