关于「实践与预注册检验」,《VCG 拍卖与社群激励》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第八章给出四步核查表与一项预注册的激励化实验室实验:随机分配到 GSP 或 VCG 广告位拍卖,唯一主要结局为如实出价轮次的比例,最小关注效应 10 个百分点,90% 把握度每组可分析 150 人、随机化 168 人,由独立研究人员实施,判定规则写成代码。书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(16 段程序)、原典与作者的模型和假说;书中所有数据都是虚构或模拟的。

数据口径:书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(16 段程序)、原典与作者的模型和假说;书中所有数据都是虚构或模拟的。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 10, 150, 168

total sd of a participant's share: GSP 0.2582, VCG 0.2608
normal approximation142 analysable participants per arm (284 in all)
simulated power (beta-binomial, Welch-type z test, 1,500 trials)0.891 (MC s.e. 0.008)
simulated false-positive rate at no effect0.024 (one-sided, nominal 0.025)
planned: round up to 150 analysable per arm; simulated power 0.913
allowing 10 % non-completion: randomise 168 per arm, 336 in all
sensitivity, analysable per arm SESOI0.08 0.10 0.12
sd of individual shares 0.20150 96 67
sd of individual shares 0.25221 142 99
sd of individual shares 0.30309 198 138
GSP mean 0.40 instead of 0.25, sd 0.25226 145 101
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 8. Sample size for the pre-registered laboratory experiment. Participants are
# randomised individually to GSP or VCG position auctions (2 slots, 2 computer rivals
# whose bidding rule is disclosed), 30 scored rounds with fresh induced values.
# Primary outcome per participant: share of scored rounds with |bid - value| <= 5 % of
# value. Effect = mean share (VCG) - mean share (GSP). Planning assumptions (NOT data):
# GSP mean 0.25; SESOI 0.10; individual true shares vary with sd 0.25 (beta
# distributed); binomial noise over 30 rounds on top. Two-sided alpha 0.05, power 90 %.
import math, random, statistics

Z = statistics.NormalDist().inv_cdf
ROUNDS = 30

def total_sd(m, sd):
    within = (m * (1 - m) - sd ** 2) / ROUNDS          # E[p(1-p)] / rounds
    return math.sqrt(sd ** 2 + within)

def n_per_arm(m0, delta, sd):
    s0, s1 = total_sd(m0, sd), total_sd(m0 + delta, sd)
    return math.ceil((Z(0.975) + Z(0.90)) ** 2 * (s0 ** 2 + s1 ** 2) / delta ** 2)

def beta_params(m, sd):
    k = m * (1 - m) / sd ** 2 - 1
    return m * k, (1 - m) * k

def simulate(n, m0, delta, sd, reps, rng):
    hits = 0
    for _ in range(reps):
        arms = []
        for m in (m0, m0 + delta):
            a, b = beta_params(m, sd); ys = []
            for _ in range(n):
                p = rng.betavariate(a, b)
                ys.append(sum(rng.random() < p for _ in range(ROUNDS)) / ROUNDS)
            arms.append(ys)
        d = statistics.fmean(arms[1]) - statistics.fmean(arms[0])
        se = math.sqrt((statistics.variance(arms[0]) + statistics.variance(arms[1])) / n)
        hits += d - Z(0.975) * se > 0
    return hits / reps

if __name__ == "__main__":
    m0, delta, sd = 0.25, 0.10, 0.25
    n = n_per_arm(m0, delta, sd)
    print(f"total sd of a participant's share: GSP {total_sd(m0, sd):.4f},"
          f" VCG {total_sd(m0 + delta, sd):.4f}")
    print(f"normal approximation: {n} analysable participants per arm ({2 * n} in all)")
    rng = random.Random(50)
    pw = simulate(n, m0, delta, sd, 1500, rng)
    print(f"simulated power (beta-binomial, Welch-type z test, 1,500 trials): {pw:.3f}"
          f" (MC s.e. {math.sqrt(pw * (1 - pw) / 1500):.3f})")
    print(f"simulated false-positive rate at no effect: "
          f"{simulate(n, m0 + 0.05, 0.0, sd, 1500, rng):.3f} (one-sided, nominal 0.025)")
    plan = math.ceil(n / 10) * 10
    pw2 = simulate(plan, m0, delta, sd, 1500, rng)
    print(f"planned: round up to {plan} analysable per arm; simulated power {pw2:.3f}")
    rec = math.ceil(plan / 0.9 / 2) * 2
    print(f"allowing 10 % non-completion: randomise {rec} per arm, {2 * rec} in all")
    print("sensitivity, analysable per arm      SESOI: 0.08    0.10    0.12")
    for s in (0.20, 0.25, 0.30):
        print(f"   sd of individual shares {s:.2f}          " +
              "".join(f"{n_per_arm(m0, d, s):8d}" for d in (0.08, 0.10, 0.12)))
    print(f"   GSP mean 0.40 instead of 0.25, sd 0.25  " +
          "".join(f"{n_per_arm(0.40, d, 0.25):8d}" for d in (0.08, 0.10, 0.12)))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《机制设计、维克里—克拉克—格罗夫斯(VCG)拍卖与数字社群激励相容工程》第 8 章「实践与预注册检验」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836274

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23836274 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-050 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026050,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Mechanism Design, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auctions and Incentive-Compatible Community Engineering},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23836274},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836274}
}

本书其他章节结论