Mechanism Design, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auctions and Incentive-Compatible Community Engineering: chapter answers
How can a rule get every participant to tell the truth, to put in effort and not to cheat? This fiftieth book of 5D Library uses mechanism design to examine auctions, advertising auctions and the points, badges and reputation rules of online communities, and separates what can be proved, what needs qualifying and the author's own models. The Vickrey second-price auction, revenue equivalence, the Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem and the Clarke pivot mechanism, treated in Book 27, are only recapped. The book covers the dominant-strategy and Bayesian versions of the revelation principle with proofs…
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23836274 · Read the monograph · 中文版
- Chapter 1 · The Revelation Principle, Incentive Compatibility and Commitment
The revelation principle says that the equilibrium outcome of any mechanism can be obtained from a direct mechanism in which people report truthfully; the proofs of the dominant-strategy and Bayesian versions both "load… - Chapter 2 · Multi-Item VCG: Pricing Externalities, the Core and False-Name Bids
VCG makes each person pay the externality he imposes on the others and thereby makes truth-telling a dominant strategy; the package auction in the program confirms this. But its revenue can fall below the core, giving t… - Chapter 3 · Position Auctions: Equilibria of the Generalized Second-Price Auction and VCG
In position auctions GSP charges the next bid and looks like a second-price auction, but truth-telling is generally not an equilibrium: in the example, the top bidder raises his payoff from 200 to 300 by dropping to slo… - Chapter 4 · Myerson's Optimal Auction: Virtual Values, Reserve Prices and Ironing
Myerson's lemma reduces incentive compatibility to "monotone allocation plus utility given by the envelope formula", which yields "expected revenue = expected virtual surplus". For regular distributions the optimal auct… - Chapter 5 · Impossibility: Hurwicz, Green–Laffont and Roberts
Hurwicz's 1972 impossibility is a precise statement about two-person exchange economies: truth-telling, efficiency and individual rationality cannot all hold; in the program the Walrasian mechanism, no trade and dictato… - Chapter 6 · Community Incentives: Points Inflation, Badges and Sybil Attacks
Points are a community currency: in the author's model, when issuance grows with membership and rewards do not, points lose value at the rate of membership growth (4.00 % a month in the example); expiry lowers the level… - Chapter 7 · Reading the Classics: One Reward, Settled Shares and "Rewards Reliable, Punishments Certain"
What the "Rewards and Punishments" chapter of the Book of Lord Shang says is "one reward, one punishment, one teaching": rewards come only from military merit, punishment knows no ranks and merit does not offset faults,… - Chapter 8 · Practice and Pre-Registered Testing
Chapter 8 gives a four-step checklist and a pre-registered incentivised laboratory experiment: participants randomised to GSP or VCG position auctions, a single primary outcome (the share of rounds with truthful bids),…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote