What does Deadlines and Temporal Motivation conclude, in numbers, about “Two Prices of a Deadline: Lost Option Value and the Minimum Late Fee”?

Answer: A deadline has two prices. The first is lost option value, whose curve is steep at first and then flat: keeping two or three spare days preserves most of the value of waiting, and this price falls mainly on time-consistent people. The second is the late fee needed to make a soft deadline bite, with a floor of \(c(1-\beta)/\beta\) that rises steeply as beta falls. Hard interim deadlines lower procrastinators' completion whenever surprises occur, and the more surprises, the larger the loss. Designing deadlines means trading these two prices against each other.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; it is not individual business, legal or financial advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it.

spare days s W(s) saving vs s0 beta 0.6 threshold
08.000 0.000 4.800
17.500 0.500 4.500
27.219 0.781 4.331
46.900 1.100 4.140
86.601 1.399 3.960
166.367 1.633 3.820
206.308 1.692 3.785
naive with beta 0.6 never acts early0.6 W(s) < 6.0 always
minimum late fee per day for a task costing 8.0 today
beta fee fee / cost
0.90.889 0.111
0.82.000 0.250
0.73.429 0.429
0.65.333 0.667
0.58.000 1.000
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p62: Two prices of a deadline. (a) Option value: with daily
# cost 6 + U(0, 4) (illustrative, as in p12), the expected cost of one
# task with s spare days, waited for optimally, is W(s); an interim
# deadline that removes spare days raises it. (b) The smallest late fee
# per day that makes a present-biased worker act on the due day rather
# than slip a day: c <= beta (c + p), so p >= c (1 - beta) / beta.
A, C = 6.0, 4.0

def wait_costs(n):
    w = [A + C / 2.0]
    for _ in range(n):
        x = min(max(w[-1] - A, 0.0), C)
        w.append(A + x - x * x / (2.0 * C))
    return w

if __name__ == "__main__":
    w = wait_costs(20)
    print("spare days s   W(s)    saving vs s = 0   beta 0.6 threshold")
    for s in (0, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 20):
        print("%8d     %6.3f       %6.3f            %6.3f"
              % (s, w[s], w[0] - w[s], 0.6 * w[s]))
    print("naive with beta 0.6 never acts early: 0.6 W(s) < %.1f always"
          % A)
    c = A + C / 2.0
    print("minimum late fee per day for a task costing %.1f today" % c)
    print("beta    fee     fee / cost")
    for b in (0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5):
        p = c * (1.0 - b) / b
        print("%.1f   %6.3f    %6.3f" % (b, p, p / c))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Hyperbolic-Discounting Preference Reversals, Deadline Commitment Devices and the Temporal Motivation Equation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Two Prices of a Deadline: Lost Option Value and the Minimum Late Fee. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-199 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026199,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Hyperbolic-Discounting Preference Reversals, Deadline Commitment Devices and the Temporal Motivation Equation},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

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