关于「反常识命题的证据:财年末季节性、折扣抢单与反方数据」,《提成阶梯与期末冲量》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第二章核对 Oyer 关于财年末季节性的研究与 Larkin 关于折扣抢单造成收入 6% 至 8% 损失的研究,并陈 Steenburgh 与 Chung 等人认为奖金主要带来努力的反方证据;在本书模型中,每多一单努力伴随 0.78 单挪动。
数据口径:书中的销售员、门店、费率与折扣均为示意参数;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化的经营建议,不构成法律、税务或理财建议,涉及法规的表述以上架前人工复核为准。 第四章用蒙特卡洛模拟比较老板利润,线性方案比台阶方案每季度多 0.2266,相当于 0.089;但在同等薪酬与某一努力弹性下,台阶方案反而小胜 0.017,所以命题只能说「往往」。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.78
| case deals/qtr moved/qtr profit/qtr | |
| flat 3%, no timing options | 9.737 0.000 2.629 |
| step bonus, no timing options | 10.996 0.000 2.732 |
| step bonus, hold and pull | 10.428 0.985 2.541 |
| effort gain from the bonus | 1.259 deals per quarter |
| net deals lost to timing | 0.569 deals per quarter |
| deals moved per extra deal of effort | 0.78 |
| profit change from timing options | -0.191 per quarter |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 2. p23: Effort or timing? Steenburgh (2008) found that lump-sum
# bonuses mainly raised effort; Larkin (2014) found costly timing games.
# In the book's model (shared core; parameters illustrative) we split the
# response to the step bonus S into an effort part (S with holding and
# pulling switched off, against a flat 3% plan) and a timing part (deals
# moved across the boundary once both are switched on).
# 把台阶奖的反应拆成「多干」与「挪时点」两部分(参数示意)。
import math
import random
# ---- shared core (identical in every DP program of this book) ----
# 一个季度 T 周;每周以概率 p 来一单(标价 1),p 由努力决定,
# 在 [P0, P1] 之间,努力成本为 k*(p-P0)^2/2。来单可当季成交,
# 或压到下季度(每单以 hloss 的概率流失)。最后 pullw 周,
# 每周以 acc 的概率可让下季度的一单打 disc 的折扣提前成交。
# 提前成交的单子下季度不再出现(下季度从负数起计)。
T, P0, P1, GM = 13, 0.6, 0.9, 0.30
BMAX, SMAX = 3, 24
BASE = dict(k=0.2, acc=0.5, disc=0.15, pullw=3, hloss=0.1,
beta=0.9, hmax=4)
LIN = (0.05, 0.05, 10, 0.0) # rate below, rate above, quota, bonus
STEP = (0.03, 0.03, 10, 0.25)
ACCEL = (0.03, 0.08, 10, 0.0)
def inc(plan, k, price):
# commission paid for the k-th deal of the quarter at this price
lo, hi, q, b = plan
if k <= 0:
return 0.0
return (lo if k <= q else hi) * price + (b if k == q else 0.0)
def backward(plan, vst, m):
hmax = m["hmax"]
sn, cn = range(-BMAX, SMAX + 1), range(-BMAX, hmax + 1)
nxt = {(s, c): m["beta"] * vst[c] for s in sn for c in cn}
pol = {}
for t in range(T, 0, -1):
pv, pd = {}, {}
for s in sn:
s1 = min(s + 1, SMAX)
for c in cn:
stay, do = nxt[(s, c)], False
best = stay
if c > -BMAX and t > T - m["pullw"]:
v = inc(plan, s + 1, 1 - m["disc"]) + nxt[(s1, c - 1)]
if v > stay + 1e-12:
best, do = v, True
pv[(s, c)] = (1 - m["acc"]) * stay + m["acc"] * best
pd[(s, c)] = do
cur = {}
for s in sn:
s1 = min(s + 1, SMAX)
for c in cn:
hold = False
if s < 0:
a = pv[(s1, c)]
else:
a = inc(plan, s + 1, 1.0) + pv[(s1, c)]
if c < hmax and pv[(s, c + 1)] > a + 1e-12:
a, hold = pv[(s, c + 1)], True
p = pv[(s, c)]
e = min(max((a - p) / m["k"], 0.0), P1 - P0)
cur[(s, c)] = p + (P0 + e) * (a - p) - m["k"] * e * e / 2
pol[(t, s, c)] = (P0 + e, hold, pd[(s, c)])
nxt = cur
return nxt, pol
def solve(plan, m):
cn = range(-BMAX, m["hmax"] + 1)
vst = {c: 0.0 for c in cn}
for _ in range(400):
w1, pol = backward(plan, vst, m)
new = {}
for c in cn:
if c <= 0:
new[c] = w1[(c, 0)]
continue
terms = []
for n in range(c + 1):
pr = (math.comb(c, n) * (1 - m["hloss"]) ** n
* m["hloss"] ** (c - n))
pay = math.fsum(inc(plan, j, 1.0) for j in range(1, n + 1))
terms.append(pr * (pay + w1[(n, 0)]))
new[c] = math.fsum(terms)
gap = max(abs(new[c] - vst[c]) for c in cn)
vst = new
if gap < 1e-7:
break
return pol
def simulate(plan, pol, m, nq, seed):
# one record per quarter: owner profit, pay, deals by week, etc.
rng = random.Random(20261112 + seed)
c, out = 0, []
for _ in range(nq):
prof, pay, rev = [], [], []
week, pulled = [0] * (T + 1), [0] * (T + 1)
holds = lost = 0
s = c
if c > 0:
s = 0
for _ in range(c):
if rng.random() < 1 - m["hloss"]:
s += 1
else:
lost += 1
for j in range(1, s + 1):
x = inc(plan, j, 1.0)
pay.append(x)
prof.append(GM - x)
rev.append(1.0)
week[1] += s
cn = 0
for t in range(1, T + 1):
p, hold, _ = pol[(t, s, cn)]
if rng.random() < p:
if s < 0:
s += 1
elif hold:
cn += 1
holds += 1
else:
x = inc(plan, s + 1, 1.0)
pay.append(x)
prof.append(GM - x)
rev.append(1.0)
s = min(s + 1, SMAX)
week[t] += 1
if rng.random() < m["acc"] and pol[(t, s, cn)][2]:
x = inc(plan, s + 1, 1 - m["disc"])
pay.append(x)
prof.append(GM - m["disc"] - x)
rev.append(1 - m["disc"])
s = min(s + 1, SMAX)
cn -= 1
week[t] += 1
pulled[t] += 1
c = cn
out.append(dict(profit=math.fsum(prof), pay=math.fsum(pay),
rev=math.fsum(rev), week=week, pulled=pulled,
holds=holds, lost=lost))
return out
def mean(xs):
return math.fsum(xs) / len(xs)
# ---- end of shared core ----
def run(plan, m):
rec = simulate(plan, solve(plan, m), m, 8000, 2)
deals = mean([math.fsum(r["week"]) for r in rec])
moved = mean([math.fsum(r["pulled"]) + r["holds"] for r in rec])
prof = mean([r["profit"] for r in rec])
return deals, moved, prof
if __name__ == "__main__":
off = dict(BASE, hmax=0, pullw=0)
flat = (0.03, 0.03, 10, 0.0)
d0, _, p0 = run(flat, off)
d1, _, p1 = run(STEP, off)
d2, mv, p2 = run(STEP, dict(BASE))
print("case deals/qtr moved/qtr profit/qtr")
print("flat 3%, no timing options {:7.3f} {:7.3f} {:7.3f}"
.format(d0, 0.0, p0))
print("step bonus, no timing options {:7.3f} {:7.3f} {:7.3f}"
.format(d1, 0.0, p1))
print("step bonus, hold and pull {:7.3f} {:7.3f} {:7.3f}"
.format(d2, mv, p2))
print("effort gain from the bonus: {:.3f} deals per quarter"
.format(d1 - d0))
print("net deals lost to timing: {:.3f} deals per quarter"
.format(d1 - d2))
print("deals moved per extra deal of effort: {:.2f}"
.format(mv / (d1 - d0)))
print("profit change from timing options: {:.3f} per quarter"
.format(p2 - p1))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《销售提成阶梯非线性、期末冲量操纵与业绩配额博弈扭曲母典》第 2 章「反常识命题的证据:财年末季节性、折扣抢单与反方数据」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-213 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026213,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Nonlinear Commission Ladders, End-of-Period Timing Manipulation and Quota-Induced Game Distortion},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}