What does Unbundling, Anti-Arbitrage and Licensing Ladders conclude, in numbers, about “The Han Tax on Hoarded Cash, the *Guanzi* and Song Salt Vouchers”?
Answer: The Pingzhun shu's tax on hoarded cash graded rates by occupation and gave half of the confiscation to informers, a structure that mirrors this book's segment pricing and 50% commission; it also shows how a large share can change the behaviour of a whole society. The *Guanzi*'s "the market is the standard of goods" is a reminder that prices must rest on market values. The over-issue and depreciation of Song salt vouchers are the historical version of resold extra slots.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate evidence, 16 runnable Python programs, classical sources and hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 50
(1) break-even detection probability q* = c / base
c (cash per suan) merchants (2,000) craftsmen (4,000)
60 0.030 0.015
120 0.060 0.030
240 0.120 0.060
informer's share of confiscated wealth: 0.50
(2) buy-back at 0.30 of face -> 3.33 claims per unit
(3) card claims per payment: k=0: 1 k=1: 2 k=2: 3 k=3: 4 k=4: 5
Reading: the Han rule made concealment a bet on a small
detection probability and paid informers half, the same
ratio as a 50% affiliate commission. If a voucher's worth were
the salt behind it over the claims issued, a buy-back at 30%
would mean more than three claims per unit of salt - as a card
with k = 2 extra slots issues three claims for one payment.Show the full program
# Chapter 7. [p14] The numbers of the classics, recomputed.
# (1) Shiji, Pingzhun shu: merchants pay one suan per 2,000 cash of
# declared wealth, craftsmen one per 4,000; concealment is punished by
# a year at the frontier and confiscation, and an informer receives
# half ("yi qi ban bi zhi"). How many cash one suan held is left as a
# parameter c. A merchant who hides wealth W is caught with probability
# q; hiding pays (ignoring the frontier year) when q W < W c / 2,000.
# (2) Songshi salt treatise (Chien 2004): old vouchers were bought back
# at 30 percent of face value. If a voucher's worth is the salt behind
# it divided by the claims issued, that is 1 / 0.30 claims per unit.
# (3) The same arithmetic for a card with k extra slots: k + 1 claims.
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" (1) break-even detection probability q* = c / base")
print(" c (cash per suan) merchants (2,000) craftsmen (4,000)")
for c in (60, 120, 240):
print(" {:17d} {:18.3f} {:18.3f}".format(
c, c / 2000, c / 4000))
print(" informer's share of confiscated wealth: {:.2f}".format(
1 / 2))
print(" (2) buy-back at 0.30 of face -> {:.2f} claims per unit"
.format(1 / 0.30))
print(" (3) card claims per payment: " + " ".join(
"k={}: {}".format(k, k + 1) for k in range(0, 5)))
print("\nReading: the Han rule made concealment a bet on a small")
print("detection probability and paid informers half, the same")
print("ratio as a 50% affiliate commission. If a voucher's worth were")
print("the salt behind it over the claims issued, a buy-back at 30%")
print("would mean more than three claims per unit of salt - as a card")
print("with k = 2 extra slots issues three claims for one payment.")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 7: The Han Tax on Hoarded Cash, the *Guanzi* and Song Salt Vouchers. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090184 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-068 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026068,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.24090184},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · When Bundling Pays: from Two Modules to Four
- Chapter 2 · How a Cheap All-Access Pass Cannibalizes, and Heavy Tails
- Chapter 3 · Resale Arbitrage and an Identity Hash Lock
- Chapter 4 · Self-Referral, Channel Blow-Through and Imitating Partners
- Chapter 5 · The Six-Tier Menu: an Exactly Solved Screening Problem
- Chapter 6 · How Robust Is the Menu: Misspecified Demand, Add-on Prices and Whale Risk
- Chapter 8 · A Menu Audit and a Pre-Registered Experiment