关于「东西方原典考辨:《商君书·赏刑》与泰勒《计件报酬制》」,《提成阶梯与期末冲量》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第七章考辨《商君书·赏刑》的「壹赏」与泰勒的差别计件:同一笔奖金拆成八个台阶时,挪单收益只占期望薪酬的 0.0249。

数据口径:书中的销售员、门店、费率与折扣均为示意参数;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化的经营建议,不构成法律、税务或理财建议,涉及法规的表述以上架前人工复核为准。 第四章用蒙特卡洛模拟比较老板利润,线性方案比台阶方案每季度多 0.2266,相当于 0.089;但在同等薪酬与某一努力弹性下,台阶方案反而小胜 0.017,所以命题只能说「往往」。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.0249

mquotasexp paygain of best moveshare
1100.43550.05080.1167
28,120.43540.03520.0808
47,9,11,130.43520.01980.0455
86,7,8,9,11,12,13,140.43480.01080.0249
0linear 0.04360.43550.00000.0000
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 7. p72: "One reward" read as one rule with no kinks. A bonus
# budget of 0.25 per quarter is split into m equal step bonuses at
# quotas spread around the mean of 10 deals (m = 0 is a linear plan with
# the same expected pay). Quarter sales are Poisson(10). At the end of
# quarter one the salesperson knows N1 and may move one deal into or out
# of it from the unknown quarter two. We print, exactly, the expected
# gain from the best move and that gain as a share of expected pay.
# Base rate 3%; all parameters illustrative.
# 把「壹赏」读作没有折点的单一规则:折点越多,挪单收益越大吗?
import math

MU, BASE_R, BUDGET, NMAX = 10, 0.03, 0.25, 40
QUOTAS = {1: (10,), 2: (8, 12), 4: (7, 9, 11, 13),
          8: (6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14)}


def poisson(n):
    return math.exp(-MU + n * math.log(MU) - math.lgamma(n + 1))


def marg(k, qs, rate):
    # pay for the k-th deal
    if k <= 0:
        return 0.0
    return rate + (BUDGET / len(qs) if k in qs else 0.0)


def expected_gain(qs, rate):
    w = [poisson(n) for n in range(NMAX + 1)]
    out_next = math.fsum(w[n] * marg(n, qs, rate) for n in range(NMAX + 1))
    in_next = math.fsum(w[n] * marg(n + 1, qs, rate)
                        for n in range(NMAX + 1))
    gains = []
    for n1 in range(NMAX + 1):
        pull = marg(n1 + 1, qs, rate) - out_next
        push = in_next - marg(n1, qs, rate)
        gains.append(w[n1] * max(0.0, pull, push))
    return math.fsum(gains)


def exp_pay(qs, rate):
    return math.fsum(poisson(n) * math.fsum(marg(k, qs, rate)
                                            for k in range(1, n + 1))
                     for n in range(NMAX + 1))


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print(" m   quotas            exp pay   gain of best move   share")
    for m in (1, 2, 4, 8):
        qs = QUOTAS[m]
        pay = exp_pay(qs, BASE_R)
        g = expected_gain(qs, BASE_R)
        print("{:2d}   {:16s}  {:.4f}    {:.4f}              {:.4f}"
              .format(m, ",".join(str(q) for q in qs), pay, g, g / pay))
    pay_l = exp_pay(QUOTAS[1], BASE_R) / MU
    g = expected_gain((), pay_l)
    print(" 0   linear {:.4f}       {:.4f}    {:.4f}              {:.4f}"
          .format(pay_l, pay_l * MU, g, g / (pay_l * MU)))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《销售提成阶梯非线性、期末冲量操纵与业绩配额博弈扭曲母典》第 7 章「东西方原典考辨:《商君书·赏刑》与泰勒《计件报酬制》」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-213 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026213,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Nonlinear Commission Ladders, End-of-Period Timing Manipulation and Quota-Induced Game Distortion},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论