What does VCG Auctions and Community Incentives conclude, in numbers, about “The Revelation Principle, Incentive Compatibility and Commitment”?
Answer: The revelation principle says that the equilibrium outcome of any mechanism can be obtained from a direct mechanism in which people report truthfully; the proofs of the dominant-strategy and Bayesian versions both "load" the equilibrium strategies into the machine. It lets mechanism design study only incentive-compatible direct mechanisms, but it does not make the equilibrium unique, relies on the designer's ability to commit, asks for complete types, and does not ensure that participants can see the dominant strategy. The program shows that the direct mechanism built from a first-price auction is only Bayesian incentive compatible, and that a seller who cannot commit not to cut her price earns, with many periods and cheap waiting, only a small part of the commitment revenue (18.2 % with \(d = 0.99\) and 1,000 periods).
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's models and hypotheses; all data in the book are fictional or simulated.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.99, 1000, 18.2
| (A) Bayesian IC: largest gap, best report vs true value | 0.000 |
| ex post, value 0.8, rival report 0.3: truth earns 0.400; report 0.301 earns 0.650 | |
| (B) two periods, d | 0.9: grid cutoff 0.846; closed form (2-d)/(4-3d) = 0.8462 |
| revenue without commitment (commitment | 0.2500 for every d and T) |
| periods T | 1 2 5 20 100 1000 |
| d | 0.5 0.2500 0.2250 0.2084 0.2071 0.2071 0.2071 |
| d | 0.9 0.2500 0.2327 0.1926 0.1269 0.1201 0.1201 |
| d | 0.99 0.2500 0.2476 0.2405 0.2084 0.1028 0.0455 |
| d | 0.99, T = 1000: first price 0.0909, revenue 18.2% of the commitment value |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. (A) The Bayesian revelation principle, checked on a grid: take the
# first-price auction with two bidders, values i.i.d. U[0,1], whose Bayes-Nash
# equilibrium is b(v) = v/2 (Book 27). The "direct" mechanism composes the strategy with
# the auction: report r, highest report wins and pays r/2. Truth is optimal in
# expectation (Bayesian IC) but NOT a dominant strategy: against a known rival report,
# shading pays. (B) Commitment: one buyer, v ~ U[0,1], T selling periods, discount d.
# With commitment the seller posts p = 1/2 once (revenue 1/4, Myerson / Riley-Zeckhauser).
# Without commitment she re-prices after each refusal and the buyer anticipates it (the
# Coase problem). Backward induction: with remaining types [0, k], continuation revenue
# is c_t k^2 and the price a_t k; type kappa is indifferent between buying now and next
# period: kappa - p = d (kappa - a_{t+1} kappa).
G = [i / 1000 for i in range(1001)]
def bayes_utility(v, r): # P(win) = P(rival value < r) = r; pay r/2 if win
return r * (v - r / 2)
def expost_utility(v, r, rival_report):
return (v - r / 2) if r > rival_report else 0.0
def no_commitment(d, T):
a, c = 0.5, 0.25 # last period: price k/2, revenue k^2/4
for _ in range(T - 1):
m = 1 - d + d * a # p = m * kappa keeps type kappa indifferent
s = m / (2 * m - 2 * d * c) # optimal new cutoff kappa = s k
a, c = m * s, m * s * (1 - s) + d * c * s * s
return c, a # revenue from k = 1, first-period price
if __name__ == "__main__":
worst = max(abs(max(G, key=lambda r: bayes_utility(v, r)) - v) for v in G[::10])
print(f"(A) Bayesian IC: largest gap, best report vs true value = {worst:.3f}")
v, rival = 0.80, 0.30
best = max(G, key=lambda r: expost_utility(v, r, rival))
print(f" ex post, value {v}, rival report {rival}: truth earns"
f" {expost_utility(v, v, rival):.3f}; report {best:.3f} earns"
f" {expost_utility(v, best, rival):.3f}")
k2 = max(G, key=lambda k: k * (1 - 0.9 / 2) * (1 - k) + 0.9 * (k / 2) ** 2)
print(f"(B) two periods, d = 0.9: grid cutoff {k2:.3f}; closed form (2-d)/(4-3d)"
f" = {(2 - 0.9) / (4 - 3 * 0.9):.4f}")
print(" revenue without commitment (commitment: 0.2500 for every d and T)")
print(" periods T: 1 2 5 20 100 1000")
for d in (0.5, 0.9, 0.99):
row = [no_commitment(d, T) for T in (1, 2, 5, 20, 100, 1000)]
print(f" d = {d:<5}" + "".join(f"{c:8.4f}" for c, _ in row))
c, a = no_commitment(0.99, 1000)
print(f" d = 0.99, T = 1000: first price {a:.4f}, revenue {c / 0.25:.1%}"
" of the commitment value")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Mechanism Design, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auctions and Incentive-Compatible Community Engineering (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: The Revelation Principle, Incentive Compatibility and Commitment. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836274
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23836274 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-050 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026050,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Mechanism Design, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auctions and Incentive-Compatible Community Engineering},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23836274},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836274}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · Multi-Item VCG: Pricing Externalities, the Core and False-Name Bids
- Chapter 3 · Position Auctions: Equilibria of the Generalized Second-Price Auction and VCG
- Chapter 4 · Myerson's Optimal Auction: Virtual Values, Reserve Prices and Ironing
- Chapter 5 · Impossibility: Hurwicz, Green–Laffont and Roberts
- Chapter 6 · Community Incentives: Points Inflation, Badges and Sybil Attacks
- Chapter 7 · Reading the Classics: One Reward, Settled Shares and "Rewards Reliable, Punishments Certain"
- Chapter 8 · Practice and Pre-Registered Testing