关于「合规边界:约束优化与佣金方案筛查表」,《合规分销与佣金斜率》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第五章把合规边界写成约束:下线报表多为自购与挤占时守住边界几乎没有代价,大半真实时代价约为 0.1104,可改由顾客推荐补回。
数据口径:最优的线性佣金斜率由努力成本、风险厌恶与噪音决定,示意基准下是 0.5263;给上线按下线业绩分成的二级佣金,主要买到的是拉人头而不是真实零售;按本书采用的最保守读法,以下线业绩给上线计酬本身落在 2005 年《禁止传销条例》列举的行为之内,合规方案的二级斜率应取零,转介绍改由只为真实购买、退货期满才发放的单层顾客推荐奖励来争取。 书中参数为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化法律、税务或理财建议,法规只述大意,以上架前人工复核的现行文本为准。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 0.1104
| free optimum vs boundary (b2 | 0, b1 * g <= 0.30) |
| r s2 V2 | b1 b2 S free | b1 S bound loss h | |
| 0.5 | 36 0.15 | 0.525 0.000 5.263 | 0.525 5.263 0.0000 0.00 |
| 0.5 | 36 0.80 | 0.480 0.275 5.916 | 0.525 5.263 0.1104 3.73 |
| 0.1 | 9 0.15 | 0.955 0.000 9.569 | 0.750 9.122 0.0468 0.00 |
| 0.1 | 9 0.80 | 0.920 0.600 11.800 | 0.750 9.122 0.2270 8.67 |
| 1.0 | 81 0.15 | 0.200 0.000 1.980 | 0.200 1.980 0.0000 0.00 |
| 0.1 | 9 1.00 | 0.910 0.750 13.852 | 0.750 9.122 0.3415 11.83 |
| revenue rate at b1 | 0.5263: 0.2105 (cap 0.30 not binding) |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 5. p51: what the compliance boundary costs in real surplus.
# Multitask model of p21/p22 (c = 0.05, d = 0.01). Boundary (the most
# conservative reading used in this book, to be checked by a person
# before publication): no second-tier pay, b2 = 0; pay only on the
# seller's own direct sales to consumers; total pay at most 0.30 of
# those sales, i.e. b1 * g <= 0.30 with gross margin ratio g = 0.4,
# so b1 <= 0.75 on margin. Scenarios vary risk aversion r, noise s2
# and the real value V2 of recruit-reported margin (Var 64).
# Grid step 0.005. All values illustrative.
C, D, G, CAP, S2B = 0.05, 0.01, 0.4, 0.30, 64.0
def effort(b1, b2):
det = C * C - D * D
s = (C * b1 - D * b2) / det
h = (C * b2 - D * b1) / det
if h < 0.0:
return b1 / C, 0.0
if s < 0.0:
return 0.0, b2 / C
return s, h
def surplus(b1, b2, r, s2, v2):
s, h = effort(b1, b2)
c = C * (s * s + h * h) / 2.0 + D * s * h
return s + v2 * h - c - r * (b1 * b1 * s2 + b2 * b2 * S2B) / 2.0
def best(r, s2, v2, bound):
top = None
b1max = int(round(CAP / G / 0.005)) if bound else 200
for i in range(b1max + 1):
for j in (range(1) if bound else range(201)):
b1, b2 = i * 0.005, j * 0.005
v = surplus(b1, b2, r, s2, v2)
if top is None or v > top[0] + 1e-12:
top = (v, b1, b2)
return top
print("free optimum vs boundary (b2 = 0, b1 * g <= 0.30)")
print(" r s2 V2 | b1 b2 S free | b1 S bound loss h")
for r, s2, v2 in ((0.5, 36.0, 0.15), (0.5, 36.0, 0.8), (0.1, 9.0, 0.15),
(0.1, 9.0, 0.8), (1.0, 81.0, 0.15), (0.1, 9.0, 1.0)):
vf, b1f, b2f = best(r, s2, v2, False)
vb, b1b, _ = best(r, s2, v2, True)
h = effort(b1f, b2f)[1]
print("{:4.1f} {:4.0f} {:5.2f} | {:5.3f} {:5.3f} {:6.3f} | {:5.3f}"
" {:6.3f} {:6.4f} {:4.2f}".format(r, s2, v2, b1f, b2f, vf, b1b,
vb, 1.0 - vb / vf, h))
print("revenue rate at b1 = 0.5263: {:.4f} (cap 0.30 not binding)".format(
0.5263 * G))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《合规分销激励相容、二级佣金斜率委托代理模型与反传销层级红线内转介绍最大化母典》第 5 章「合规边界:约束优化与佣金方案筛查表」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-279 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026279,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}