Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits: chapter answers
Operators of distribution networks often believe three things: more tiers and a higher second-tier commission sell more; copying competitors' commission rates is safest; and two tiers of commission sit inside the legal red line. This book refutes all three with principal-agent models. The optimal linear commission slope is set by effort cost, risk aversion and noise, and is 0.5263 in the illustrative base case; a second-tier commission paying uplines on downline results mainly buys recruiting, not real retail; and on the most conservative reading adopted here, paying an upline on downline res…
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-279 · 中文版
- Chapter 1 · Linear Contracts: Cost, Risk and Noise Set the Optimal Commission Slope
A linear contract splits a commission plan into incentive, insurance and measurement. With linear contracts, exponential utility and normal noise, the optimal slope is $1/(1+rc\sigma^2)$; in the base case it is 0.5263,… - Chapter 2 · Multitasking: a Second-Tier Slope Pushes Effort from Selling to Recruiting
Once the upline can move hours from selling to recruiting, the second-tier commission stops being a harmless pure override and becomes a hand that pushes effort towards recruiting. Under the illustrative parameters, rec… - Chapter 3 · Referral Trees: Expected Size in a Branching Process and Saturation in a Finite Market
Chapter 3 uses a branching process to show that referral chains extend on single-tier rewards, the first generation being only 0.4196 of new buyers within six generations, and that in a finite market the largest cohort… - Chapter 4 · Maximising Referrals: a Bonus Paid Once, Only for a Real Purchase
Chapter 4 finds a profit-maximising referral bonus of 158.5 yuan with 1.1543 referred buyers per seed customer; paid at order, 0.7376 of the bonus goes to fakers, while paid after the return window nobody fakes. - Chapter 5 · The Compliance Boundary: Constrained Optimisation and a Screen for Commission Plans
Chapter 5 writes the compliance boundary as constraints: when downline reports are mostly self-purchase and displacement, holding the boundary costs almost nothing, and when they are mostly real the cost is about 0.1104… - Chapter 6 · Estimating the Parameters and a Robust Slope: When Unsure, Err Low
Chapter 6 gives a minimax-regret slope of 0.4705 with a worst regret of 0.1010 under uncertain risk aversion. - Chapter 7 · Classical Sources: the Two Handles of the Han Feizi and Mackay's Crowds
Chapter 7 examines "The Two Handles" of the Han Feizi and Mackay's crowds: with the same budget, second-tier pay raises early joiners' share from 0.0650 to 0.1085, and with 6 recruits each the last tier holds 0.8333 of… - Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Compliance Review Sheet, the Commission Slope Calculator and Pre-Registered Tests
Chapter 8 gives the compliance review sheet, the Commission Slope Calculator and pre-registered tests needing 284 to 1135 sellers per group. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (17 pro…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote