What does VCG Auctions and Community Incentives conclude, in numbers, about “Myerson's Optimal Auction: Virtual Values, Reserve Prices and Ironing”?

Answer: Myerson's lemma reduces incentive compatibility to "monotone allocation plus utility given by the envelope formula", which yields "expected revenue = expected virtual surplus". For regular distributions the optimal auction is a second-price auction with reserve \(\psi^{-1}(0)\), independent of the number of bidders (0.5 for the uniform, 1 for the exponential); the gain from the reserve shrinks quickly with more bidders, and the Bulow–Klemperer theorem says one more bidder beats the optimal reserve. Non-regular distributions require ironing: in the program's example the optimal auction earns 1.4–3.3 % more than a second-price auction with the best reserve, and allocating by raw virtual values is not monotone and cannot be implemented.

Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's models and hypotheses; all data in the book are fictional or simulated.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.5

uniform[0,1]: psi increasing on the grid: True; optimal reserve 0.5000
nR_n(0)R_n(r*)gainR_n+1(0)Bulow-Klemperer holds
10.00000.2500n/a0.3333True
20.33330.416725.0%0.5000True
30.50000.53126.2%0.6000True
40.60000.61252.1%0.6667True
50.66670.67190.8%0.7143True
exponential(1): psi increasing on the grid: True; optimal reserve 1.0000
nR_n(0)R_n(r*)gainR_n+1(0)Bulow-Klemperer holds
10.00000.3679n/a0.5000True
20.50000.668133.6%0.8333True
30.83330.917210.1%1.0833True
41.08331.12734.1%1.2833True
51.28331.30711.9%1.4500True
lognormal(0,.5): psi increasing on the grid: True; optimal reserve 0.7719
nR_n(0)R_n(r*)gainR_n+1(0)Bulow-Klemperer holds
10.00000.5386n/a0.8200True
20.82000.85544.3%1.0577True
31.05771.06430.6%1.2139True
41.21391.21540.1%1.3322True
51.33221.33260.0%1.4280True
Monte Carlo, uniform, n = 2, reserve 0.5: 0.4166 (exact 5/12 = 0.4167)

Key formula

\[E[U_i(v_i)] = U_i(\underline v) + \int_{\underline v}^{\bar v} (1 - F(s))\,Q_i(s)\,ds = U_i(\underline v) + E\Big[\tfrac{1-F(v_i)}{f(v_i)}\,Q_i(v_i)\Big],\]
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. Myerson (1981) for regular distributions. Virtual value
# psi(v) = v - (1 - F(v)) / f(v); expected revenue = expected virtual surplus; with
# i.i.d. regular bidders the optimal auction is a second-price auction with reserve
# r* = psi^-1(0), whatever the number of bidders. Revenue of a second-price auction with
# reserve r and n bidders: R_n(r) = integral_r^inf psi(v) n F(v)^(n-1) f(v) dv.
# Bulow-Klemperer (1996): R_{n+1}(0) >= R_n(r*) for regular distributions.
import math, random, statistics

LN = statistics.NormalDist(0.0, 0.5)              # log-value of the lognormal
DISTS = {
    "uniform[0,1]":   (lambda v: v, lambda v: 1.0, 0.0, 1.0),
    "exponential(1)": (lambda v: 1 - math.exp(-v), lambda v: math.exp(-v), 0.0, 25.0),
    "lognormal(0,.5)": (lambda v: LN.cdf(math.log(v)),
                        lambda v: LN.pdf(math.log(v)) / v, 1e-6, math.exp(4.0)),
}

def psi(F, f, v):
    return v - (1 - F(v)) / f(v)

def simpson(g, a, b, m=4000):
    h = (b - a) / m
    s = g(a) + g(b) + math.fsum((4 if k % 2 else 2) * g(a + k * h)
                                for k in range(1, m))
    return s * h / 3

def revenue(F, f, hi, n, r, lo):
    return simpson(lambda v: psi(F, f, v) * n * F(v) ** (n - 1) * f(v), max(r, lo), hi)

def reserve(F, f, lo, hi):
    a, b = lo + 1e-9, hi
    for _ in range(100):                          # bisection on psi(v) = 0
        m = (a + b) / 2
        a, b = (m, b) if psi(F, f, m) < 0 else (a, m)
    return (a + b) / 2

if __name__ == "__main__":
    for name, (F, f, lo, hi) in DISTS.items():
        xs = [lo + (hi - lo) * k / 400 for k in range(1, 400)]
        xs = [x for x in xs if F(x) < 0.999999]
        mono = all(psi(F, f, a) <= psi(F, f, b) + 1e-12 for a, b in zip(xs, xs[1:]))
        r = reserve(F, f, lo, hi)
        print(f"{name}: psi increasing on the grid: {mono}; optimal reserve {r:.4f}")
        print("   n   R_n(0)   R_n(r*)   gain   R_n+1(0)  Bulow-Klemperer holds")
        for n in range(1, 6):
            r0, rs = revenue(F, f, hi, n, 0.0, lo), revenue(F, f, hi, n, r, lo)
            r1 = revenue(F, f, hi, n + 1, 0.0, lo)
            g = f"{rs / r0 - 1:6.1%}" if r0 > 1e-6 else "   n/a"
            print(f"   {n}  {abs(r0):7.4f}  {rs:8.4f}  {g}  {r1:8.4f}  {r1 >= rs - 1e-9}")
    rng = random.Random(1981); tot = 0.0; N = 200000
    for _ in range(N):
        a, b = sorted((rng.random(), rng.random()))
        tot += max(a, 0.5) if b >= 0.5 else 0.0
    print(f"Monte Carlo, uniform, n = 2, reserve 0.5: {tot / N:.4f} (exact 5/12 ="
          f" {5 / 12:.4f})")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Mechanism Design, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auctions and Incentive-Compatible Community Engineering (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: Myerson's Optimal Auction: Virtual Values, Reserve Prices and Ironing. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836274

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23836274 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-050 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026050,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Mechanism Design, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auctions and Incentive-Compatible Community Engineering},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23836274},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836274}
}

Other chapter answers in this book