What does Compliant Referral Commissions conclude, in numbers, about “Linear Contracts: Cost, Risk and Noise Set the Optimal Commission Slope”?
Answer: A linear contract splits a commission plan into incentive, insurance and measurement. With linear contracts, exponential utility and normal noise, the optimal slope is \(1/(1+rc\sigma^2)\); in the base case it is 0.5263, and total surplus is the same fraction of what it would be without risk. Noisier results call for lower slopes: doubling noise variance cuts the slope by 0.3214. Losses from missing the optimum grow with the square of the miss, so paying too much is as costly as paying too little. The informativeness principle says that downline results unrelated to the upline's effort belong in the contract at most with a negative weight, to filter common market swings; a positive pure override only adds a risk premium. When the upline can move time from selling to recruiting, is the second-tier commission still pure cost? The next chapter answers with a multitask model.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not individual legal, tax or financial advice, and regulations are given only in gist, subject to human review of the text in force before publication. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (17 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.5263
| LEN slope b* = 1/(1 + r c s2), c = 0.05 (illustrative) | |||||||
| r | s2 | rcs2 | b* | grid | effort | surplus | premium |
| 0.1 | 9 | 0.045 | 0.957 | 0.957 | 19.14 | 9.569 | 0.412 |
| 0.1 | 36 | 0.180 | 0.847 | 0.847 | 16.95 | 8.475 | 1.293 |
| 0.1 | 81 | 0.405 | 0.712 | 0.712 | 14.23 | 7.117 | 2.052 |
| 0.5 | 9 | 0.225 | 0.816 | 0.816 | 16.33 | 8.163 | 1.499 |
| 0.5 | 36 | 0.900 | 0.526 | 0.526 | 10.53 | 5.263 | 2.493 |
| 0.5 | 81 | 2.025 | 0.331 | 0.331 | 6.61 | 3.306 | 2.213 |
| 1.0 | 9 | 0.450 | 0.690 | 0.690 | 13.79 | 6.897 | 2.140 |
| 1.0 | 36 | 1.800 | 0.357 | 0.357 | 7.14 | 3.571 | 2.296 |
| 1.0 | 81 | 4.050 | 0.198 | 0.198 | 3.96 | 1.980 | 1.588 |
| base case r=0.5, s2=36: b* = 0.5263, surplus 5.263 | |||||||
| first best (r = 0): b = 1, surplus 10.000 | |||||||
| share of first best kept: 0.5263 | |||||||
| closed form equals grid optimum: True |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p11: the LEN linear contract and its optimal slope b*.
# Model (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987, in the textbook LEN form): monthly
# gross margin x = e + eps with eps ~ N(0, s2); pay w = a + b * x;
# effort cost c * e^2 / 2; the agent has CARA risk aversion r, so his
# certainty equivalent is a + b*e - c*e^2/2 - r*b^2*s2/2 and he picks
# e = b / c. Total certainty-equivalent surplus
# S(b) = e - c*e^2/2 - r*b^2*s2/2, maximised at b* = 1/(1 + r*c*s2).
# Units: thousand yuan of gross margin per month. All parameters are
# illustrative (示意), not estimates for any real programme.
import math
def surplus(b, r, c, s2):
e = b / c
return e - c * e * e / 2.0 - r * b * b * s2 / 2.0
def bstar(r, c, s2):
return 1.0 / (1.0 + r * c * s2)
def grid_best(r, c, s2):
# 逐千分位穷举 b,核对闭式解
ks = range(0, 1001)
k = max(ks, key=lambda k: surplus(k / 1000.0, r, c, s2))
return k / 1000.0
C = 0.05
print("LEN slope b* = 1/(1 + r c s2), c = 0.05 (illustrative)")
print(" r s2 rcs2 b* grid effort surplus premium")
for r in (0.1, 0.5, 1.0):
for s2 in (9.0, 36.0, 81.0):
b = bstar(r, C, s2)
g = grid_best(r, C, s2)
e = b / C
prem = r * b * b * s2 / 2.0
print("{:5.1f} {:6.0f} {:6.3f} {:6.3f} {:6.3f} {:7.2f} {:8.3f}"
" {:8.3f}".format(r, s2, r * C * s2, b, g, e,
surplus(b, r, C, s2), prem))
base = bstar(0.5, C, 36.0)
first = surplus(1.0, 0.0, C, 36.0)
print("base case r=0.5, s2=36: b* = {:.4f}, surplus {:.3f}".format(
base, surplus(base, 0.5, C, 36.0)))
print("first best (r = 0): b = 1, surplus {:.3f}".format(first))
print("share of first best kept: {:.4f}".format(
surplus(base, 0.5, C, 36.0) / first))
print("closed form equals grid optimum: {}".format(all(
math.isclose(round(bstar(r, C, s), 3), grid_best(r, C, s))
for r in (0.1, 0.5, 1.0) for s in (9.0, 36.0, 81.0))))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Linear Contracts: Cost, Risk and Noise Set the Optimal Commission Slope. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-279 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026279,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · Multitasking: a Second-Tier Slope Pushes Effort from Selling to Recruiting
- Chapter 3 · Referral Trees: Expected Size in a Branching Process and Saturation in a Finite Market
- Chapter 4 · Maximising Referrals: a Bonus Paid Once, Only for a Real Purchase
- Chapter 5 · The Compliance Boundary: Constrained Optimisation and a Screen for Commission Plans
- Chapter 6 · Estimating the Parameters and a Robust Slope: When Unsure, Err Low
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources: the Two Handles of the Han Feizi and Mackay's Crowds
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Compliance Review Sheet, the Commission Slope Calculator and Pre-Registered Tests