Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders: chapter answers
A digital service that sells four modules - cycle readings, acoustic interventions, metabolic meal plans and business scripts - has to answer three pricing questions: should it offer a cheap all-access pass, may a personal annual card carry transferable extra readings, and how should the price steps run from a lead-in reading to a five-figure business licence? This book writes the three as runnable programs: multiproduct bundling, resale arbitrage and nonlinear pricing (screening). Its demand curves and values are model parameters, not data from any business; it neither claims nor tests that…
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.24090184 · Read the monograph · 中文版
- Chapter 1 · When Bundling Pays: from Two Modules to Four
Chapters 1 and 2 show that separate selling does not generally beat the optimal bundle: under independent, single-scale orthogonal and heavy-tailed demand with tail index 1.5, separate selling earns only 0.825, 0.873 an… - Chapter 2 · How a Cheap All-Access Pass Cannibalizes, and Heavy Tails
The loss from a cheap all-access pass comes from high-value buyers coming back down: once the pass is cheaper than what studios pay for the business module, they all switch; at a tenth of the sum of single prices, reven… - Chapter 3 · Resale Arbitrage and an Identity Hash Lock
Chapters 3 and 4 model resale arbitrage: with a 50% affiliate commission, resale beats referral when the extra slots satisfy k + 1 > 4.020; with self-referral, arbitrage costs half as much and six extra slots make the f… - Chapter 4 · Self-Referral, Channel Blow-Through and Imitating Partners
Self-referral halves the cost of arbitrage: two extra slots make resale beat referral, and at six the firm pays for every resold slot it serves. Imitation among partners spreads profitable resale: with 3 extra slots and… - Chapter 5 · The Six-Tier Menu: an Exactly Solved Screening Problem
Chapter 5 solves the six-tier menu exactly as a screening problem: the optimal prices are 12, 117, 287, 567, 12537 and 34537, and the business licence and agency seat bring about four fifths of profit; with the licence… - Chapter 6 · How Robust Is the Menu: Misspecified Demand, Add-on Prices and Whale Risk
Chapter 6 shows the menu's fragility when demand is misspecified (the worst 5% of worlds earn 0.315 of their optimum), that add-on discounts are right only for negatively correlated values, and a 0.112 chance that a qua… - Chapter 7 · The Han Tax on Hoarded Cash, the *Guanzi* and Song Salt Vouchers
The Pingzhun shu's tax on hoarded cash graded rates by occupation and gave half of the confiscation to informers, a structure that mirrors this book's segment pricing and 50% commission; it also shows how a large share… - Chapter 8 · A Menu Audit and a Pre-Registered Experiment
Chapter 8 gives a four-flag menu audit and a pre-registered experiment (188 channel partners per arm). Marked boxes separate evidence, 16 runnable Python programs, classical sources and hypotheses.
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote