What does VCG Auctions and Community Incentives conclude, in numbers, about “Reading the Classics: One Reward, Settled Shares and "Rewards Reliable, Punishments Certain"”?

Answer: What the "Rewards and Punishments" chapter of the *Book of Lord Shang* says is "one reward, one punishment, one teaching": rewards come only from military merit, punishment knows no ranks and merit does not offset faults, and "clear rewards need not be costly, clear punishments need not kill". "One hare runs, a hundred chase it" in "Fixing Shares" and in Shen Dao's words quoted in the *Lüshi chunqiu* differ in wording but agree in meaning: an unclaimed valuable thing provokes a contest, and the author's model (Tullock's contest) shows 99 % of its value dissipated when a hundred people compete, and nothing dissipated when ownership is settled. "Rewards reliable, punishments certain" does not occur in the *Book of Lord Shang*; its earliest source is Hu Yan's words in the *Han Feizi*, "Outer Collections of Sayings, Right, Upper", and it recurs in the eulogy of the "Annals of Emperor Xuan". Legalist reward and punishment serves the ruler, allows no exit and binds the subjects rather than the ruler; the incentive compatibility of mechanism design rests on the participant's own best choice and voluntary participation. The two share a name but not a meaning, and the similarity is only structural.

Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's models and hypotheses; all data in the book are fictional or simulated.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 100

(A) one hare, n chasers: equilibrium effort each, total effort (= share of
the hare's value dissipated)
n2: iterated 0.2500, formula 0.2500; total 0.500; deviation gain 0.0000
n3: iterated 0.2222, formula 0.2222; total 0.667; deviation gain 0.0000
n10: iterated 0.0900, formula 0.0900; total 0.900; deviation gain 0.0000
n100: iterated 0.0099, formula 0.0099; total 0.990; deviation gain 0.0000
names and shares settled (owner known, theft punished): effort 0
(B) deterrence: q F >1 needed
detection 0.9, penalty1.5: expected penalty 1.35 -> deterred
detection 0.5, penalty1.5: expected penalty 0.75 -> not deterred
detection 0.5, penalty3.0: expected penalty 1.50 -> deterred
detection 0.1, penalty3.0: expected penalty 0.30 -> not deterred
detection 0.1, penalty12.0: expected penalty 1.20 -> deterred
(C) to get 60 % of agents to work, announced reward needed0.6 / rho
paid with probability 1.00: announce 0.60
paid with probability 0.80: announce 0.75
paid with probability 0.50: announce 1.20
paid with probability 0.25: announce 2.40
Show the full program
# Chapter 7. The author's toy models beside "one hare runs, a hundred chase it"
# (Shangjunshu, Dingfen; Lushi chunqiu, Shenshi). An analogy, not a reconstruction.
# (A) Unassigned prize: n chasers spend effort x_i, win the hare (value 1) with
#     probability x_i / sum x (Tullock lottery). Symmetric equilibrium x* = (n-1)/n^2;
#     total effort (n-1)/n of the prize is dissipated. Checked by damped iteration of
#     the best reply sqrt(O) - O to the others' total O, then by a grid search for a
#     profitable deviation. Assigned prize ("names and shares settled"): no one chases.
# (B) Enforcement ("bi fa"): a thief takes a hare worth 1 unless deterred; expected
#     penalty q F (detection probability q, fine F). Deterred iff q F >= 1 (Becker 1968).
# (C) Credibility ("xin shang"): a reward R promised for a task, paid with probability
#     rho; agents with costs ~ U[0,1] work iff rho R >= cost. Share working = rho R.
def best_response(others, grid=4000):
    best = (0.0, 0.0)
    for k in range(grid + 1):
        x = 0.5 * k / grid
        u = (x / (x + others) if x + others > 0 else 0.0) - x
        if u > best[0]:
            best = (u, x)
    return best[1]

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("(A) one hare, n chasers: equilibrium effort each, total effort (= share of")
    print("    the hare's value dissipated)")
    for n in (2, 3, 10, 100):
        x = 0.1
        for _ in range(5000):                       # damped best-reply iteration
            O = (n - 1) * x; x = 0.995 * x + 0.005 * max(0.0, O ** 0.5 - O)
        O = (n - 1) * x; dev = best_response(O)
        gain = (dev / (dev + O) - dev) - (x / (x + O) - x)
        print(f"    n = {n:3d}: iterated {x:.4f}, formula {(n - 1) / n ** 2:.4f};"
              f" total {n * x:.3f}; deviation gain {max(gain, 0.0):.4f}")
    print("    names and shares settled (owner known, theft punished): effort 0")
    print("(B) deterrence: q F >= 1 needed")
    for q, F in ((0.9, 1.5), (0.5, 1.5), (0.5, 3.0), (0.1, 3.0), (0.1, 12.0)):
        print(f"    detection {q:.1f}, penalty {F:5.1f}: expected penalty {q * F:5.2f}"
              f" -> {'deterred' if q * F >= 1 else 'not deterred'}")
    print("(C) to get 60 % of agents to work, announced reward needed = 0.6 / rho")
    for rho in (1.0, 0.8, 0.5, 0.25):
        print(f"    paid with probability {rho:.2f}: announce {0.6 / rho:.2f}")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Mechanism Design, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auctions and Incentive-Compatible Community Engineering (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 7: Reading the Classics: One Reward, Settled Shares and "Rewards Reliable, Punishments Certain". 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836274

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23836274 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-050 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026050,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Mechanism Design, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auctions and Incentive-Compatible Community Engineering},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23836274},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836274}
}

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