关于「迈尔森最优拍卖:虚拟估值、保留价与熨平」,《VCG 拍卖与社群激励》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:迈尔森引理把激励相容化为「分配单调 + 效用由包络公式决定」,由此得到「期望收入 = 期望虚拟剩余」。分布正则时,最优拍卖是保留价为 \(\psi^{-1}(0)\) 的二价拍卖,保留价与人数无关(均匀分布 0.5、指数分布 1);保留价的增益随人数迅速变小,而布洛—克伦佩雷尔定理说多一名出价者胜过最优保留价。分布非正则时要熨平:程序中的例子里,最优拍卖比最佳保留价的二价拍卖多收 1.4%—3.3%,而按原始虚拟估值分配的规则不单调、不可实施。
数据口径:书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(16 段程序)、原典与作者的模型和假说;书中所有数据都是虚构或模拟的。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.5
| uniform[0,1]: psi increasing on the grid: True; optimal reserve 0.5000 | |||||
| n | R_n(0) | R_n(r*) | gain | R_n+1(0) | Bulow-Klemperer holds |
| 1 | 0.0000 | 0.2500 | n/a | 0.3333 | True |
| 2 | 0.3333 | 0.4167 | 25.0% | 0.5000 | True |
| 3 | 0.5000 | 0.5312 | 6.2% | 0.6000 | True |
| 4 | 0.6000 | 0.6125 | 2.1% | 0.6667 | True |
| 5 | 0.6667 | 0.6719 | 0.8% | 0.7143 | True |
| exponential(1): psi increasing on the grid: True; optimal reserve 1.0000 | |||||
| n | R_n(0) | R_n(r*) | gain | R_n+1(0) | Bulow-Klemperer holds |
| 1 | 0.0000 | 0.3679 | n/a | 0.5000 | True |
| 2 | 0.5000 | 0.6681 | 33.6% | 0.8333 | True |
| 3 | 0.8333 | 0.9172 | 10.1% | 1.0833 | True |
| 4 | 1.0833 | 1.1273 | 4.1% | 1.2833 | True |
| 5 | 1.2833 | 1.3071 | 1.9% | 1.4500 | True |
| lognormal(0,.5): psi increasing on the grid: True; optimal reserve 0.7719 | |||||
| n | R_n(0) | R_n(r*) | gain | R_n+1(0) | Bulow-Klemperer holds |
| 1 | 0.0000 | 0.5386 | n/a | 0.8200 | True |
| 2 | 0.8200 | 0.8554 | 4.3% | 1.0577 | True |
| 3 | 1.0577 | 1.0643 | 0.6% | 1.2139 | True |
| 4 | 1.2139 | 1.2154 | 0.1% | 1.3322 | True |
| 5 | 1.3322 | 1.3326 | 0.0% | 1.4280 | True |
| Monte Carlo, uniform, n = 2, reserve 0.5: 0.4166 (exact 5/12 = 0.4167) |
核心公式
\[E[U_i(v_i)] = U_i(\underline v) + \int_{\underline v}^{\bar v} (1 - F(s))\,Q_i(s)\,ds = U_i(\underline v) + E\Big[\tfrac{1-F(v_i)}{f(v_i)}\,Q_i(v_i)\Big],\]
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 4. Myerson (1981) for regular distributions. Virtual value
# psi(v) = v - (1 - F(v)) / f(v); expected revenue = expected virtual surplus; with
# i.i.d. regular bidders the optimal auction is a second-price auction with reserve
# r* = psi^-1(0), whatever the number of bidders. Revenue of a second-price auction with
# reserve r and n bidders: R_n(r) = integral_r^inf psi(v) n F(v)^(n-1) f(v) dv.
# Bulow-Klemperer (1996): R_{n+1}(0) >= R_n(r*) for regular distributions.
import math, random, statistics
LN = statistics.NormalDist(0.0, 0.5) # log-value of the lognormal
DISTS = {
"uniform[0,1]": (lambda v: v, lambda v: 1.0, 0.0, 1.0),
"exponential(1)": (lambda v: 1 - math.exp(-v), lambda v: math.exp(-v), 0.0, 25.0),
"lognormal(0,.5)": (lambda v: LN.cdf(math.log(v)),
lambda v: LN.pdf(math.log(v)) / v, 1e-6, math.exp(4.0)),
}
def psi(F, f, v):
return v - (1 - F(v)) / f(v)
def simpson(g, a, b, m=4000):
h = (b - a) / m
s = g(a) + g(b) + math.fsum((4 if k % 2 else 2) * g(a + k * h)
for k in range(1, m))
return s * h / 3
def revenue(F, f, hi, n, r, lo):
return simpson(lambda v: psi(F, f, v) * n * F(v) ** (n - 1) * f(v), max(r, lo), hi)
def reserve(F, f, lo, hi):
a, b = lo + 1e-9, hi
for _ in range(100): # bisection on psi(v) = 0
m = (a + b) / 2
a, b = (m, b) if psi(F, f, m) < 0 else (a, m)
return (a + b) / 2
if __name__ == "__main__":
for name, (F, f, lo, hi) in DISTS.items():
xs = [lo + (hi - lo) * k / 400 for k in range(1, 400)]
xs = [x for x in xs if F(x) < 0.999999]
mono = all(psi(F, f, a) <= psi(F, f, b) + 1e-12 for a, b in zip(xs, xs[1:]))
r = reserve(F, f, lo, hi)
print(f"{name}: psi increasing on the grid: {mono}; optimal reserve {r:.4f}")
print(" n R_n(0) R_n(r*) gain R_n+1(0) Bulow-Klemperer holds")
for n in range(1, 6):
r0, rs = revenue(F, f, hi, n, 0.0, lo), revenue(F, f, hi, n, r, lo)
r1 = revenue(F, f, hi, n + 1, 0.0, lo)
g = f"{rs / r0 - 1:6.1%}" if r0 > 1e-6 else " n/a"
print(f" {n} {abs(r0):7.4f} {rs:8.4f} {g} {r1:8.4f} {r1 >= rs - 1e-9}")
rng = random.Random(1981); tot = 0.0; N = 200000
for _ in range(N):
a, b = sorted((rng.random(), rng.random()))
tot += max(a, 0.5) if b >= 0.5 else 0.0
print(f"Monte Carlo, uniform, n = 2, reserve 0.5: {tot / N:.4f} (exact 5/12 ="
f" {5 / 12:.4f})")唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《机制设计、维克里—克拉克—格罗夫斯(VCG)拍卖与数字社群激励相容工程》第 4 章「迈尔森最优拍卖:虚拟估值、保留价与熨平」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836274
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23836274 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-050 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026050,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Mechanism Design, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auctions and Incentive-Compatible Community Engineering},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23836274},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836274}
}