What does Deadlines and Temporal Motivation conclude, in numbers, about “The Temporal Motivation Equation: Four Levers of Expectancy, Value, Impulsiveness and Delay”?
Answer: The motivation curve already tells the story. Twenty-one days before the deadline motivation is only 0.364; at 14 days it is 0.533; at 7 days it is 1.000, exactly level with leisure; at 3 days 2.000; on the last day 8.000. The curve rises steeply at the end. This is the last-minute rush as the equation sees it.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; it is not individual business, legal or financial advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.364, 0.533, 1.000, 14, 2.000, 21
| days to deadline D | 21 14 7 3 1 0 |
| motivation M | 0.364 0.533 1.000 2.000 4.000 8.000 |
| baseline window w | 7.00 days |
| lever change window gain elasticity | |
| E E x 1.2 | 8.60 +1.60 +1.129 |
| V V x 1.2 | 8.60 +1.60 +1.129 |
| I I / 1.2 | 8.40 +1.40 -1.000 |
| L L / 1.2 | 8.60 +1.60 -1.129 |
| point elasticity of E, V | 1.143; of I: -1.000 |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Chapter 3. p32: Four levers of the temporal motivation equation. With
# one deadline the job beats leisure (worth L) once D < (E V / L - 1) / I,
# so the motivated window is w = (E V / L - 1) / I days. Baseline E = 0.8,
# V = 10, I = 1, L = 1 (illustrative, as in p31). We move each lever 20 %
# in the helpful direction and print the window and its elasticity.
import math
BASE = {"E": 0.8, "V": 10.0, "I": 1.0, "L": 1.0}
def window(p):
return (p["E"] * p["V"] / p["L"] - 1.0) / p["I"]
def curve(p, d):
return p["E"] * p["V"] / (1.0 + p["I"] * d)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("days to deadline D: 21 14 7 3 1 0")
print("motivation M: " + " ".join(
"%6.3f" % curve(BASE, d) for d in (21, 14, 7, 3, 1, 0)))
w0 = window(BASE)
print("baseline window w = %.2f days" % w0)
print("lever change window gain elasticity")
moves = (("E", 1.2, "E x 1.2"), ("V", 1.2, "V x 1.2"),
("I", 1 / 1.2, "I / 1.2"), ("L", 1 / 1.2, "L / 1.2"))
for key, f, label in moves:
p = dict(BASE)
p[key] = p[key] * f
w = window(p)
el = math.log(w / w0) / math.log(f)
print("%-5s %-12s %6.2f %+6.2f %+6.3f"
% (key, label, w, w - w0, el))
ev = BASE["E"] * BASE["V"] / BASE["L"]
print("point elasticity of E, V: %.3f; of I: -1.000" % (ev / (ev - 1)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Hyperbolic-Discounting Preference Reversals, Deadline Commitment Devices and the Temporal Motivation Equation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: The Temporal Motivation Equation: Four Levers of Expectancy, Value, Impulsiveness and Delay. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-199 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026199,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Hyperbolic-Discounting Preference Reversals, Deadline Commitment Devices and the Temporal Motivation Equation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · A Retracted Deadline Experiment: the Evidence For and Against Evenly Spaced Deadlines
- Chapter 2 · Hyperbolic Discounting and Preference Reversal: Where 1/(1+kD) Crosses Over
- Chapter 4 · Naive, Partly Naive and Sophisticated: Who Sets Deadlines for Themselves
- Chapter 5 · Sizing the Overestimate in "I Will Organise It Myself": the Planning Fallacy and the Gym Contract
- Chapter 6 · Two Prices of a Deadline: Lost Option Value and the Minimum Late Fee
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: the Endless Recursion of the "Song of Tomorrow" and Seneca's Ledger of Time
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: Writing Milestones, Client Instalment Deadlines and a Preregistered Test