关于「自购返佣、渠道穿仓与伙伴的模仿」,《分拆、防套利与授权阶梯》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:允许自购返佣会让套利成本减半:附赠 2 个名额,转售就胜过推荐;附赠 6 个名额,公司开始为每个转售名额倒贴。渠道伙伴之间的模仿会把有利可图的转售扩散开来:附赠 3 个名额并允许自购返佣时,两年后 0.877 的伙伴在转售。身份锁与「不对本人购买付佣金」两条规则合起来,使转售在一开始就无利可图。
数据口径:书中以标注框区分证据、16 段可运行的 Python 程序、原典与假说。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.877
share of partners reselling after 6, 12 and 24 months card 6 mo 12 mo 24 mo identity lock (k = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 k = 3, no self-referral 0.010 0.003 0.000 k = 5, no self-referral 0.020 0.062 0.380 k = 3, self-referral paid 0.028 0.122 0.877 Reading: once resale pays more than referral, imitation spreads it, slowly at first and then fast: most of the channel within two years when self-referral is paid. With the lock, or whenever resale pays less, the first resellers die out.
核心公式
\[\frac{(1-\gamma)P}{k+1} - c ,\]
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 4. [p08] Partner dynamics: how fast does a channel turn into
# resellers? 400 channel partners each serve 10 clients a month. Each
# month a partner compares her last-month payoff with that of a random
# other partner and copies the better strategy with probability
# gap / (referral payoff) (pairwise imitation, a discrete replicator
# rule), seed 68. Referral pays g * p2 = 49.5 per client. Resale pays
# p2 - slot cost, slot cost from p05/p07; resale also loses a share of
# clients each month to complaints (10%). Start: 2% resellers.
import random
P2, CARD, G, PARTNERS, CLIENTS = 99.0, 199.0, 0.5, 400, 10
def resale_pay(k, self_ref):
cost = (1 - G) * CARD if self_ref else CARD
return P2 - cost / (k + 1)
def run(k, self_ref, months=24, seed=68):
rng = random.Random(seed)
resell = [rng.random() < 0.02 for _ in range(PARTNERS)]
pay_r = 0.9 * CLIENTS * resale_pay(k, self_ref)
pay_a = CLIENTS * G * P2
scale = pay_a
for _ in range(months):
new = resell[:]
for i in range(PARTNERS):
j = rng.randrange(PARTNERS)
mine = pay_r if resell[i] else pay_a
theirs = pay_r if resell[j] else pay_a
if theirs > mine and rng.random() < (theirs - mine) / scale:
new[i] = resell[j]
resell = new
return sum(resell) / PARTNERS
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" share of partners reselling after 6, 12 and 24 months")
print(" card 6 mo 12 mo 24 mo")
cases = (("identity lock (k = 0)", 0, False),
("k = 3, no self-referral", 3, False),
("k = 5, no self-referral", 5, False),
("k = 3, self-referral paid", 3, True))
for name, k, sr in cases:
out = [run(k, sr, m) for m in (6, 12, 24)]
print(" {:26s} {:6.3f} {:7.3f} {:7.3f}".format(name, *out))
print("\nReading: once resale pays more than referral, imitation")
print("spreads it, slowly at first and then fast: most of the channel")
print("within two years when self-referral is paid. With the lock, or")
print("whenever resale pays less, the first resellers die out.")唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《分拆经济学、防套利身份锁定与多阶授权阶梯》第 4 章「自购返佣、渠道穿仓与伙伴的模仿」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090184 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-068 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026068,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.24090184},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184}
}