关于「捆绑何时有利:从两个板块到四个板块」,《分拆、防套利与授权阶梯》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第一、二章证明,分拆并不普遍胜过最优捆绑:在独立、单一尺度正交与尾指数 1.5 的重尾需求下,分拆只得到最优捆绑收入的 0.825、0.873 与 0.730;只有当需求正交、且工作室与个人用户的估值相差三个数量级时,分拆才是最优捆绑的 1.479 倍。廉价全通卡的损失来自高估值客户的回流:卡价为单品价总和的十分之一时,收入只剩分拆的 0.439。
数据口径:书中以标注框区分证据、16 段可运行的 Python 程序、原典与假说。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.730, 0.825, 0.873, 1.479, 1.5
| regime SEP BUN PASS 1.5x MIX SEP/BUN | |
| indep | 99.82 121.05 73.37 122.31 0.825 |
| prices C,A,M,B | 52.3, 50.5, 48.3, 47.4 |
| bundle 156.8; cheap pass 74.4 | |
| ortho | 25.29 28.95 25.29 28.95 0.873 |
| prices C,A,M,B | 52.5, 53.8, 54.3, 48.4 |
| bundle 50.8; cheap pass 78.4 | |
| segm | 206.54 139.65 151.75 207.16 1.479 |
| prices C,A,M,B | 48.7, 50.8, 51.1, 2558.5 |
| bundle 2647.3; cheap pass 1015.9 | |
| pareto | 31.05 42.51 38.58 41.95 0.730 |
| prices C,A,M,B | 46.0, 39.5, 30.0, 47.9 |
| bundle 92.7; cheap pass 61.3 | |
| (revenue per buyer; cost zero) |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 1. [p02] Four modules, four demand regimes, four price plans.
# Modules: C cycle, A acoustic, M metabolic, B business scripts.
# 8,000 simulated buyers per regime (seeds 68..71):
# indep : values iid uniform on 0..100 (light tails, independent)
# ortho : each buyer wants ONE module (uniform 0..100), the others
# are worth 0..5 to her (orthogonal demand, one scale)
# segm : 92% consumers value C, A, M uniform 0..100 and B 0..10;
# 8% studios value B uniform 1,000..5,000 and C, A, M 0..100
# (orthogonal AND three orders of magnitude apart)
# pareto: values iid Lomax, scale 20, tail index 1.5 (heavy tails),
# capped at a budget of 2,000
# Plans: SEP optimal separate prices; BUN optimal pure bundle;
# PASS separate prices plus a cheap all-access pass priced at
# 1.5 x the mean separate price; MIX best of separate prices
# scaled by s (1, 1.25, 1.5, 2) plus a pass on a price grid.
# A price must sell to at least 1% of buyers (no pricing for a single
# whale in the sample).
import random
N, MODS = 8000, 4
def draw(regime, rng):
if regime == "indep":
return [rng.uniform(0, 100) for _ in range(MODS)]
if regime == "ortho":
v = [rng.uniform(0, 5) for _ in range(MODS)]
v[rng.randrange(MODS)] = rng.uniform(0, 100)
return v
if regime == "segm":
v = [rng.uniform(0, 100) for _ in range(3)]
if rng.random() < 0.08:
return v + [rng.uniform(1000, 5000)]
return v + [rng.uniform(0, 10)]
return [min(2000.0, 20 * ((1 - rng.random()) ** (-1 / 1.5) - 1))
for _ in range(MODS)]
def best_price(values):
s = sorted(values)
n = len(s)
top = n - n // 100
return max((s[i] * (n - i), s[i]) for i in range(top))[1]
def revenue(pop, prices, pass_price=None):
tot = 0.0
for v in pop:
sep_s = sum(max(0.0, x - p) for x, p in zip(v, prices))
sep_r = sum(p for x, p in zip(v, prices) if x >= p)
t = sum(v)
if pass_price is not None and t >= pass_price and \
t - pass_price >= sep_s:
tot += pass_price
else:
tot += sep_r
return tot / len(pop)
def plans(pop):
prices = [best_price([v[j] for v in pop]) for j in range(MODS)]
pb = best_price([sum(v) for v in pop])
sep = revenue(pop, prices)
bun = revenue(pop, [1e18] * MODS, pb)
cheap = 1.5 * sum(prices) / MODS
pas = revenue(pop, prices, cheap)
mix = max(revenue(pop, [s * p for p in prices], pb * k / 10)
for s in (1, 1.25, 1.5, 2) for k in range(6, 17))
return prices, pb, sep, bun, cheap, pas, mix
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" regime SEP BUN PASS 1.5x MIX SEP/BUN")
for k, regime in enumerate(("indep", "ortho", "segm", "pareto")):
rng = random.Random(68 + k)
pop = [draw(regime, rng) for _ in range(N)]
pr, pb, sep, bun, cheap, pas, mix = plans(pop)
print(" {:6s} {:8.2f} {:8.2f} {:11.2f} {:8.2f} {:9.3f}".format(
regime, sep, bun, pas, mix, sep / bun))
print(" prices C,A,M,B = {}".format(
", ".join("{:.1f}".format(p) for p in pr)))
print(" bundle {:.1f}; cheap pass {:.1f}".format(
pb, cheap))
print("\n (revenue per buyer; cost zero)")唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《分拆经济学、防套利身份锁定与多阶授权阶梯》第 1 章「捆绑何时有利:从两个板块到四个板块」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090184 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-068 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026068,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.24090184},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184}
}