What does Commission Ladders and the Quarter-End Push conclude, in numbers, about “The Owner's Profit: a Monte Carlo Contest of Linear and Ladder Plans”?
Answer: Chapter 4 compares the owner's profit by Monte Carlo: the linear plan earns 0.2266 a quarter more than the step plan, or 0.089; but at equal pay and one elasticity of effort the step plan wins narrowly, by 0.017, so the claim can only say "often".
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (19 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.089, 0.2266
| plan | profit/qtr | 95% +/- | pay/qtr | deals | cut/qtr | lost/qtr |
| L | 2.7601 | 0.0045 | 0.5520 | 11.040 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| S | 2.5335 | 0.0033 | 0.5576 | 10.411 | 0.0323 | 0.0634 |
| A | 2.5720 | 0.0059 | 0.4777 | 10.551 | 0.1156 | 0.1955 |
| L minus S: 0.2266 +/- 0.0056 per quarter, 0.089 of S | ||||||
| L minus A: 0.1882 +/- 0.0074 per quarter, 0.073 of A |
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p41: The owner's profit, Monte Carlo. Each plan's optimal
# policy (p31) is simulated for 20,000 quarters with a fixed seed; the
# owner keeps a gross margin of 0.30 per list-price unit, minus any
# discount and commission (shared core; parameters illustrative).
# 95% intervals use 100 batch means of 200 quarters each, so that the
# carry-over between quarters does not shrink the interval.
# 老板利润的蒙特卡洛:线性 vs 台阶 vs 加速(批均值 95% 区间)。
import math
import random
# ---- shared core (identical in every DP program of this book) ----
# 一个季度 T 周;每周以概率 p 来一单(标价 1),p 由努力决定,
# 在 [P0, P1] 之间,努力成本为 k*(p-P0)^2/2。来单可当季成交,
# 或压到下季度(每单以 hloss 的概率流失)。最后 pullw 周,
# 每周以 acc 的概率可让下季度的一单打 disc 的折扣提前成交。
# 提前成交的单子下季度不再出现(下季度从负数起计)。
T, P0, P1, GM = 13, 0.6, 0.9, 0.30
BMAX, SMAX = 3, 24
BASE = dict(k=0.2, acc=0.5, disc=0.15, pullw=3, hloss=0.1,
beta=0.9, hmax=4)
LIN = (0.05, 0.05, 10, 0.0) # rate below, rate above, quota, bonus
STEP = (0.03, 0.03, 10, 0.25)
ACCEL = (0.03, 0.08, 10, 0.0)
def inc(plan, k, price):
# commission paid for the k-th deal of the quarter at this price
lo, hi, q, b = plan
if k <= 0:
return 0.0
return (lo if k <= q else hi) * price + (b if k == q else 0.0)
def backward(plan, vst, m):
hmax = m["hmax"]
sn, cn = range(-BMAX, SMAX + 1), range(-BMAX, hmax + 1)
nxt = {(s, c): m["beta"] * vst[c] for s in sn for c in cn}
pol = {}
for t in range(T, 0, -1):
pv, pd = {}, {}
for s in sn:
s1 = min(s + 1, SMAX)
for c in cn:
stay, do = nxt[(s, c)], False
best = stay
if c > -BMAX and t > T - m["pullw"]:
v = inc(plan, s + 1, 1 - m["disc"]) + nxt[(s1, c - 1)]
if v > stay + 1e-12:
best, do = v, True
pv[(s, c)] = (1 - m["acc"]) * stay + m["acc"] * best
pd[(s, c)] = do
cur = {}
for s in sn:
s1 = min(s + 1, SMAX)
for c in cn:
hold = False
if s < 0:
a = pv[(s1, c)]
else:
a = inc(plan, s + 1, 1.0) + pv[(s1, c)]
if c < hmax and pv[(s, c + 1)] > a + 1e-12:
a, hold = pv[(s, c + 1)], True
p = pv[(s, c)]
e = min(max((a - p) / m["k"], 0.0), P1 - P0)
cur[(s, c)] = p + (P0 + e) * (a - p) - m["k"] * e * e / 2
pol[(t, s, c)] = (P0 + e, hold, pd[(s, c)])
nxt = cur
return nxt, pol
def solve(plan, m):
cn = range(-BMAX, m["hmax"] + 1)
vst = {c: 0.0 for c in cn}
for _ in range(400):
w1, pol = backward(plan, vst, m)
new = {}
for c in cn:
if c <= 0:
new[c] = w1[(c, 0)]
continue
terms = []
for n in range(c + 1):
pr = (math.comb(c, n) * (1 - m["hloss"]) ** n
* m["hloss"] ** (c - n))
pay = math.fsum(inc(plan, j, 1.0) for j in range(1, n + 1))
terms.append(pr * (pay + w1[(n, 0)]))
new[c] = math.fsum(terms)
gap = max(abs(new[c] - vst[c]) for c in cn)
vst = new
if gap < 1e-7:
break
return pol
def simulate(plan, pol, m, nq, seed):
# one record per quarter: owner profit, pay, deals by week, etc.
rng = random.Random(20261112 + seed)
c, out = 0, []
for _ in range(nq):
prof, pay, rev = [], [], []
week, pulled = [0] * (T + 1), [0] * (T + 1)
holds = lost = 0
s = c
if c > 0:
s = 0
for _ in range(c):
if rng.random() < 1 - m["hloss"]:
s += 1
else:
lost += 1
for j in range(1, s + 1):
x = inc(plan, j, 1.0)
pay.append(x)
prof.append(GM - x)
rev.append(1.0)
week[1] += s
cn = 0
for t in range(1, T + 1):
p, hold, _ = pol[(t, s, cn)]
if rng.random() < p:
if s < 0:
s += 1
elif hold:
cn += 1
holds += 1
else:
x = inc(plan, s + 1, 1.0)
pay.append(x)
prof.append(GM - x)
rev.append(1.0)
s = min(s + 1, SMAX)
week[t] += 1
if rng.random() < m["acc"] and pol[(t, s, cn)][2]:
x = inc(plan, s + 1, 1 - m["disc"])
pay.append(x)
prof.append(GM - m["disc"] - x)
rev.append(1 - m["disc"])
s = min(s + 1, SMAX)
cn -= 1
week[t] += 1
pulled[t] += 1
c = cn
out.append(dict(profit=math.fsum(prof), pay=math.fsum(pay),
rev=math.fsum(rev), week=week, pulled=pulled,
holds=holds, lost=lost))
return out
def mean(xs):
return math.fsum(xs) / len(xs)
# ---- end of shared core ----
from statistics import NormalDist, stdev
Z = NormalDist().inv_cdf(0.975)
def batch_ci(xs, nb=100):
size = len(xs) // nb
bm = [mean(xs[i * size:(i + 1) * size]) for i in range(nb)]
return mean(bm), Z * stdev(bm) / math.sqrt(nb), stdev(bm) ** 2 / nb
if __name__ == "__main__":
m = dict(BASE)
res = {}
print("plan profit/qtr 95% +/- pay/qtr deals cut/qtr lost/qtr")
for name, plan in (("L", LIN), ("S", STEP), ("A", ACCEL)):
rec = simulate(plan, solve(plan, m), m, 20000, 4)
mu, hw, var = batch_ci([r["profit"] for r in rec])
res[name] = (mu, var)
cut = mean([math.fsum(r["pulled"]) for r in rec]) * m["disc"]
print(" {} {:.4f} {:.4f} {:.4f} {:6.3f} {:.4f} {:.4f}"
.format(name, mu, hw,
mean([r["pay"] for r in rec]),
mean([math.fsum(r["week"]) for r in rec]), cut,
mean([r["lost"] for r in rec])))
for other in "SA":
d = res["L"][0] - res[other][0]
hw = Z * math.sqrt(res["L"][1] + res[other][1])
print("L minus {}: {:.4f} +/- {:.4f} per quarter, {:.3f} of {}"
.format(other, d, hw, d / res[other][0], other))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Nonlinear Commission Ladders, End-of-Period Timing Manipulation and Quota-Induced Game Distortion (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: The Owner's Profit: a Monte Carlo Contest of Linear and Ladder Plans. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-213 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026213,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Nonlinear Commission Ladders, End-of-Period Timing Manipulation and Quota-Induced Game Distortion},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Geometry of a Commission Ladder: Kinks, Convexity and Marginal Rates
- Chapter 2 · The Evidence for the Claim: Fiscal-Year Seasonality, Discounted Pull-Ins and the Case Against
- Chapter 3 · Dynamic Programming of Close Timing: Holding, Dragging and Quarter-End Pull-Ins
- Chapter 5 · The Quota Ratchet and Where to Set the Quota: Holding Back and the "One or Two Short" Band
- Chapter 6 · Detecting the Quarter-End Push: a Test on Weekly Shares and a Discount Monitor
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: "Rewards and Punishments" in the Book of Lord Shang and Taylor's "A Piece-Rate System"
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Commission Plan Simulator, a Monitoring Sheet and a Pre-Registered Test