Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits: chapter answers

Operators of distribution networks often believe three things: more tiers and a higher second-tier commission sell more; copying competitors' commission rates is safest; and two tiers of commission sit inside the legal red line. This book refutes all three with principal-agent models. The optimal linear commission slope is set by effort cost, risk aversion and noise, and is 0.5263 in the illustrative base case; a second-tier commission paying uplines on downline results mainly buys recruiting, not real retail; and on the most conservative reading adopted here, paying an upline on downline res…

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-279 · 中文版

Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote