What does Unbundling, Anti-Arbitrage and Licensing Ladders conclude, in numbers, about “How a Cheap All-Access Pass Cannibalizes, and Heavy Tails”?
Answer: The loss from a cheap all-access pass comes from high-value buyers coming back down: once the pass is cheaper than what studios pay for the business module, they all switch; at a tenth of the sum of single prices, revenue falls to 0.439. Heavy tails shrink the bundle's edge from about a third to about 5%, but with this book's parameters do not let separate selling overtake it.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate evidence, 16 runnable Python programs, classical sources and hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.439
| separate prices sum to 2709.1; revenue 206.54 per buyer | ||||
| f | pass price | revenue/SEP | studios on pass | lost/buyer |
| 0.05 | 135.5 | 0.413 | 1.000 | 126.88 |
| 0.10 | 270.9 | 0.439 | 1.000 | 115.79 |
| 0.20 | 541.8 | 0.547 | 1.000 | 93.61 |
| 0.30 | 812.7 | 0.654 | 1.000 | 71.43 |
| 0.40 | 1083.6 | 0.761 | 0.998 | 49.39 |
| 0.50 | 1354.5 | 0.836 | 0.936 | 33.87 |
| 0.60 | 1625.5 | 0.893 | 0.866 | 22.00 |
| 0.80 | 2167.3 | 0.979 | 0.745 | 4.27 |
| 0.90 | 2438.2 | 0.992 | 0.673 | 1.65 |
| 1.00 | 2709.1 | 1.000 | 0.078 | 0.00 |
| Reading: any pass priced below the studio price of B moves | ||||
| studios onto it; the loss is their consumer surplus handed | ||||
| back, and it is not made up by the consumers the pass adds. |
Show the full program
# Chapter 2. [p03] How a cheap all-access pass cannibalizes high-value
# buyers. Regime segm of p02 (92% consumers, 8% studios that value the
# business-script module B at 1,000..5,000). Separate prices are held
# at their optimum; a pass is added at a fraction f of the sum of the
# separate prices. For each f we report revenue per buyer relative to
# separate pricing, the share of studios that switch to the pass, and
# the revenue those studios used to pay that is now lost.
import math
import random
N, MODS = 8000, 4
def draw(rng):
v = [rng.uniform(0, 100) for _ in range(3)]
if rng.random() < 0.08:
return v + [rng.uniform(1000, 5000)], True
return v + [rng.uniform(0, 10)], False
def best_price(values):
s = sorted(values)
n = len(s)
top = n - n // 100
return max((s[i] * (n - i), s[i]) for i in range(top))[1]
def outcome(v, prices, pp):
sep_s = math.fsum(max(0.0, x - p) for x, p in zip(v, prices))
sep_r = math.fsum(p for x, p in zip(v, prices) if x >= p)
t = math.fsum(v)
# an indifferent buyer takes the pass; the 1e-9 keeps that tie a tie
if t >= pp and t - pp >= sep_s - 1e-9:
return pp, sep_r, True
return sep_r, sep_r, False
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(70)
pop = [draw(rng) for _ in range(N)]
prices = [best_price([v[j] for v, s in pop]) for j in range(MODS)]
total = math.fsum(prices)
base = math.fsum(outcome(v, prices, 1e18)[0] for v, s in pop) / N
studios = sum(1 for v, s in pop if s)
print(" separate prices sum to {:.1f}; revenue {:.2f} per buyer".format(
total, base))
print(" f pass price revenue/SEP studios on pass lost/buyer")
for f in (0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0):
pp = f * total
rev, lost, sw = 0.0, 0.0, 0
for v, s in pop:
r, old, took = outcome(v, prices, pp)
rev += r
if s and took:
sw += 1
lost += old - r
print(" {:4.2f} {:11.1f} {:12.3f} {:16.3f} {:11.2f}".format(
f, pp, rev / N / base, sw / studios, lost / N))
print("\nReading: any pass priced below the studio price of B moves")
print("studios onto it; the loss is their consumer surplus handed")
print("back, and it is not made up by the consumers the pass adds.")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: How a Cheap All-Access Pass Cannibalizes, and Heavy Tails. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090184 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-068 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026068,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.24090184},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · When Bundling Pays: from Two Modules to Four
- Chapter 3 · Resale Arbitrage and an Identity Hash Lock
- Chapter 4 · Self-Referral, Channel Blow-Through and Imitating Partners
- Chapter 5 · The Six-Tier Menu: an Exactly Solved Screening Problem
- Chapter 6 · How Robust Is the Menu: Misspecified Demand, Add-on Prices and Whale Risk
- Chapter 7 · The Han Tax on Hoarded Cash, the *Guanzi* and Song Salt Vouchers
- Chapter 8 · A Menu Audit and a Pre-Registered Experiment