What does Commission Ladders and the Quarter-End Push conclude, in numbers, about “The Quota Ratchet and Where to Set the Quota: Holding Back and the "One or Two Short" Band”?
Answer: Chapter 5 shows that when the quota follows results upward, long-run profit falls from 2.5333 to 2.2633.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (19 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 2.2633, 2.5333
| lam | target at q=10 | quota | sales | hit | pay | profit |
| 0.00 | 10 | 10.000 | 10.000 | 0.667 | 0.4667 | 2.5333 |
| 0.25 | 6 | 9.000 | 9.000 | 0.667 | 0.4367 | 2.2633 |
| 0.50 | 6 | 9.000 | 8.571 | 0.714 | 0.4357 | 2.1357 |
| 0.75 | 6 | 8.378 | 8.200 | 0.719 | 0.4256 | 2.0344 |
| 1.00 | 7 | 8.286 | 8.286 | 0.730 | 0.4311 | 2.0546 |
| linear 5%, no quota: target 9, pay 0.4500, profit 2.2500 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p51: The quota ratchet (Weitzman 1980). Each quarter the
# salesperson picks a sales target y (cost 0.05 (y - 8)^2 / 2 above a
# free level of 8); realised sales are y - 1, y or y + 1 with equal odds.
# Pay is 3% of sales plus a bonus of 0.25 if sales reach the quota q.
# Next quota: q + round(lam (sales - q)), kept within 6 to 16. Value
# iteration (discount 0.9 a quarter) gives the policy; the long-run
# distribution of q is computed exactly by iterating the Markov chain.
# All parameters illustrative.
# 配额棘轮:下季配额随本季业绩上调的比例 lam 越大,越会藏力。
import math
R, B, KQ, Y0, BETA, GM = 0.03, 0.25, 0.05, 8, 0.9, 0.30
QS = range(6, 17)
YS = range(6, 17)
def nxt(q, s, lam):
return min(16, max(6, q + math.floor(lam * (s - q) + 0.5)))
def solve(lam):
v = {q: 0.0 for q in QS}
for _ in range(300):
new, pol = {}, {}
for q in QS:
best = None
for y in YS:
vals = []
for s in (y - 1, y, y + 1):
pay = R * s + (B if s >= q else 0.0)
vals.append(pay + BETA * v[nxt(q, s, lam)])
u = math.fsum(vals) / 3 - KQ * max(y - Y0, 0) ** 2 / 2
if best is None or u > best + 1e-12:
best, pol[q] = u, y
new[q] = best
v = new
return pol
def long_run(lam, pol):
dist = {q: (1.0 if q == 10 else 0.0) for q in QS}
for _ in range(500):
nd = {q: [] for q in QS}
for q in QS:
for s in (pol[q] - 1, pol[q], pol[q] + 1):
nd[nxt(q, s, lam)].append(dist[q] / 3)
dist = {q: math.fsum(nd[q]) for q in QS}
out = dict(q=[], s=[], hit=[], pay=[], prof=[])
for q in QS:
for s in (pol[q] - 1, pol[q], pol[q] + 1):
w = dist[q] / 3
pay = R * s + (B if s >= q else 0.0)
out["q"].append(w * q)
out["s"].append(w * s)
out["hit"].append(w * (s >= q))
out["pay"].append(w * pay)
out["prof"].append(w * (GM * s - pay))
return {k: math.fsum(x) for k, x in out.items()}
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" lam target at q=10 quota sales hit pay profit")
for lam in (0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0):
pol = solve(lam)
r = long_run(lam, pol)
print(" {:.2f} {:2d} {:6.3f} {:6.3f} {:.3f} {:.4f}"
" {:.4f}".format(lam, pol[10], r["q"], r["s"], r["hit"],
r["pay"], r["prof"]))
rl = 0.05
y = max(YS, key=lambda y: rl * y - KQ * max(y - Y0, 0) ** 2 / 2)
print("linear 5%, no quota: target {}, pay {:.4f}, profit {:.4f}"
.format(y, rl * y, (GM - rl) * y))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Nonlinear Commission Ladders, End-of-Period Timing Manipulation and Quota-Induced Game Distortion (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: The Quota Ratchet and Where to Set the Quota: Holding Back and the "One or Two Short" Band. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-213 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026213,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Nonlinear Commission Ladders, End-of-Period Timing Manipulation and Quota-Induced Game Distortion},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Geometry of a Commission Ladder: Kinks, Convexity and Marginal Rates
- Chapter 2 · The Evidence for the Claim: Fiscal-Year Seasonality, Discounted Pull-Ins and the Case Against
- Chapter 3 · Dynamic Programming of Close Timing: Holding, Dragging and Quarter-End Pull-Ins
- Chapter 4 · The Owner's Profit: a Monte Carlo Contest of Linear and Ladder Plans
- Chapter 6 · Detecting the Quarter-End Push: a Test on Weekly Shares and a Discount Monitor
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: "Rewards and Punishments" in the Book of Lord Shang and Taylor's "A Piece-Rate System"
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Commission Plan Simulator, a Monitoring Sheet and a Pre-Registered Test