What does Deadlines and Temporal Motivation conclude, in numbers, about “Sizing the Overestimate in "I Will Organise It Myself": the Planning Fallacy and the Gym Contract”?
Answer: Chapter 5 finds almost the same overestimate in theses and gym contracts, 1.637 and 1.628, and shows that 80 % confidence of finishing on time requires multiplying one's own estimate by 2.690.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; it is not individual business, legal or financial advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 1.637, 2.690
| ratio of means actual / best | 1.637 |
| lognormal fit of R: mu 0.384, sigma 0.720 | |
| median R 1.468, mean R 1.902 | |
| check: P(R < | 1) 0.297, P(R <= 1.434) 0.487 |
| target on-time multiplier days for a 33.9-day guess | |
| 0.50 | 1.468 49.8 |
| 0.70 | 2.141 72.6 |
| 0.80 | 2.690 91.2 |
| 0.90 | 3.692 125.1 |
| 0.95 | 4.795 162.5 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p51: How large a buffer the planning fallacy demands. Source:
# Buehler, Griffin and Ross (1994), Study 1, honours theses, 33 analysed:
# best guess 33.9 days, actual 55.5; 29.7 % done by the best guess;
# pessimistic guess 48.6 days, 48.7 % done by it. We fit a lognormal to
# R = actual / best guess from the two shares (the pessimistic guess is
# 48.6 / 33.9 of the best guess on average; an approximation) and ask
# what multiplier on one's own guess gives 50 to 95 % on-time.
import math
def phi(z):
return 0.5 * (1.0 + math.erf(z / math.sqrt(2.0)))
def probit(p):
lo, hi = -8.0, 8.0
for _ in range(200):
mid = (lo + hi) / 2.0
if phi(mid) < p:
lo = mid
else:
hi = mid
return (lo + hi) / 2.0
BEST, ACTUAL, PESS = 33.9, 55.5, 48.6
P_BEST, P_PESS = 0.297, 0.487
if __name__ == "__main__":
z1, z2 = probit(P_BEST), probit(P_PESS)
x2 = math.log(PESS / BEST)
sig = x2 / (z2 - z1)
mu = -z1 * sig
print("ratio of means actual / best: %.3f" % (ACTUAL / BEST))
print("lognormal fit of R: mu %.3f, sigma %.3f" % (mu, sig))
print("median R %.3f, mean R %.3f" % (math.exp(mu),
math.exp(mu + sig * sig / 2)))
print("check: P(R <= 1) %.3f, P(R <= %.3f) %.3f"
% (phi(-mu / sig), PESS / BEST, phi((x2 - mu) / sig)))
print("target on-time multiplier days for a 33.9-day guess")
for p in (0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95):
m = math.exp(mu + probit(p) * sig)
print(" %.2f %6.3f %6.1f" % (p, m, m * BEST))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Hyperbolic-Discounting Preference Reversals, Deadline Commitment Devices and the Temporal Motivation Equation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Sizing the Overestimate in "I Will Organise It Myself": the Planning Fallacy and the Gym Contract. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-199 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026199,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Hyperbolic-Discounting Preference Reversals, Deadline Commitment Devices and the Temporal Motivation Equation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · A Retracted Deadline Experiment: the Evidence For and Against Evenly Spaced Deadlines
- Chapter 2 · Hyperbolic Discounting and Preference Reversal: Where 1/(1+kD) Crosses Over
- Chapter 3 · The Temporal Motivation Equation: Four Levers of Expectancy, Value, Impulsiveness and Delay
- Chapter 4 · Naive, Partly Naive and Sophisticated: Who Sets Deadlines for Themselves
- Chapter 6 · Two Prices of a Deadline: Lost Option Value and the Minimum Late Fee
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: the Endless Recursion of the "Song of Tomorrow" and Seneca's Ledger of Time
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: Writing Milestones, Client Instalment Deadlines and a Preregistered Test