What does Commission Ladders and the Quarter-End Push conclude, in numbers, about “Detecting the Quarter-End Push: a Test on Weekly Shares and a Discount Monitor”?

Answer: Chapter 6 designs a test on weekly shares and a quarter-end discount monitor, which catches the accelerator with probability 0.540 from only 4 people over 1 quarter.

Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (19 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.540

L: discounted share weeks 11-13 0.092, weeks 1-10 0.092
S: discounted share weeks 11-13 0.204, weeks 1-10 0.106
A: discounted share weeks 11-13 0.319, weeks 1-10 0.107
peoplequartersfires Lfires Sfires A
410.0750.2150.540
810.0650.2820.760
440.0700.4380.975
840.0550.6621.000
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p62: The end-of-period discount monitor. Besides the pulled
# deals of the timing game, every ordinary deal is discounted with a
# background probability of 0.10 (illustrative). The monitor compares
# the share of discounted deals in weeks 11 to 13 with weeks 1 to 10,
# one-sided two-proportion z-test at the 5% level. Same simulated
# quarters as the shared core (fixed seeds). We print the average
# discount shares and how often the monitor fires for teams of n people
# watched for k quarters (400 team-samples each).
# 期末折扣率监控:期末三周打折单占比与前十周相比(参数示意)。
import math
import random

# ---- shared core (identical in every DP program of this book) ----
# 一个季度 T 周;每周以概率 p 来一单(标价 1),p 由努力决定,
# 在 [P0, P1] 之间,努力成本为 k*(p-P0)^2/2。来单可当季成交,
# 或压到下季度(每单以 hloss 的概率流失)。最后 pullw 周,
# 每周以 acc 的概率可让下季度的一单打 disc 的折扣提前成交。
# 提前成交的单子下季度不再出现(下季度从负数起计)。
T, P0, P1, GM = 13, 0.6, 0.9, 0.30
BMAX, SMAX = 3, 24
BASE = dict(k=0.2, acc=0.5, disc=0.15, pullw=3, hloss=0.1,
            beta=0.9, hmax=4)
LIN = (0.05, 0.05, 10, 0.0)      # rate below, rate above, quota, bonus
STEP = (0.03, 0.03, 10, 0.25)
ACCEL = (0.03, 0.08, 10, 0.0)


def inc(plan, k, price):
    # commission paid for the k-th deal of the quarter at this price
    lo, hi, q, b = plan
    if k <= 0:
        return 0.0
    return (lo if k <= q else hi) * price + (b if k == q else 0.0)


def backward(plan, vst, m):
    hmax = m["hmax"]
    sn, cn = range(-BMAX, SMAX + 1), range(-BMAX, hmax + 1)
    nxt = {(s, c): m["beta"] * vst[c] for s in sn for c in cn}
    pol = {}
    for t in range(T, 0, -1):
        pv, pd = {}, {}
        for s in sn:
            s1 = min(s + 1, SMAX)
            for c in cn:
                stay, do = nxt[(s, c)], False
                best = stay
                if c > -BMAX and t > T - m["pullw"]:
                    v = inc(plan, s + 1, 1 - m["disc"]) + nxt[(s1, c - 1)]
                    if v > stay + 1e-12:
                        best, do = v, True
                pv[(s, c)] = (1 - m["acc"]) * stay + m["acc"] * best
                pd[(s, c)] = do
        cur = {}
        for s in sn:
            s1 = min(s + 1, SMAX)
            for c in cn:
                hold = False
                if s < 0:
                    a = pv[(s1, c)]
                else:
                    a = inc(plan, s + 1, 1.0) + pv[(s1, c)]
                    if c < hmax and pv[(s, c + 1)] > a + 1e-12:
                        a, hold = pv[(s, c + 1)], True
                p = pv[(s, c)]
                e = min(max((a - p) / m["k"], 0.0), P1 - P0)
                cur[(s, c)] = p + (P0 + e) * (a - p) - m["k"] * e * e / 2
                pol[(t, s, c)] = (P0 + e, hold, pd[(s, c)])
        nxt = cur
    return nxt, pol


def solve(plan, m):
    cn = range(-BMAX, m["hmax"] + 1)
    vst = {c: 0.0 for c in cn}
    for _ in range(400):
        w1, pol = backward(plan, vst, m)
        new = {}
        for c in cn:
            if c <= 0:
                new[c] = w1[(c, 0)]
                continue
            terms = []
            for n in range(c + 1):
                pr = (math.comb(c, n) * (1 - m["hloss"]) ** n
                      * m["hloss"] ** (c - n))
                pay = math.fsum(inc(plan, j, 1.0) for j in range(1, n + 1))
                terms.append(pr * (pay + w1[(n, 0)]))
            new[c] = math.fsum(terms)
        gap = max(abs(new[c] - vst[c]) for c in cn)
        vst = new
        if gap < 1e-7:
            break
    return pol


def simulate(plan, pol, m, nq, seed):
    # one record per quarter: owner profit, pay, deals by week, etc.
    rng = random.Random(20261112 + seed)
    c, out = 0, []
    for _ in range(nq):
        prof, pay, rev = [], [], []
        week, pulled = [0] * (T + 1), [0] * (T + 1)
        holds = lost = 0
        s = c
        if c > 0:
            s = 0
            for _ in range(c):
                if rng.random() < 1 - m["hloss"]:
                    s += 1
                else:
                    lost += 1
            for j in range(1, s + 1):
                x = inc(plan, j, 1.0)
                pay.append(x)
                prof.append(GM - x)
                rev.append(1.0)
            week[1] += s
        cn = 0
        for t in range(1, T + 1):
            p, hold, _ = pol[(t, s, cn)]
            if rng.random() < p:
                if s < 0:
                    s += 1
                elif hold:
                    cn += 1
                    holds += 1
                else:
                    x = inc(plan, s + 1, 1.0)
                    pay.append(x)
                    prof.append(GM - x)
                    rev.append(1.0)
                    s = min(s + 1, SMAX)
                    week[t] += 1
            if rng.random() < m["acc"] and pol[(t, s, cn)][2]:
                x = inc(plan, s + 1, 1 - m["disc"])
                pay.append(x)
                prof.append(GM - m["disc"] - x)
                rev.append(1 - m["disc"])
                s = min(s + 1, SMAX)
                cn -= 1
                week[t] += 1
                pulled[t] += 1
        c = cn
        out.append(dict(profit=math.fsum(prof), pay=math.fsum(pay),
                        rev=math.fsum(rev), week=week, pulled=pulled,
                        holds=holds, lost=lost))
    return out


def mean(xs):
    return math.fsum(xs) / len(xs)
# ---- end of shared core ----
BG = 0.10


def window(recs, n, k, rng):
    late = [0, 0]
    early = [0, 0]
    for _ in range(n):
        i = rng.randrange(len(recs) - k)
        for r in recs[i:i + k]:
            for t in range(1, T + 1):
                reg = r["week"][t] - r["pulled"][t]
                bg = 0
                for _ in range(reg):
                    bg += rng.random() < BG
                box = late if t > T - 3 else early
                box[0] += r["week"][t]
                box[1] += bg + r["pulled"][t]
    return late, early


def z_one_sided(late, early):
    p1, p2 = late[1] / late[0], early[1] / early[0]
    pp = (late[1] + early[1]) / (late[0] + early[0])
    se = math.sqrt(pp * (1 - pp) * (1 / late[0] + 1 / early[0]))
    return (p1 - p2) / se if se > 0 else 0.0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    m = dict(BASE)
    recs = {}
    for name, plan in (("L", LIN), ("S", STEP), ("A", ACCEL)):
        recs[name] = simulate(plan, solve(plan, m), m, 24000, 8)
    rng = random.Random(20261112)
    for name in "LSA":
        late, early = window(recs[name], 400, 1, rng)
        print("{}: discounted share weeks 11-13 {:.3f}, weeks 1-10 {:.3f}"
              .format(name, late[1] / late[0], early[1] / early[0]))
    print("people  quarters   fires L   fires S   fires A")
    for n, k in ((4, 1), (8, 1), (4, 4), (8, 4)):
        row = []
        for name in "LSA":
            hits = 0
            for _ in range(400):
                hits += z_one_sided(*window(recs[name], n, k, rng)) > 1.645
            row.append(hits / 400)
        print("  {:2d}       {}        {:.3f}     {:.3f}     {:.3f}"
              .format(n, k, *row))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Nonlinear Commission Ladders, End-of-Period Timing Manipulation and Quota-Induced Game Distortion (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Detecting the Quarter-End Push: a Test on Weekly Shares and a Discount Monitor. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-213 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026213,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Nonlinear Commission Ladders, End-of-Period Timing Manipulation and Quota-Induced Game Distortion},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book