What does Compliant Referral Commissions conclude, in numbers, about “Multitasking: a Second-Tier Slope Pushes Effort from Selling to Recruiting”?
Answer: Once the upline can move hours from selling to recruiting, the second-tier commission stops being a harmless pure override and becomes a hand that pushes effort towards recruiting. Under the illustrative parameters, recruiting starts only when the second-tier slope exceeds one fifth of the first-tier slope; at a second-tier slope of 0.3, each seller recruits 2.03 more people a month and reported margin rises by 3.25 thousand yuan, while real margin falls by 0.20 thousand. The jointly optimal second-tier slope is zero whenever the real increment in the downline's report is at most half, and positive only when that increment is very high, which is precisely what is hardest to verify. How many people can a downline grow to, layer by layer, and how many can the last joiners bring in? The next chapter answers with a branching process and a finite market.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not individual legal, tax or financial advice, and regulations are given only in gist, subject to human review of the text in force before publication. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (17 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.20, 0.3, 2.03, 3.25
| b1 | 0.5263 on own margin; second-tier slope b2 varies |
| b2 own s recruit h recruits reported real rep/real surplus | |
| 0.00 | 10.53 0.00 0.00 10.53 10.53 1.000 5.263 |
| 0.10 | 10.53 0.00 0.00 10.53 10.53 1.000 5.103 |
| 0.15 | 10.34 0.93 0.47 11.27 10.48 1.076 4.836 |
| 0.20 | 10.13 1.97 0.99 12.10 10.43 1.161 4.431 |
| 0.30 | 9.71 4.06 2.03 13.77 10.32 1.334 3.225 |
| 0.40 | 9.30 6.14 3.07 15.44 10.22 1.511 1.491 |
| b2 | 0.3 vs 0: reported margin +3.25, real -0.20 |
| recruits per month 0.00 | 2.03; own selling 10.53 -> 9.71 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 2. p21: a second-tier slope moves effort from selling to
# recruiting (multitask LEN, after Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991).
# Efforts: s (selling to end consumers), h (recruiting sellers).
# Own margin x1 = s + e1, Var 36; margin reported by recruits
# x2 = h + e2, Var 64 (thousand yuan a month). Of x2 only a share
# LAM = 0.5 is real end-consumer retail (the rest is self-purchase
# and stock loading) and THETA = 0.35 displaces sales that existing
# sellers would have made, so one unit of x2 is worth V2 = 0.15.
# Cost c*(s^2 + h^2)/2 + d*s*h with c = 0.05, d = 0.01 (the two tasks
# compete for the same hours). Pay w = a + b1*x1 + b2*x2; r = 0.5.
# A recruit reports 2 thousand yuan a month on average. Illustrative.
C, D, R = 0.05, 0.01, 0.5
S1, S2 = 36.0, 64.0
LAM, THETA = 0.5, 0.35
V2 = LAM - THETA
PER_RECRUIT = 2.0
def effort(b1, b2):
# 一阶条件 c*s + d*h = b1, d*s + c*h = b2;非负约束下取角点
det = C * C - D * D
s = (C * b1 - D * b2) / det
h = (C * b2 - D * b1) / det
if h < 0.0:
return b1 / C, 0.0
if s < 0.0:
return 0.0, b2 / C
return s, h
def cost(s, h):
return C * (s * s + h * h) / 2.0 + D * s * h
def surplus(b1, b2, v2=V2):
s, h = effort(b1, b2)
prem = R * (b1 * b1 * S1 + b2 * b2 * S2) / 2.0
return s + v2 * h - cost(s, h) - prem
B1 = 0.5263
print("b1 = {} on own margin; second-tier slope b2 varies".format(B1))
print(" b2 own s recruit h recruits reported real rep/real"
" surplus")
for b2 in (0.0, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4):
s, h = effort(B1, b2)
rep = s + h
real = s + V2 * h
print("{:5.2f} {:6.2f} {:10.2f} {:9.2f} {:9.2f} {:5.2f} {:9.3f}"
" {:8.3f}".format(b2, s, h, h / PER_RECRUIT, rep, real,
rep / real, surplus(B1, b2)))
s0, h0 = effort(B1, 0.0)
s3, h3 = effort(B1, 0.3)
print("b2 = 0.3 vs 0: reported margin {:+.2f}, real {:+.2f}".format(
(s3 + h3) - (s0 + h0), (s3 + V2 * h3) - (s0 + V2 * h0)))
print("recruits per month {:.2f} -> {:.2f}; own selling {:.2f} -> "
"{:.2f}".format(h0 / PER_RECRUIT, h3 / PER_RECRUIT, s0, s3))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: Multitasking: a Second-Tier Slope Pushes Effort from Selling to Recruiting. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-279 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026279,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Linear Contracts: Cost, Risk and Noise Set the Optimal Commission Slope
- Chapter 3 · Referral Trees: Expected Size in a Branching Process and Saturation in a Finite Market
- Chapter 4 · Maximising Referrals: a Bonus Paid Once, Only for a Real Purchase
- Chapter 5 · The Compliance Boundary: Constrained Optimisation and a Screen for Commission Plans
- Chapter 6 · Estimating the Parameters and a Robust Slope: When Unsure, Err Low
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources: the Two Handles of the Han Feizi and Mackay's Crowds
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Compliance Review Sheet, the Commission Slope Calculator and Pre-Registered Tests