What does Deadlines and Temporal Motivation conclude, in numbers, about “Two Prices of a Deadline: Lost Option Value and the Minimum Late Fee”?
Answer: A deadline has two prices. The first is lost option value, whose curve is steep at first and then flat: keeping two or three spare days preserves most of the value of waiting, and this price falls mainly on time-consistent people. The second is the late fee needed to make a soft deadline bite, with a floor of \(c(1-\beta)/\beta\) that rises steeply as beta falls. Hard interim deadlines lower procrastinators' completion whenever surprises occur, and the more surprises, the larger the loss. Designing deadlines means trading these two prices against each other.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; it is not individual business, legal or financial advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it.
| spare days s W(s) saving vs s | 0 beta 0.6 threshold |
| 0 | 8.000 0.000 4.800 |
| 1 | 7.500 0.500 4.500 |
| 2 | 7.219 0.781 4.331 |
| 4 | 6.900 1.100 4.140 |
| 8 | 6.601 1.399 3.960 |
| 16 | 6.367 1.633 3.820 |
| 20 | 6.308 1.692 3.785 |
| naive with beta 0.6 never acts early | 0.6 W(s) < 6.0 always |
| minimum late fee per day for a task costing 8.0 today | |
| beta fee fee / cost | |
| 0.9 | 0.889 0.111 |
| 0.8 | 2.000 0.250 |
| 0.7 | 3.429 0.429 |
| 0.6 | 5.333 0.667 |
| 0.5 | 8.000 1.000 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p62: Two prices of a deadline. (a) Option value: with daily
# cost 6 + U(0, 4) (illustrative, as in p12), the expected cost of one
# task with s spare days, waited for optimally, is W(s); an interim
# deadline that removes spare days raises it. (b) The smallest late fee
# per day that makes a present-biased worker act on the due day rather
# than slip a day: c <= beta (c + p), so p >= c (1 - beta) / beta.
A, C = 6.0, 4.0
def wait_costs(n):
w = [A + C / 2.0]
for _ in range(n):
x = min(max(w[-1] - A, 0.0), C)
w.append(A + x - x * x / (2.0 * C))
return w
if __name__ == "__main__":
w = wait_costs(20)
print("spare days s W(s) saving vs s = 0 beta 0.6 threshold")
for s in (0, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 20):
print("%8d %6.3f %6.3f %6.3f"
% (s, w[s], w[0] - w[s], 0.6 * w[s]))
print("naive with beta 0.6 never acts early: 0.6 W(s) < %.1f always"
% A)
c = A + C / 2.0
print("minimum late fee per day for a task costing %.1f today" % c)
print("beta fee fee / cost")
for b in (0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5):
p = c * (1.0 - b) / b
print("%.1f %6.3f %6.3f" % (b, p, p / c))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Hyperbolic-Discounting Preference Reversals, Deadline Commitment Devices and the Temporal Motivation Equation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Two Prices of a Deadline: Lost Option Value and the Minimum Late Fee. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-199 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026199,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Hyperbolic-Discounting Preference Reversals, Deadline Commitment Devices and the Temporal Motivation Equation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · A Retracted Deadline Experiment: the Evidence For and Against Evenly Spaced Deadlines
- Chapter 2 · Hyperbolic Discounting and Preference Reversal: Where 1/(1+kD) Crosses Over
- Chapter 3 · The Temporal Motivation Equation: Four Levers of Expectancy, Value, Impulsiveness and Delay
- Chapter 4 · Naive, Partly Naive and Sophisticated: Who Sets Deadlines for Themselves
- Chapter 5 · Sizing the Overestimate in "I Will Organise It Myself": the Planning Fallacy and the Gym Contract
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: the Endless Recursion of the "Song of Tomorrow" and Seneca's Ledger of Time
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: Writing Milestones, Client Instalment Deadlines and a Preregistered Test