关于「迈尔森最优拍卖:虚拟估值、保留价与熨平」,《VCG 拍卖与社群激励》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:迈尔森引理把激励相容化为「分配单调 + 效用由包络公式决定」,由此得到「期望收入 = 期望虚拟剩余」。分布正则时,最优拍卖是保留价为 \(\psi^{-1}(0)\) 的二价拍卖,保留价与人数无关(均匀分布 0.5、指数分布 1);保留价的增益随人数迅速变小,而布洛—克伦佩雷尔定理说多一名出价者胜过最优保留价。分布非正则时要熨平:程序中的例子里,最优拍卖比最佳保留价的二价拍卖多收 1.4%—3.3%,而按原始虚拟估值分配的规则不单调、不可实施。

数据口径:书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(16 段程序)、原典与作者的模型和假说;书中所有数据都是虚构或模拟的。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.5

uniform[0,1]: psi increasing on the grid: True; optimal reserve 0.5000
nR_n(0)R_n(r*)gainR_n+1(0)Bulow-Klemperer holds
10.00000.2500n/a0.3333True
20.33330.416725.0%0.5000True
30.50000.53126.2%0.6000True
40.60000.61252.1%0.6667True
50.66670.67190.8%0.7143True
exponential(1): psi increasing on the grid: True; optimal reserve 1.0000
nR_n(0)R_n(r*)gainR_n+1(0)Bulow-Klemperer holds
10.00000.3679n/a0.5000True
20.50000.668133.6%0.8333True
30.83330.917210.1%1.0833True
41.08331.12734.1%1.2833True
51.28331.30711.9%1.4500True
lognormal(0,.5): psi increasing on the grid: True; optimal reserve 0.7719
nR_n(0)R_n(r*)gainR_n+1(0)Bulow-Klemperer holds
10.00000.5386n/a0.8200True
20.82000.85544.3%1.0577True
31.05771.06430.6%1.2139True
41.21391.21540.1%1.3322True
51.33221.33260.0%1.4280True
Monte Carlo, uniform, n = 2, reserve 0.5: 0.4166 (exact 5/12 = 0.4167)

核心公式

\[E[U_i(v_i)] = U_i(\underline v) + \int_{\underline v}^{\bar v} (1 - F(s))\,Q_i(s)\,ds = U_i(\underline v) + E\Big[\tfrac{1-F(v_i)}{f(v_i)}\,Q_i(v_i)\Big],\]
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 4. Myerson (1981) for regular distributions. Virtual value
# psi(v) = v - (1 - F(v)) / f(v); expected revenue = expected virtual surplus; with
# i.i.d. regular bidders the optimal auction is a second-price auction with reserve
# r* = psi^-1(0), whatever the number of bidders. Revenue of a second-price auction with
# reserve r and n bidders: R_n(r) = integral_r^inf psi(v) n F(v)^(n-1) f(v) dv.
# Bulow-Klemperer (1996): R_{n+1}(0) >= R_n(r*) for regular distributions.
import math, random, statistics

LN = statistics.NormalDist(0.0, 0.5)              # log-value of the lognormal
DISTS = {
    "uniform[0,1]":   (lambda v: v, lambda v: 1.0, 0.0, 1.0),
    "exponential(1)": (lambda v: 1 - math.exp(-v), lambda v: math.exp(-v), 0.0, 25.0),
    "lognormal(0,.5)": (lambda v: LN.cdf(math.log(v)),
                        lambda v: LN.pdf(math.log(v)) / v, 1e-6, math.exp(4.0)),
}

def psi(F, f, v):
    return v - (1 - F(v)) / f(v)

def simpson(g, a, b, m=4000):
    h = (b - a) / m
    s = g(a) + g(b) + math.fsum((4 if k % 2 else 2) * g(a + k * h)
                                for k in range(1, m))
    return s * h / 3

def revenue(F, f, hi, n, r, lo):
    return simpson(lambda v: psi(F, f, v) * n * F(v) ** (n - 1) * f(v), max(r, lo), hi)

def reserve(F, f, lo, hi):
    a, b = lo + 1e-9, hi
    for _ in range(100):                          # bisection on psi(v) = 0
        m = (a + b) / 2
        a, b = (m, b) if psi(F, f, m) < 0 else (a, m)
    return (a + b) / 2

if __name__ == "__main__":
    for name, (F, f, lo, hi) in DISTS.items():
        xs = [lo + (hi - lo) * k / 400 for k in range(1, 400)]
        xs = [x for x in xs if F(x) < 0.999999]
        mono = all(psi(F, f, a) <= psi(F, f, b) + 1e-12 for a, b in zip(xs, xs[1:]))
        r = reserve(F, f, lo, hi)
        print(f"{name}: psi increasing on the grid: {mono}; optimal reserve {r:.4f}")
        print("   n   R_n(0)   R_n(r*)   gain   R_n+1(0)  Bulow-Klemperer holds")
        for n in range(1, 6):
            r0, rs = revenue(F, f, hi, n, 0.0, lo), revenue(F, f, hi, n, r, lo)
            r1 = revenue(F, f, hi, n + 1, 0.0, lo)
            g = f"{rs / r0 - 1:6.1%}" if r0 > 1e-6 else "   n/a"
            print(f"   {n}  {abs(r0):7.4f}  {rs:8.4f}  {g}  {r1:8.4f}  {r1 >= rs - 1e-9}")
    rng = random.Random(1981); tot = 0.0; N = 200000
    for _ in range(N):
        a, b = sorted((rng.random(), rng.random()))
        tot += max(a, 0.5) if b >= 0.5 else 0.0
    print(f"Monte Carlo, uniform, n = 2, reserve 0.5: {tot / N:.4f} (exact 5/12 ="
          f" {5 / 12:.4f})")

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《机制设计、维克里—克拉克—格罗夫斯(VCG)拍卖与数字社群激励相容工程》第 4 章「迈尔森最优拍卖:虚拟估值、保留价与熨平」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836274

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23836274 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-050 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026050,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Mechanism Design, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auctions and Incentive-Compatible Community Engineering},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23836274},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836274}
}

本书其他章节结论