What does Unbundling, Anti-Arbitrage and Licensing Ladders conclude, in numbers, about “When Bundling Pays: from Two Modules to Four”?
Answer: Chapters 1 and 2 show that separate selling does not generally beat the optimal bundle: under independent, single-scale orthogonal and heavy-tailed demand with tail index 1.5, separate selling earns only 0.825, 0.873 and 0.730 of optimal bundle revenue; only when demand is orthogonal and studios' values are three orders of magnitude above individual users' does separate selling earn 1.479 times the optimal bundle. The loss from a cheap all-access pass comes from high-value buyers coming back down: at a tenth of the sum of single prices, revenue falls to 0.439 of separate selling.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate evidence, 16 runnable Python programs, classical sources and hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.730, 0.825, 0.873, 1.479, 1.5
| regime SEP BUN PASS 1.5x MIX SEP/BUN | |
| indep | 99.82 121.05 73.37 122.31 0.825 |
| prices C,A,M,B | 52.3, 50.5, 48.3, 47.4 |
| bundle 156.8; cheap pass 74.4 | |
| ortho | 25.29 28.95 25.29 28.95 0.873 |
| prices C,A,M,B | 52.5, 53.8, 54.3, 48.4 |
| bundle 50.8; cheap pass 78.4 | |
| segm | 206.54 139.65 151.75 207.16 1.479 |
| prices C,A,M,B | 48.7, 50.8, 51.1, 2558.5 |
| bundle 2647.3; cheap pass 1015.9 | |
| pareto | 31.05 42.51 38.58 41.95 0.730 |
| prices C,A,M,B | 46.0, 39.5, 30.0, 47.9 |
| bundle 92.7; cheap pass 61.3 | |
| (revenue per buyer; cost zero) |
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. [p02] Four modules, four demand regimes, four price plans.
# Modules: C cycle, A acoustic, M metabolic, B business scripts.
# 8,000 simulated buyers per regime (seeds 68..71):
# indep : values iid uniform on 0..100 (light tails, independent)
# ortho : each buyer wants ONE module (uniform 0..100), the others
# are worth 0..5 to her (orthogonal demand, one scale)
# segm : 92% consumers value C, A, M uniform 0..100 and B 0..10;
# 8% studios value B uniform 1,000..5,000 and C, A, M 0..100
# (orthogonal AND three orders of magnitude apart)
# pareto: values iid Lomax, scale 20, tail index 1.5 (heavy tails),
# capped at a budget of 2,000
# Plans: SEP optimal separate prices; BUN optimal pure bundle;
# PASS separate prices plus a cheap all-access pass priced at
# 1.5 x the mean separate price; MIX best of separate prices
# scaled by s (1, 1.25, 1.5, 2) plus a pass on a price grid.
# A price must sell to at least 1% of buyers (no pricing for a single
# whale in the sample).
import random
N, MODS = 8000, 4
def draw(regime, rng):
if regime == "indep":
return [rng.uniform(0, 100) for _ in range(MODS)]
if regime == "ortho":
v = [rng.uniform(0, 5) for _ in range(MODS)]
v[rng.randrange(MODS)] = rng.uniform(0, 100)
return v
if regime == "segm":
v = [rng.uniform(0, 100) for _ in range(3)]
if rng.random() < 0.08:
return v + [rng.uniform(1000, 5000)]
return v + [rng.uniform(0, 10)]
return [min(2000.0, 20 * ((1 - rng.random()) ** (-1 / 1.5) - 1))
for _ in range(MODS)]
def best_price(values):
s = sorted(values)
n = len(s)
top = n - n // 100
return max((s[i] * (n - i), s[i]) for i in range(top))[1]
def revenue(pop, prices, pass_price=None):
tot = 0.0
for v in pop:
sep_s = sum(max(0.0, x - p) for x, p in zip(v, prices))
sep_r = sum(p for x, p in zip(v, prices) if x >= p)
t = sum(v)
if pass_price is not None and t >= pass_price and \
t - pass_price >= sep_s:
tot += pass_price
else:
tot += sep_r
return tot / len(pop)
def plans(pop):
prices = [best_price([v[j] for v in pop]) for j in range(MODS)]
pb = best_price([sum(v) for v in pop])
sep = revenue(pop, prices)
bun = revenue(pop, [1e18] * MODS, pb)
cheap = 1.5 * sum(prices) / MODS
pas = revenue(pop, prices, cheap)
mix = max(revenue(pop, [s * p for p in prices], pb * k / 10)
for s in (1, 1.25, 1.5, 2) for k in range(6, 17))
return prices, pb, sep, bun, cheap, pas, mix
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" regime SEP BUN PASS 1.5x MIX SEP/BUN")
for k, regime in enumerate(("indep", "ortho", "segm", "pareto")):
rng = random.Random(68 + k)
pop = [draw(regime, rng) for _ in range(N)]
pr, pb, sep, bun, cheap, pas, mix = plans(pop)
print(" {:6s} {:8.2f} {:8.2f} {:11.2f} {:8.2f} {:9.3f}".format(
regime, sep, bun, pas, mix, sep / bun))
print(" prices C,A,M,B = {}".format(
", ".join("{:.1f}".format(p) for p in pr)))
print(" bundle {:.1f}; cheap pass {:.1f}".format(
pb, cheap))
print("\n (revenue per buyer; cost zero)")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: When Bundling Pays: from Two Modules to Four. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090184 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-068 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026068,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.24090184},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · How a Cheap All-Access Pass Cannibalizes, and Heavy Tails
- Chapter 3 · Resale Arbitrage and an Identity Hash Lock
- Chapter 4 · Self-Referral, Channel Blow-Through and Imitating Partners
- Chapter 5 · The Six-Tier Menu: an Exactly Solved Screening Problem
- Chapter 6 · How Robust Is the Menu: Misspecified Demand, Add-on Prices and Whale Risk
- Chapter 7 · The Han Tax on Hoarded Cash, the *Guanzi* and Song Salt Vouchers
- Chapter 8 · A Menu Audit and a Pre-Registered Experiment