关于「东西方原典考辨:《商君书·赏刑》与泰勒《计件报酬制》」,《提成阶梯与期末冲量》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第七章考辨《商君书·赏刑》的「壹赏」与泰勒的差别计件:同一笔奖金拆成八个台阶时,挪单收益只占期望薪酬的 0.0249。
数据口径:书中的销售员、门店、费率与折扣均为示意参数;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化的经营建议,不构成法律、税务或理财建议,涉及法规的表述以上架前人工复核为准。 第四章用蒙特卡洛模拟比较老板利润,线性方案比台阶方案每季度多 0.2266,相当于 0.089;但在同等薪酬与某一努力弹性下,台阶方案反而小胜 0.017,所以命题只能说「往往」。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.0249
| m | quotas | exp pay | gain of best move | share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 10 | 0.4355 | 0.0508 | 0.1167 |
| 2 | 8,12 | 0.4354 | 0.0352 | 0.0808 |
| 4 | 7,9,11,13 | 0.4352 | 0.0198 | 0.0455 |
| 8 | 6,7,8,9,11,12,13,14 | 0.4348 | 0.0108 | 0.0249 |
| 0 | linear 0.0436 | 0.4355 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 7. p72: "One reward" read as one rule with no kinks. A bonus
# budget of 0.25 per quarter is split into m equal step bonuses at
# quotas spread around the mean of 10 deals (m = 0 is a linear plan with
# the same expected pay). Quarter sales are Poisson(10). At the end of
# quarter one the salesperson knows N1 and may move one deal into or out
# of it from the unknown quarter two. We print, exactly, the expected
# gain from the best move and that gain as a share of expected pay.
# Base rate 3%; all parameters illustrative.
# 把「壹赏」读作没有折点的单一规则:折点越多,挪单收益越大吗?
import math
MU, BASE_R, BUDGET, NMAX = 10, 0.03, 0.25, 40
QUOTAS = {1: (10,), 2: (8, 12), 4: (7, 9, 11, 13),
8: (6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14)}
def poisson(n):
return math.exp(-MU + n * math.log(MU) - math.lgamma(n + 1))
def marg(k, qs, rate):
# pay for the k-th deal
if k <= 0:
return 0.0
return rate + (BUDGET / len(qs) if k in qs else 0.0)
def expected_gain(qs, rate):
w = [poisson(n) for n in range(NMAX + 1)]
out_next = math.fsum(w[n] * marg(n, qs, rate) for n in range(NMAX + 1))
in_next = math.fsum(w[n] * marg(n + 1, qs, rate)
for n in range(NMAX + 1))
gains = []
for n1 in range(NMAX + 1):
pull = marg(n1 + 1, qs, rate) - out_next
push = in_next - marg(n1, qs, rate)
gains.append(w[n1] * max(0.0, pull, push))
return math.fsum(gains)
def exp_pay(qs, rate):
return math.fsum(poisson(n) * math.fsum(marg(k, qs, rate)
for k in range(1, n + 1))
for n in range(NMAX + 1))
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" m quotas exp pay gain of best move share")
for m in (1, 2, 4, 8):
qs = QUOTAS[m]
pay = exp_pay(qs, BASE_R)
g = expected_gain(qs, BASE_R)
print("{:2d} {:16s} {:.4f} {:.4f} {:.4f}"
.format(m, ",".join(str(q) for q in qs), pay, g, g / pay))
pay_l = exp_pay(QUOTAS[1], BASE_R) / MU
g = expected_gain((), pay_l)
print(" 0 linear {:.4f} {:.4f} {:.4f} {:.4f}"
.format(pay_l, pay_l * MU, g, g / (pay_l * MU)))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《销售提成阶梯非线性、期末冲量操纵与业绩配额博弈扭曲母典》第 7 章「东西方原典考辨:《商君书·赏刑》与泰勒《计件报酬制》」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-213 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026213,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Nonlinear Commission Ladders, End-of-Period Timing Manipulation and Quota-Induced Game Distortion},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}