What does Commission Ladders and the Quarter-End Push conclude, in numbers, about “The Quota Ratchet and Where to Set the Quota: Holding Back and the "One or Two Short" Band”?

Answer: Chapter 5 shows that when the quota follows results upward, long-run profit falls from 2.5333 to 2.2633.

Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (19 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 2.2633, 2.5333

lamtarget at q=10quotasaleshitpayprofit
0.001010.00010.0000.6670.46672.5333
0.2569.0009.0000.6670.43672.2633
0.5069.0008.5710.7140.43572.1357
0.7568.3788.2000.7190.42562.0344
1.0078.2868.2860.7300.43112.0546
linear 5%, no quota: target 9, pay 0.4500, profit 2.2500
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p51: The quota ratchet (Weitzman 1980). Each quarter the
# salesperson picks a sales target y (cost 0.05 (y - 8)^2 / 2 above a
# free level of 8); realised sales are y - 1, y or y + 1 with equal odds.
# Pay is 3% of sales plus a bonus of 0.25 if sales reach the quota q.
# Next quota: q + round(lam (sales - q)), kept within 6 to 16. Value
# iteration (discount 0.9 a quarter) gives the policy; the long-run
# distribution of q is computed exactly by iterating the Markov chain.
# All parameters illustrative.
# 配额棘轮:下季配额随本季业绩上调的比例 lam 越大,越会藏力。
import math

R, B, KQ, Y0, BETA, GM = 0.03, 0.25, 0.05, 8, 0.9, 0.30
QS = range(6, 17)
YS = range(6, 17)


def nxt(q, s, lam):
    return min(16, max(6, q + math.floor(lam * (s - q) + 0.5)))


def solve(lam):
    v = {q: 0.0 for q in QS}
    for _ in range(300):
        new, pol = {}, {}
        for q in QS:
            best = None
            for y in YS:
                vals = []
                for s in (y - 1, y, y + 1):
                    pay = R * s + (B if s >= q else 0.0)
                    vals.append(pay + BETA * v[nxt(q, s, lam)])
                u = math.fsum(vals) / 3 - KQ * max(y - Y0, 0) ** 2 / 2
                if best is None or u > best + 1e-12:
                    best, pol[q] = u, y
            new[q] = best
        v = new
    return pol


def long_run(lam, pol):
    dist = {q: (1.0 if q == 10 else 0.0) for q in QS}
    for _ in range(500):
        nd = {q: [] for q in QS}
        for q in QS:
            for s in (pol[q] - 1, pol[q], pol[q] + 1):
                nd[nxt(q, s, lam)].append(dist[q] / 3)
        dist = {q: math.fsum(nd[q]) for q in QS}
    out = dict(q=[], s=[], hit=[], pay=[], prof=[])
    for q in QS:
        for s in (pol[q] - 1, pol[q], pol[q] + 1):
            w = dist[q] / 3
            pay = R * s + (B if s >= q else 0.0)
            out["q"].append(w * q)
            out["s"].append(w * s)
            out["hit"].append(w * (s >= q))
            out["pay"].append(w * pay)
            out["prof"].append(w * (GM * s - pay))
    return {k: math.fsum(x) for k, x in out.items()}


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print(" lam   target at q=10  quota   sales   hit    pay     profit")
    for lam in (0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0):
        pol = solve(lam)
        r = long_run(lam, pol)
        print(" {:.2f}      {:2d}         {:6.3f}  {:6.3f}  {:.3f}  {:.4f}"
              "  {:.4f}".format(lam, pol[10], r["q"], r["s"], r["hit"],
                                r["pay"], r["prof"]))
    rl = 0.05
    y = max(YS, key=lambda y: rl * y - KQ * max(y - Y0, 0) ** 2 / 2)
    print("linear 5%, no quota: target {}, pay {:.4f}, profit {:.4f}"
          .format(y, rl * y, (GM - rl) * y))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Nonlinear Commission Ladders, End-of-Period Timing Manipulation and Quota-Induced Game Distortion (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: The Quota Ratchet and Where to Set the Quota: Holding Back and the "One or Two Short" Band. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-213 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026213,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Nonlinear Commission Ladders, End-of-Period Timing Manipulation and Quota-Induced Game Distortion},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book