What does Compliant Referral Commissions conclude, in numbers, about “The Compliance Boundary: Constrained Optimisation and a Screen for Commission Plans”?
Answer: Chapter 5 writes the compliance boundary as constraints: when downline reports are mostly self-purchase and displacement, holding the boundary costs almost nothing, and when they are mostly real the cost is about 0.1104, which customer referral can win back.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not individual legal, tax or financial advice, and regulations are given only in gist, subject to human review of the text in force before publication. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (17 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.1104
| free optimum vs boundary (b2 | 0, b1 * g <= 0.30) |
| r s2 V2 | b1 b2 S free | b1 S bound loss h | |
| 0.5 | 36 0.15 | 0.525 0.000 5.263 | 0.525 5.263 0.0000 0.00 |
| 0.5 | 36 0.80 | 0.480 0.275 5.916 | 0.525 5.263 0.1104 3.73 |
| 0.1 | 9 0.15 | 0.955 0.000 9.569 | 0.750 9.122 0.0468 0.00 |
| 0.1 | 9 0.80 | 0.920 0.600 11.800 | 0.750 9.122 0.2270 8.67 |
| 1.0 | 81 0.15 | 0.200 0.000 1.980 | 0.200 1.980 0.0000 0.00 |
| 0.1 | 9 1.00 | 0.910 0.750 13.852 | 0.750 9.122 0.3415 11.83 |
| revenue rate at b1 | 0.5263: 0.2105 (cap 0.30 not binding) |
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p51: what the compliance boundary costs in real surplus.
# Multitask model of p21/p22 (c = 0.05, d = 0.01). Boundary (the most
# conservative reading used in this book, to be checked by a person
# before publication): no second-tier pay, b2 = 0; pay only on the
# seller's own direct sales to consumers; total pay at most 0.30 of
# those sales, i.e. b1 * g <= 0.30 with gross margin ratio g = 0.4,
# so b1 <= 0.75 on margin. Scenarios vary risk aversion r, noise s2
# and the real value V2 of recruit-reported margin (Var 64).
# Grid step 0.005. All values illustrative.
C, D, G, CAP, S2B = 0.05, 0.01, 0.4, 0.30, 64.0
def effort(b1, b2):
det = C * C - D * D
s = (C * b1 - D * b2) / det
h = (C * b2 - D * b1) / det
if h < 0.0:
return b1 / C, 0.0
if s < 0.0:
return 0.0, b2 / C
return s, h
def surplus(b1, b2, r, s2, v2):
s, h = effort(b1, b2)
c = C * (s * s + h * h) / 2.0 + D * s * h
return s + v2 * h - c - r * (b1 * b1 * s2 + b2 * b2 * S2B) / 2.0
def best(r, s2, v2, bound):
top = None
b1max = int(round(CAP / G / 0.005)) if bound else 200
for i in range(b1max + 1):
for j in (range(1) if bound else range(201)):
b1, b2 = i * 0.005, j * 0.005
v = surplus(b1, b2, r, s2, v2)
if top is None or v > top[0] + 1e-12:
top = (v, b1, b2)
return top
print("free optimum vs boundary (b2 = 0, b1 * g <= 0.30)")
print(" r s2 V2 | b1 b2 S free | b1 S bound loss h")
for r, s2, v2 in ((0.5, 36.0, 0.15), (0.5, 36.0, 0.8), (0.1, 9.0, 0.15),
(0.1, 9.0, 0.8), (1.0, 81.0, 0.15), (0.1, 9.0, 1.0)):
vf, b1f, b2f = best(r, s2, v2, False)
vb, b1b, _ = best(r, s2, v2, True)
h = effort(b1f, b2f)[1]
print("{:4.1f} {:4.0f} {:5.2f} | {:5.3f} {:5.3f} {:6.3f} | {:5.3f}"
" {:6.3f} {:6.4f} {:4.2f}".format(r, s2, v2, b1f, b2f, vf, b1b,
vb, 1.0 - vb / vf, h))
print("revenue rate at b1 = 0.5263: {:.4f} (cap 0.30 not binding)".format(
0.5263 * G))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: The Compliance Boundary: Constrained Optimisation and a Screen for Commission Plans. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-279 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026279,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Linear Contracts: Cost, Risk and Noise Set the Optimal Commission Slope
- Chapter 2 · Multitasking: a Second-Tier Slope Pushes Effort from Selling to Recruiting
- Chapter 3 · Referral Trees: Expected Size in a Branching Process and Saturation in a Finite Market
- Chapter 4 · Maximising Referrals: a Bonus Paid Once, Only for a Real Purchase
- Chapter 6 · Estimating the Parameters and a Robust Slope: When Unsure, Err Low
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources: the Two Handles of the Han Feizi and Mackay's Crowds
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Compliance Review Sheet, the Commission Slope Calculator and Pre-Registered Tests