What does VCG Auctions and Community Incentives conclude, in numbers, about “Practice and Pre-Registered Testing”?
Answer: Chapter 8 gives a four-step checklist and a pre-registered incentivised laboratory experiment: participants randomised to GSP or VCG position auctions, a single primary outcome (the share of rounds with truthful bids), a smallest effect of interest of 10 percentage points, 150 analysable and 168 randomised participants per arm for 90 % power, run by independent researchers, with the decision rule written as code. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's models and hypotheses; all data in the book are fictional or simulated.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's models and hypotheses; all data in the book are fictional or simulated.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 10, 150, 168
| total sd of a participant's share: GSP 0.2582, VCG 0.2608 | |
| normal approximation | 142 analysable participants per arm (284 in all) |
| simulated power (beta-binomial, Welch-type z test, 1,500 trials) | 0.891 (MC s.e. 0.008) |
| simulated false-positive rate at no effect | 0.024 (one-sided, nominal 0.025) |
| planned: round up to 150 analysable per arm; simulated power 0.913 | |
| allowing 10 % non-completion: randomise 168 per arm, 336 in all | |
| sensitivity, analysable per arm SESOI | 0.08 0.10 0.12 |
| sd of individual shares 0.20 | 150 96 67 |
| sd of individual shares 0.25 | 221 142 99 |
| sd of individual shares 0.30 | 309 198 138 |
| GSP mean 0.40 instead of 0.25, sd 0.25 | 226 145 101 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 8. Sample size for the pre-registered laboratory experiment. Participants are
# randomised individually to GSP or VCG position auctions (2 slots, 2 computer rivals
# whose bidding rule is disclosed), 30 scored rounds with fresh induced values.
# Primary outcome per participant: share of scored rounds with |bid - value| <= 5 % of
# value. Effect = mean share (VCG) - mean share (GSP). Planning assumptions (NOT data):
# GSP mean 0.25; SESOI 0.10; individual true shares vary with sd 0.25 (beta
# distributed); binomial noise over 30 rounds on top. Two-sided alpha 0.05, power 90 %.
import math, random, statistics
Z = statistics.NormalDist().inv_cdf
ROUNDS = 30
def total_sd(m, sd):
within = (m * (1 - m) - sd ** 2) / ROUNDS # E[p(1-p)] / rounds
return math.sqrt(sd ** 2 + within)
def n_per_arm(m0, delta, sd):
s0, s1 = total_sd(m0, sd), total_sd(m0 + delta, sd)
return math.ceil((Z(0.975) + Z(0.90)) ** 2 * (s0 ** 2 + s1 ** 2) / delta ** 2)
def beta_params(m, sd):
k = m * (1 - m) / sd ** 2 - 1
return m * k, (1 - m) * k
def simulate(n, m0, delta, sd, reps, rng):
hits = 0
for _ in range(reps):
arms = []
for m in (m0, m0 + delta):
a, b = beta_params(m, sd); ys = []
for _ in range(n):
p = rng.betavariate(a, b)
ys.append(sum(rng.random() < p for _ in range(ROUNDS)) / ROUNDS)
arms.append(ys)
d = statistics.fmean(arms[1]) - statistics.fmean(arms[0])
se = math.sqrt((statistics.variance(arms[0]) + statistics.variance(arms[1])) / n)
hits += d - Z(0.975) * se > 0
return hits / reps
if __name__ == "__main__":
m0, delta, sd = 0.25, 0.10, 0.25
n = n_per_arm(m0, delta, sd)
print(f"total sd of a participant's share: GSP {total_sd(m0, sd):.4f},"
f" VCG {total_sd(m0 + delta, sd):.4f}")
print(f"normal approximation: {n} analysable participants per arm ({2 * n} in all)")
rng = random.Random(50)
pw = simulate(n, m0, delta, sd, 1500, rng)
print(f"simulated power (beta-binomial, Welch-type z test, 1,500 trials): {pw:.3f}"
f" (MC s.e. {math.sqrt(pw * (1 - pw) / 1500):.3f})")
print(f"simulated false-positive rate at no effect: "
f"{simulate(n, m0 + 0.05, 0.0, sd, 1500, rng):.3f} (one-sided, nominal 0.025)")
plan = math.ceil(n / 10) * 10
pw2 = simulate(plan, m0, delta, sd, 1500, rng)
print(f"planned: round up to {plan} analysable per arm; simulated power {pw2:.3f}")
rec = math.ceil(plan / 0.9 / 2) * 2
print(f"allowing 10 % non-completion: randomise {rec} per arm, {2 * rec} in all")
print("sensitivity, analysable per arm SESOI: 0.08 0.10 0.12")
for s in (0.20, 0.25, 0.30):
print(f" sd of individual shares {s:.2f} " +
"".join(f"{n_per_arm(m0, d, s):8d}" for d in (0.08, 0.10, 0.12)))
print(f" GSP mean 0.40 instead of 0.25, sd 0.25 " +
"".join(f"{n_per_arm(0.40, d, 0.25):8d}" for d in (0.08, 0.10, 0.12)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Mechanism Design, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auctions and Incentive-Compatible Community Engineering (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 8: Practice and Pre-Registered Testing. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836274
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23836274 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-050 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026050,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Mechanism Design, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auctions and Incentive-Compatible Community Engineering},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23836274},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836274}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Revelation Principle, Incentive Compatibility and Commitment
- Chapter 2 · Multi-Item VCG: Pricing Externalities, the Core and False-Name Bids
- Chapter 3 · Position Auctions: Equilibria of the Generalized Second-Price Auction and VCG
- Chapter 4 · Myerson's Optimal Auction: Virtual Values, Reserve Prices and Ironing
- Chapter 5 · Impossibility: Hurwicz, Green–Laffont and Roberts
- Chapter 6 · Community Incentives: Points Inflation, Badges and Sybil Attacks
- Chapter 7 · Reading the Classics: One Reward, Settled Shares and "Rewards Reliable, Punishments Certain"