What does Deadlines and Temporal Motivation conclude, in numbers, about “Naive, Partly Naive and Sophisticated: Who Sets Deadlines for Themselves”?

Answer: In the cost case, people with beta of 1.0 or 0.9 finish on day 1 at a cost of 4.0. At beta 0.7 the three types part ways. The naive and the partly naive believe each day that they will act tomorrow and drag the task to day 4, at a cost of 9.0; the sophisticate foresees that his day-3 self would put it off once more and finishes on day 2 at a cost of 5.0. At beta 0.5 the gap widens: the naif still waits until day 4, while the sophisticate finishes on day 1 at 4.0, because he knows that once today is missed every later self will keep postponing.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; it is not individual business, legal or financial advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.0, 4.0, 5.0

case costbetanaivepartialsophisticated
1.0day 14.0day 14.0day 14.0
0.9day 14.0day 14.0day 14.0
0.7day 49.0day 49.0day 25.0
0.5day 49.0day 49.0day 14.0
case rewardbetanaivepartialsophisticated
1.0day 49.0day 49.0day 49.0
0.9day 49.0day 49.0day 49.0
0.7day 36.5day 36.5day 14.0
0.5day 25.0day 25.0day 14.0
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p41: Naive, partly naive and sophisticated agents (beta-delta
# with delta = 1, after O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999). A one-off task must be
# done on one of four days. Case "cost": doing it costs 4, 5, 6.5, 9 on
# days 1 to 4 (the cost is felt that day). Case "reward": it pays
# 4, 5, 6.5, 9 that day. The agent has present bias beta but believes his
# future selves have beta_hat; he predicts them by backward induction.
# Schedules are illustrative.
X = (4.0, 5.0, 6.5, 9.0)

def plan(bh, sign):
    # day on which each future self acts, as predicted with beta_hat
    n = len(X)
    act = [False] * n
    act[n - 1] = True
    for t in range(n - 2, -1, -1):
        nxt = next(s for s in range(t + 1, n) if act[s])
        now, later = sign * X[t], sign * X[nxt]
        act[t] = now >= bh * later
    return act

def actual_day(b, bh, sign):
    n = len(X)
    for t in range(n):
        if t == n - 1:
            return t
        pred = plan(bh, sign)
        nxt = next(s for s in range(t + 1, n) if pred[s])
        if sign * X[t] >= b * sign * X[nxt]:
            return t

if __name__ == "__main__":
    for name, sign in (("cost", -1.0), ("reward", 1.0)):
        print("case %-6s  beta   naive    partial   sophisticated" % name)
        for b in (1.0, 0.9, 0.7, 0.5):
            cells = []
            for bh in (1.0, (1.0 + b) / 2.0, b):
                d = actual_day(b, bh, sign)
                cells.append("day %d %4.1f" % (d + 1, X[d]))
            print("             %.1f   %s  %s  %s" % (b, cells[0],
                                                     cells[1], cells[2]))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Hyperbolic-Discounting Preference Reversals, Deadline Commitment Devices and the Temporal Motivation Equation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: Naive, Partly Naive and Sophisticated: Who Sets Deadlines for Themselves. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-199 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026199,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Hyperbolic-Discounting Preference Reversals, Deadline Commitment Devices and the Temporal Motivation Equation},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book