关于「自购返佣、渠道穿仓与伙伴的模仿」,《分拆、防套利与授权阶梯》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:允许自购返佣会让套利成本减半:附赠 2 个名额,转售就胜过推荐;附赠 6 个名额,公司开始为每个转售名额倒贴。渠道伙伴之间的模仿会把有利可图的转售扩散开来:附赠 3 个名额并允许自购返佣时,两年后 0.877 的伙伴在转售。身份锁与「不对本人购买付佣金」两条规则合起来,使转售在一开始就无利可图。

数据口径:书中以标注框区分证据、16 段可运行的 Python 程序、原典与假说。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.877

   share of partners reselling after 6, 12 and 24 months
   card                         6 mo   12 mo   24 mo
   identity lock (k = 0)       0.000   0.000   0.000
   k = 3, no self-referral     0.010   0.003   0.000
   k = 5, no self-referral     0.020   0.062   0.380
   k = 3, self-referral paid   0.028   0.122   0.877
Reading: once resale pays more than referral, imitation
spreads it, slowly at first and then fast: most of the channel
within two years when self-referral is paid. With the lock, or
whenever resale pays less, the first resellers die out.

核心公式

\[\frac{(1-\gamma)P}{k+1} - c ,\]
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 4. [p08] Partner dynamics: how fast does a channel turn into
# resellers? 400 channel partners each serve 10 clients a month. Each
# month a partner compares her last-month payoff with that of a random
# other partner and copies the better strategy with probability
# gap / (referral payoff) (pairwise imitation, a discrete replicator
# rule), seed 68. Referral pays g * p2 = 49.5 per client. Resale pays
# p2 - slot cost, slot cost from p05/p07; resale also loses a share of
# clients each month to complaints (10%). Start: 2% resellers.
import random

P2, CARD, G, PARTNERS, CLIENTS = 99.0, 199.0, 0.5, 400, 10

def resale_pay(k, self_ref):
    cost = (1 - G) * CARD if self_ref else CARD
    return P2 - cost / (k + 1)

def run(k, self_ref, months=24, seed=68):
    rng = random.Random(seed)
    resell = [rng.random() < 0.02 for _ in range(PARTNERS)]
    pay_r = 0.9 * CLIENTS * resale_pay(k, self_ref)
    pay_a = CLIENTS * G * P2
    scale = pay_a
    for _ in range(months):
        new = resell[:]
        for i in range(PARTNERS):
            j = rng.randrange(PARTNERS)
            mine = pay_r if resell[i] else pay_a
            theirs = pay_r if resell[j] else pay_a
            if theirs > mine and rng.random() < (theirs - mine) / scale:
                new[i] = resell[j]
        resell = new
    return sum(resell) / PARTNERS

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   share of partners reselling after 6, 12 and 24 months")
    print("   card                         6 mo   12 mo   24 mo")
    cases = (("identity lock (k = 0)", 0, False),
             ("k = 3, no self-referral", 3, False),
             ("k = 5, no self-referral", 5, False),
             ("k = 3, self-referral paid", 3, True))
    for name, k, sr in cases:
        out = [run(k, sr, m) for m in (6, 12, 24)]
        print("   {:26s} {:6.3f} {:7.3f} {:7.3f}".format(name, *out))
    print("\nReading: once resale pays more than referral, imitation")
    print("spreads it, slowly at first and then fast: most of the channel")
    print("within two years when self-referral is paid. With the lock, or")
    print("whenever resale pays less, the first resellers die out.")

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《分拆经济学、防套利身份锁定与多阶授权阶梯》第 4 章「自购返佣、渠道穿仓与伙伴的模仿」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090184 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-068 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026068,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.24090184},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184}
}

本书其他章节结论