What does Commission Ladders and the Quarter-End Push conclude, in numbers, about “Closing the Loop: a Commission Plan Simulator, a Monitoring Sheet and a Pre-Registered Test”?
Answer: Chapter 8 gives a commission plan simulator, monitoring red lines and a pre-registered test protocol; softening the step plan raises the model's profit from 2.5347 to 2.7005. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (19 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (19 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 2.5347, 2.7005
| plan | pay | profit | moved | last2 | lin r | lin profit | gap |
| S 3%+0.25 | 0.5569 | 2.5347 | 0.989 | 0.104 | 0.0503 | 2.7641 | 0.229 |
| S 4%+0.10 | 0.5305 | 2.7005 | 0.267 | 0.150 | 0.0485 | 2.7543 | 0.054 |
| A 3%/8% | 0.4774 | 2.5701 | 2.719 | 0.204 | 0.0446 | 2.7326 | 0.163 |
| A 4%/6% | 0.4957 | 2.6489 | 2.624 | 0.203 | 0.0460 | 2.7404 | 0.091 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 8. p82: The plan simulator, the engine of distill/tool.py. For
# each candidate ladder it solves the salesperson's timing policy, runs
# 8,000 quarters (fixed seed) and sets beside it the linear plan with the
# same expected pay (closed form, as in p42). Candidates: the step plan
# S, a softened step (4% plus a 0.10 bonus), the accelerator A and a
# softened accelerator (4% to 6%). Shared core; parameters illustrative.
# 提成方案模拟器的内核:候选阶梯与同薪酬线性方案并排(参数示意)。
import math
import random
# ---- shared core (identical in every DP program of this book) ----
# 一个季度 T 周;每周以概率 p 来一单(标价 1),p 由努力决定,
# 在 [P0, P1] 之间,努力成本为 k*(p-P0)^2/2。来单可当季成交,
# 或压到下季度(每单以 hloss 的概率流失)。最后 pullw 周,
# 每周以 acc 的概率可让下季度的一单打 disc 的折扣提前成交。
# 提前成交的单子下季度不再出现(下季度从负数起计)。
T, P0, P1, GM = 13, 0.6, 0.9, 0.30
BMAX, SMAX = 3, 24
BASE = dict(k=0.2, acc=0.5, disc=0.15, pullw=3, hloss=0.1,
beta=0.9, hmax=4)
LIN = (0.05, 0.05, 10, 0.0) # rate below, rate above, quota, bonus
STEP = (0.03, 0.03, 10, 0.25)
ACCEL = (0.03, 0.08, 10, 0.0)
def inc(plan, k, price):
# commission paid for the k-th deal of the quarter at this price
lo, hi, q, b = plan
if k <= 0:
return 0.0
return (lo if k <= q else hi) * price + (b if k == q else 0.0)
def backward(plan, vst, m):
hmax = m["hmax"]
sn, cn = range(-BMAX, SMAX + 1), range(-BMAX, hmax + 1)
nxt = {(s, c): m["beta"] * vst[c] for s in sn for c in cn}
pol = {}
for t in range(T, 0, -1):
pv, pd = {}, {}
for s in sn:
s1 = min(s + 1, SMAX)
for c in cn:
stay, do = nxt[(s, c)], False
best = stay
if c > -BMAX and t > T - m["pullw"]:
v = inc(plan, s + 1, 1 - m["disc"]) + nxt[(s1, c - 1)]
if v > stay + 1e-12:
best, do = v, True
pv[(s, c)] = (1 - m["acc"]) * stay + m["acc"] * best
pd[(s, c)] = do
cur = {}
for s in sn:
s1 = min(s + 1, SMAX)
for c in cn:
hold = False
if s < 0:
a = pv[(s1, c)]
else:
a = inc(plan, s + 1, 1.0) + pv[(s1, c)]
if c < hmax and pv[(s, c + 1)] > a + 1e-12:
a, hold = pv[(s, c + 1)], True
p = pv[(s, c)]
e = min(max((a - p) / m["k"], 0.0), P1 - P0)
cur[(s, c)] = p + (P0 + e) * (a - p) - m["k"] * e * e / 2
pol[(t, s, c)] = (P0 + e, hold, pd[(s, c)])
nxt = cur
return nxt, pol
def solve(plan, m):
cn = range(-BMAX, m["hmax"] + 1)
vst = {c: 0.0 for c in cn}
for _ in range(400):
w1, pol = backward(plan, vst, m)
new = {}
for c in cn:
if c <= 0:
new[c] = w1[(c, 0)]
continue
terms = []
for n in range(c + 1):
pr = (math.comb(c, n) * (1 - m["hloss"]) ** n
* m["hloss"] ** (c - n))
pay = math.fsum(inc(plan, j, 1.0) for j in range(1, n + 1))
terms.append(pr * (pay + w1[(n, 0)]))
new[c] = math.fsum(terms)
gap = max(abs(new[c] - vst[c]) for c in cn)
vst = new
if gap < 1e-7:
break
return pol
def simulate(plan, pol, m, nq, seed):
# one record per quarter: owner profit, pay, deals by week, etc.
rng = random.Random(20261112 + seed)
c, out = 0, []
for _ in range(nq):
prof, pay, rev = [], [], []
week, pulled = [0] * (T + 1), [0] * (T + 1)
holds = lost = 0
s = c
if c > 0:
s = 0
for _ in range(c):
if rng.random() < 1 - m["hloss"]:
s += 1
else:
lost += 1
for j in range(1, s + 1):
x = inc(plan, j, 1.0)
pay.append(x)
prof.append(GM - x)
rev.append(1.0)
week[1] += s
cn = 0
for t in range(1, T + 1):
p, hold, _ = pol[(t, s, cn)]
if rng.random() < p:
if s < 0:
s += 1
elif hold:
cn += 1
holds += 1
else:
x = inc(plan, s + 1, 1.0)
pay.append(x)
prof.append(GM - x)
rev.append(1.0)
s = min(s + 1, SMAX)
week[t] += 1
if rng.random() < m["acc"] and pol[(t, s, cn)][2]:
x = inc(plan, s + 1, 1 - m["disc"])
pay.append(x)
prof.append(GM - m["disc"] - x)
rev.append(1 - m["disc"])
s = min(s + 1, SMAX)
cn -= 1
week[t] += 1
pulled[t] += 1
c = cn
out.append(dict(profit=math.fsum(prof), pay=math.fsum(pay),
rev=math.fsum(rev), week=week, pulled=pulled,
holds=holds, lost=lost))
return out
def mean(xs):
return math.fsum(xs) / len(xs)
# ---- end of shared core ----
def lin_pay(r, k):
p = P0 + min(r / k, P1 - P0)
return T * r * p, T * p * (GM - r)
def equal_pay_rate(target, k):
lo, hi = 0.0, 0.3
for _ in range(80):
mid = (lo + hi) / 2
if lin_pay(mid, k)[0] < target:
lo = mid
else:
hi = mid
return (lo + hi) / 2
if __name__ == "__main__":
m = dict(BASE)
cands = (("S 3%+0.25", STEP), ("S 4%+0.10", (0.04, 0.04, 10, 0.10)),
("A 3%/8%", ACCEL), ("A 4%/6%", (0.04, 0.06, 10, 0.0)))
print("plan pay profit moved last2 lin r lin profit"
" gap")
for name, plan in cands:
rec = simulate(plan, solve(plan, m), m, 8000, 10)
pay = mean([r["pay"] for r in rec])
prof = mean([r["profit"] for r in rec])
moved = mean([math.fsum(r["pulled"]) + r["holds"] for r in rec])
wk = [math.fsum(r["week"][t] for r in rec) for t in range(T + 1)]
last2 = (wk[T - 1] + wk[T]) / math.fsum(wk)
r = equal_pay_rate(pay, m["k"])
lp = lin_pay(r, m["k"])[1]
print("{:10s} {:.4f} {:.4f} {:.3f} {:.3f} {:.4f} {:.4f}"
" {:.3f}".format(name, pay, prof, moved, last2, r, lp,
lp - prof))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Nonlinear Commission Ladders, End-of-Period Timing Manipulation and Quota-Induced Game Distortion (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 8: Closing the Loop: a Commission Plan Simulator, a Monitoring Sheet and a Pre-Registered Test. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-213 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026213,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Nonlinear Commission Ladders, End-of-Period Timing Manipulation and Quota-Induced Game Distortion},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Geometry of a Commission Ladder: Kinks, Convexity and Marginal Rates
- Chapter 2 · The Evidence for the Claim: Fiscal-Year Seasonality, Discounted Pull-Ins and the Case Against
- Chapter 3 · Dynamic Programming of Close Timing: Holding, Dragging and Quarter-End Pull-Ins
- Chapter 4 · The Owner's Profit: a Monte Carlo Contest of Linear and Ladder Plans
- Chapter 5 · The Quota Ratchet and Where to Set the Quota: Holding Back and the "One or Two Short" Band
- Chapter 6 · Detecting the Quarter-End Push: a Test on Weekly Shares and a Discount Monitor
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: "Rewards and Punishments" in the Book of Lord Shang and Taylor's "A Piece-Rate System"