Mechanism Design, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auctions and Incentive-Compatible Community Engineering: chapter answers

How can a rule get every participant to tell the truth, to put in effort and not to cheat? This fiftieth book of 5D Library uses mechanism design to examine auctions, advertising auctions and the points, badges and reputation rules of online communities, and separates what can be proved, what needs qualifying and the author's own models. The Vickrey second-price auction, revenue equivalence, the Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem and the Clarke pivot mechanism, treated in Book 27, are only recapped. The book covers the dominant-strategy and Bayesian versions of the revelation principle with proofs…

DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23836274 · Read the monograph · 中文版

Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote