What does Compliant Referral Commissions conclude, in numbers, about “Maximising Referrals: a Bonus Paid Once, Only for a Real Purchase”?
Answer: Chapter 4 finds a profit-maximising referral bonus of 158.5 yuan with 1.1543 referred buyers per seed customer; paid at order, 0.7376 of the bonus goes to fakers, while paid after the return window nobody fakes.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not individual legal, tax or financial advice, and regulations are given only in gist, subject to human review of the text in force before publication. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (17 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 1.1543, 158.5
| bonus share refer R referred profit/seed | |
| 0.0 | 0.0500 0.0400 0.0417 12.50 |
| 20.0 | 0.1686 0.1349 0.1559 43.65 |
| 50.0 | 0.3193 0.2554 0.3431 85.77 |
| 150.0 | 0.6505 0.5204 1.0851 162.77 |
| 158.5 | 0.6698 0.5358 1.1543 163.33 |
| 200.0 | 0.7496 0.5997 1.4979 149.79 |
| 300.0 | 0.8714 0.6971 2.3019 0.00 |
| profit-maximising bonus 158.5 yuan, profit 163.33 | |
| largest bonus keeping 0.9 of it | 203.5 yuan, referred 1.5271 |
| referrals gained by that step: +0.3229 | |
| override b2 | 20: same referrals, profit 150.97 (-0.0757) |
| override b2 | 50: same referrals, profit 132.41 (-0.1893) |
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p41: the per-purchase referral bonus that maximises profit,
# and the largest bonus that keeps 0.9 of that profit.
# A customer contacts up to 2 friends; a contacted friend buys with
# probability PI = 0.4. Referring costs the customer t, exponential with
# mean MU = 60 yuan; 5 % refer whatever the bonus. Share who refer:
# F(b) = 1 - 0.95 * exp(-b * PI / MU). Every buyer may refer in turn,
# so R(b) = 2 * F(b) * PI and referred purchases per seed customer are
# R / (1 - R). Gross margin per purchase M = 300 yuan. The bonus is paid
# only on a real purchase. An override b2 to the referrer's referrer
# changes nobody's own decision here, so it only adds cost on buyers
# from depth 2 onward. All numbers illustrative.
import math
PI, MU, F0, FRIENDS, M = 0.4, 60.0, 0.05, 2, 300.0
def reach(b):
f = 1.0 - (1.0 - F0) * math.exp(-b * PI / MU)
r = FRIENDS * f * PI
return f, r, r / (1.0 - r)
def profit(b, b2=0.0):
f, r, tot = reach(b)
deeper = tot - r
return (M - b) * tot - b2 * deeper
bs = [k * 0.5 for k in range(0, 601)]
bstar = max(bs, key=profit)
pmax = profit(bstar)
print("bonus share refer R referred profit/seed")
for b in sorted((0.0, 20.0, 50.0, bstar, 150.0, 200.0, 300.0)):
f, r, tot = reach(b)
print("{:5.1f} {:12.4f} {:6.4f} {:9.4f} {:12.2f}".format(
b, f, r, tot, profit(b)))
floor = [b for b in bs if profit(b) >= 0.9 * pmax]
bhi = max(floor)
print("profit-maximising bonus {:.1f} yuan, profit {:.2f}".format(
bstar, pmax))
print("largest bonus keeping 0.9 of it: {:.1f} yuan, referred {:.4f}"
.format(bhi, reach(bhi)[2]))
print("referrals gained by that step: {:+.4f}".format(
reach(bhi)[2] / reach(bstar)[2] - 1.0))
for b2 in (20.0, 50.0):
print("override b2 = {:.0f}: same referrals, profit {:.2f} "
"({:+.4f})".format(b2, profit(bstar, b2),
profit(bstar, b2) / pmax - 1.0))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: Maximising Referrals: a Bonus Paid Once, Only for a Real Purchase. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-279 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026279,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Linear Contracts: Cost, Risk and Noise Set the Optimal Commission Slope
- Chapter 2 · Multitasking: a Second-Tier Slope Pushes Effort from Selling to Recruiting
- Chapter 3 · Referral Trees: Expected Size in a Branching Process and Saturation in a Finite Market
- Chapter 5 · The Compliance Boundary: Constrained Optimisation and a Screen for Commission Plans
- Chapter 6 · Estimating the Parameters and a Robust Slope: When Unsure, Err Low
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources: the Two Handles of the Han Feizi and Mackay's Crowds
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Compliance Review Sheet, the Commission Slope Calculator and Pre-Registered Tests