What does Commission Ladders and the Quarter-End Push conclude, in numbers, about “The Evidence for the Claim: Fiscal-Year Seasonality, Discounted Pull-Ins and the Case Against”?
Answer: Chapter 2 checks Oyer's study of fiscal-year-end seasonality and Larkin's finding that discounted pull-ins cost 6% to 8% of revenue, and sets beside them the evidence of Steenburgh and of Chung and co-authors that bonuses mainly buy effort; in the book's model each extra deal of effort comes with 0.78 deals moved.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (19 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.78
| case deals/qtr moved/qtr profit/qtr | |
| flat 3%, no timing options | 9.737 0.000 2.629 |
| step bonus, no timing options | 10.996 0.000 2.732 |
| step bonus, hold and pull | 10.428 0.985 2.541 |
| effort gain from the bonus | 1.259 deals per quarter |
| net deals lost to timing | 0.569 deals per quarter |
| deals moved per extra deal of effort | 0.78 |
| profit change from timing options | -0.191 per quarter |
Show the full program
# Chapter 2. p23: Effort or timing? Steenburgh (2008) found that lump-sum
# bonuses mainly raised effort; Larkin (2014) found costly timing games.
# In the book's model (shared core; parameters illustrative) we split the
# response to the step bonus S into an effort part (S with holding and
# pulling switched off, against a flat 3% plan) and a timing part (deals
# moved across the boundary once both are switched on).
# 把台阶奖的反应拆成「多干」与「挪时点」两部分(参数示意)。
import math
import random
# ---- shared core (identical in every DP program of this book) ----
# 一个季度 T 周;每周以概率 p 来一单(标价 1),p 由努力决定,
# 在 [P0, P1] 之间,努力成本为 k*(p-P0)^2/2。来单可当季成交,
# 或压到下季度(每单以 hloss 的概率流失)。最后 pullw 周,
# 每周以 acc 的概率可让下季度的一单打 disc 的折扣提前成交。
# 提前成交的单子下季度不再出现(下季度从负数起计)。
T, P0, P1, GM = 13, 0.6, 0.9, 0.30
BMAX, SMAX = 3, 24
BASE = dict(k=0.2, acc=0.5, disc=0.15, pullw=3, hloss=0.1,
beta=0.9, hmax=4)
LIN = (0.05, 0.05, 10, 0.0) # rate below, rate above, quota, bonus
STEP = (0.03, 0.03, 10, 0.25)
ACCEL = (0.03, 0.08, 10, 0.0)
def inc(plan, k, price):
# commission paid for the k-th deal of the quarter at this price
lo, hi, q, b = plan
if k <= 0:
return 0.0
return (lo if k <= q else hi) * price + (b if k == q else 0.0)
def backward(plan, vst, m):
hmax = m["hmax"]
sn, cn = range(-BMAX, SMAX + 1), range(-BMAX, hmax + 1)
nxt = {(s, c): m["beta"] * vst[c] for s in sn for c in cn}
pol = {}
for t in range(T, 0, -1):
pv, pd = {}, {}
for s in sn:
s1 = min(s + 1, SMAX)
for c in cn:
stay, do = nxt[(s, c)], False
best = stay
if c > -BMAX and t > T - m["pullw"]:
v = inc(plan, s + 1, 1 - m["disc"]) + nxt[(s1, c - 1)]
if v > stay + 1e-12:
best, do = v, True
pv[(s, c)] = (1 - m["acc"]) * stay + m["acc"] * best
pd[(s, c)] = do
cur = {}
for s in sn:
s1 = min(s + 1, SMAX)
for c in cn:
hold = False
if s < 0:
a = pv[(s1, c)]
else:
a = inc(plan, s + 1, 1.0) + pv[(s1, c)]
if c < hmax and pv[(s, c + 1)] > a + 1e-12:
a, hold = pv[(s, c + 1)], True
p = pv[(s, c)]
e = min(max((a - p) / m["k"], 0.0), P1 - P0)
cur[(s, c)] = p + (P0 + e) * (a - p) - m["k"] * e * e / 2
pol[(t, s, c)] = (P0 + e, hold, pd[(s, c)])
nxt = cur
return nxt, pol
def solve(plan, m):
cn = range(-BMAX, m["hmax"] + 1)
vst = {c: 0.0 for c in cn}
for _ in range(400):
w1, pol = backward(plan, vst, m)
new = {}
for c in cn:
if c <= 0:
new[c] = w1[(c, 0)]
continue
terms = []
for n in range(c + 1):
pr = (math.comb(c, n) * (1 - m["hloss"]) ** n
* m["hloss"] ** (c - n))
pay = math.fsum(inc(plan, j, 1.0) for j in range(1, n + 1))
terms.append(pr * (pay + w1[(n, 0)]))
new[c] = math.fsum(terms)
gap = max(abs(new[c] - vst[c]) for c in cn)
vst = new
if gap < 1e-7:
break
return pol
def simulate(plan, pol, m, nq, seed):
# one record per quarter: owner profit, pay, deals by week, etc.
rng = random.Random(20261112 + seed)
c, out = 0, []
for _ in range(nq):
prof, pay, rev = [], [], []
week, pulled = [0] * (T + 1), [0] * (T + 1)
holds = lost = 0
s = c
if c > 0:
s = 0
for _ in range(c):
if rng.random() < 1 - m["hloss"]:
s += 1
else:
lost += 1
for j in range(1, s + 1):
x = inc(plan, j, 1.0)
pay.append(x)
prof.append(GM - x)
rev.append(1.0)
week[1] += s
cn = 0
for t in range(1, T + 1):
p, hold, _ = pol[(t, s, cn)]
if rng.random() < p:
if s < 0:
s += 1
elif hold:
cn += 1
holds += 1
else:
x = inc(plan, s + 1, 1.0)
pay.append(x)
prof.append(GM - x)
rev.append(1.0)
s = min(s + 1, SMAX)
week[t] += 1
if rng.random() < m["acc"] and pol[(t, s, cn)][2]:
x = inc(plan, s + 1, 1 - m["disc"])
pay.append(x)
prof.append(GM - m["disc"] - x)
rev.append(1 - m["disc"])
s = min(s + 1, SMAX)
cn -= 1
week[t] += 1
pulled[t] += 1
c = cn
out.append(dict(profit=math.fsum(prof), pay=math.fsum(pay),
rev=math.fsum(rev), week=week, pulled=pulled,
holds=holds, lost=lost))
return out
def mean(xs):
return math.fsum(xs) / len(xs)
# ---- end of shared core ----
def run(plan, m):
rec = simulate(plan, solve(plan, m), m, 8000, 2)
deals = mean([math.fsum(r["week"]) for r in rec])
moved = mean([math.fsum(r["pulled"]) + r["holds"] for r in rec])
prof = mean([r["profit"] for r in rec])
return deals, moved, prof
if __name__ == "__main__":
off = dict(BASE, hmax=0, pullw=0)
flat = (0.03, 0.03, 10, 0.0)
d0, _, p0 = run(flat, off)
d1, _, p1 = run(STEP, off)
d2, mv, p2 = run(STEP, dict(BASE))
print("case deals/qtr moved/qtr profit/qtr")
print("flat 3%, no timing options {:7.3f} {:7.3f} {:7.3f}"
.format(d0, 0.0, p0))
print("step bonus, no timing options {:7.3f} {:7.3f} {:7.3f}"
.format(d1, 0.0, p1))
print("step bonus, hold and pull {:7.3f} {:7.3f} {:7.3f}"
.format(d2, mv, p2))
print("effort gain from the bonus: {:.3f} deals per quarter"
.format(d1 - d0))
print("net deals lost to timing: {:.3f} deals per quarter"
.format(d1 - d2))
print("deals moved per extra deal of effort: {:.2f}"
.format(mv / (d1 - d0)))
print("profit change from timing options: {:.3f} per quarter"
.format(p2 - p1))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Nonlinear Commission Ladders, End-of-Period Timing Manipulation and Quota-Induced Game Distortion (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: The Evidence for the Claim: Fiscal-Year Seasonality, Discounted Pull-Ins and the Case Against. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-213 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026213,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Nonlinear Commission Ladders, End-of-Period Timing Manipulation and Quota-Induced Game Distortion},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Geometry of a Commission Ladder: Kinks, Convexity and Marginal Rates
- Chapter 3 · Dynamic Programming of Close Timing: Holding, Dragging and Quarter-End Pull-Ins
- Chapter 4 · The Owner's Profit: a Monte Carlo Contest of Linear and Ladder Plans
- Chapter 5 · The Quota Ratchet and Where to Set the Quota: Holding Back and the "One or Two Short" Band
- Chapter 6 · Detecting the Quarter-End Push: a Test on Weekly Shares and a Discount Monitor
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: "Rewards and Punishments" in the Book of Lord Shang and Taylor's "A Piece-Rate System"
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Commission Plan Simulator, a Monitoring Sheet and a Pre-Registered Test