关于「多任务:二级斜率把力气从卖货推向拉人」,《合规分销与佣金斜率》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:当上线可以把时间从卖货挪到拉人,二级佣金就不再是无害的纯抽成,而是一只把力气推向拉人的手。在示意参数下,二级斜率要超过一级斜率的五分之一,拉人才开始;二级斜率 0.3 时,每人每月多拉 2.03 人,报表毛利多 3.25 千元,真实毛利却少 0.20 千元。联合最优的二级斜率在下线报表的真实增量不超过一半时为零,只在真实增量很高时才为正,而这个增量恰恰最难核实。下线一层一层往下长,到底能长出多少人?最后一批加入的人又能拉到几个?下一章用分支过程与有限市场回答。
数据口径:最优的线性佣金斜率由努力成本、风险厌恶与噪音决定,示意基准下是 0.5263;给上线按下线业绩分成的二级佣金,主要买到的是拉人头而不是真实零售;按本书采用的最保守读法,以下线业绩给上线计酬本身落在 2005 年《禁止传销条例》列举的行为之内,合规方案的二级斜率应取零,转介绍改由只为真实购买、退货期满才发放的单层顾客推荐奖励来争取。 书中参数为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化法律、税务或理财建议,法规只述大意,以上架前人工复核的现行文本为准。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 0.20, 0.3, 2.03, 3.25
| b1 | 0.5263 on own margin; second-tier slope b2 varies |
| b2 own s recruit h recruits reported real rep/real surplus | |
| 0.00 | 10.53 0.00 0.00 10.53 10.53 1.000 5.263 |
| 0.10 | 10.53 0.00 0.00 10.53 10.53 1.000 5.103 |
| 0.15 | 10.34 0.93 0.47 11.27 10.48 1.076 4.836 |
| 0.20 | 10.13 1.97 0.99 12.10 10.43 1.161 4.431 |
| 0.30 | 9.71 4.06 2.03 13.77 10.32 1.334 3.225 |
| 0.40 | 9.30 6.14 3.07 15.44 10.22 1.511 1.491 |
| b2 | 0.3 vs 0: reported margin +3.25, real -0.20 |
| recruits per month 0.00 | 2.03; own selling 10.53 -> 9.71 |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 2. p21: a second-tier slope moves effort from selling to
# recruiting (multitask LEN, after Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991).
# Efforts: s (selling to end consumers), h (recruiting sellers).
# Own margin x1 = s + e1, Var 36; margin reported by recruits
# x2 = h + e2, Var 64 (thousand yuan a month). Of x2 only a share
# LAM = 0.5 is real end-consumer retail (the rest is self-purchase
# and stock loading) and THETA = 0.35 displaces sales that existing
# sellers would have made, so one unit of x2 is worth V2 = 0.15.
# Cost c*(s^2 + h^2)/2 + d*s*h with c = 0.05, d = 0.01 (the two tasks
# compete for the same hours). Pay w = a + b1*x1 + b2*x2; r = 0.5.
# A recruit reports 2 thousand yuan a month on average. Illustrative.
C, D, R = 0.05, 0.01, 0.5
S1, S2 = 36.0, 64.0
LAM, THETA = 0.5, 0.35
V2 = LAM - THETA
PER_RECRUIT = 2.0
def effort(b1, b2):
# 一阶条件 c*s + d*h = b1, d*s + c*h = b2;非负约束下取角点
det = C * C - D * D
s = (C * b1 - D * b2) / det
h = (C * b2 - D * b1) / det
if h < 0.0:
return b1 / C, 0.0
if s < 0.0:
return 0.0, b2 / C
return s, h
def cost(s, h):
return C * (s * s + h * h) / 2.0 + D * s * h
def surplus(b1, b2, v2=V2):
s, h = effort(b1, b2)
prem = R * (b1 * b1 * S1 + b2 * b2 * S2) / 2.0
return s + v2 * h - cost(s, h) - prem
B1 = 0.5263
print("b1 = {} on own margin; second-tier slope b2 varies".format(B1))
print(" b2 own s recruit h recruits reported real rep/real"
" surplus")
for b2 in (0.0, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4):
s, h = effort(B1, b2)
rep = s + h
real = s + V2 * h
print("{:5.2f} {:6.2f} {:10.2f} {:9.2f} {:9.2f} {:5.2f} {:9.3f}"
" {:8.3f}".format(b2, s, h, h / PER_RECRUIT, rep, real,
rep / real, surplus(B1, b2)))
s0, h0 = effort(B1, 0.0)
s3, h3 = effort(B1, 0.3)
print("b2 = 0.3 vs 0: reported margin {:+.2f}, real {:+.2f}".format(
(s3 + h3) - (s0 + h0), (s3 + V2 * h3) - (s0 + V2 * h0)))
print("recruits per month {:.2f} -> {:.2f}; own selling {:.2f} -> "
"{:.2f}".format(h0 / PER_RECRUIT, h3 / PER_RECRUIT, s0, s3))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《合规分销激励相容、二级佣金斜率委托代理模型与反传销层级红线内转介绍最大化母典》第 2 章「多任务:二级斜率把力气从卖货推向拉人」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-279 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026279,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Incentive-Compatible Compliant Referral Programmes: Commission Slopes in a Principal-Agent Model, a Second-Tier Slope of Zero and Maximal Referrals within Anti-Pyramid Limits},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}