What does Choice Architecture and Pricing Interfaces conclude, in numbers, about “Time: Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting, Procrastination and the Friction of Forms”?
Answer: The quasi-hyperbolic discount function originates in Phelps and Pollak's intergenerational model; Laibson applied it to one person's dates; it and the hyperbolic function both produce preference reversals, the exponential does not. Present bias is clearer in effort tasks than in choices over money. In the author's form model the threshold for today beating tomorrow is 2 steps; with 3 to 14 steps the naive person waits for the last day and completes with probability 0.488, while the sophisticated person completes on day 2 with probability 0.902 for 4 to 7 steps, her day of action becoming non-monotone beyond that; when cost exceeds \(\beta V\) both give up. Defaults make no difference for exponential discounters, change the outcome for about half of naive people and for about a tenth of sophisticated ones. The framework's "procrastination–default threshold" is, in this model, two thresholds, and it is the author's model, not a published result.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's models and hypotheses; all data in the book are fictional or simulated.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.488, 0.902, 14
| V | 10.0, e = 0.5 per step, beta = 0.7, q = 0.05 per day, window T = 14 days |
| acting today beats acting tomorrow iff C <= beta q V / (1 - beta (1 - q)) | 1.045 |
| steps cost exponential naive sophisticated | |
| (first day on which the form is done, P(done)) | |
| 1 | 0.5 day 0 1.000 day 0 1.000 day 0 1.000 |
| 2 | 1.0 day 0 1.000 day 0 1.000 day 0 1.000 |
| 3 | 1.5 day 0 1.000 day 14 0.488 day 0 1.000 |
| 4 | 2.0 day 0 1.000 day 14 0.488 day 2 0.902 |
| 6 | 3.0 day 0 1.000 day 14 0.488 day 2 0.902 |
| 10 | 5.0 day 0 1.000 day 14 0.488 day 3 0.857 |
| 13 | 6.5 day 0 1.000 day 14 0.488 day 14 0.488 |
| 14 | 7.0 day 0 1.000 day 14 0.488 day 14 0.488 |
| 21 | 10.5 never 0.000 never 0.000 never 0.000 |
| sophisticated, first day by steps 1..15 | 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 5 3 14 14 14 14 - |
| enrolment after the window, m | 6 steps, 30 % of people would rather not join: |
| exponential : opt-in form 0.700; opt-out form 0.700 (target 0.700) | |
| naive : opt-in form 0.341; opt-out form 0.854 (target 0.700) | |
| sophisticated: opt-in form 0.632; opt-out form 0.729 (target 0.700) |
Key formula
Show the full program
# THE AUTHOR'S MODEL of a multi-step form, in the setting of O'Donoghue & Rabin (1999).
# Completing it costs C = m * e on the day it is done (m steps, effort e each); the
# benefit V comes later, so on that day it carries the factor beta (delta = 1 within the
# window). The offer closes after day T; each day a person who has not acted drops out
# (forgets, loses the tab) with probability q. Self t acts iff acting beats her forecast:
# act now: -C + beta V; if the next self to act does so k days later:
# wait: beta (1 - q)^k (V - C).
# Exponential (beta = 1) forecasts correctly; a naive person forecasts that tomorrow's
# self will act (k = 1) whenever C <= V; a sophisticated person solves backwards.
V, E, BETA, Q, T = 10.0, 0.5, 0.7, 0.05, 14
def plan(C, beta, kind):
"""Return the first day on which the form is done (None = never)."""
act = [False] * (T + 1)
act[T] = -C + beta * V >= 0
for t in range(T - 1, -1, -1):
if kind == "naive": # believes she will do it tomorrow
k = 1 if C <= V else None
else: # knows the next self who acts
k = next((j - t for j in range(t + 1, T + 1) if act[j]), None)
wait = beta * (1 - Q) ** k * (V - C) if k else 0.0
act[t] = -C + beta * V >= max(wait, 0.0) and -C + beta * V >= 0
return next((t for t in range(T + 1) if act[t]), None)
def done(m, kind):
day = plan(m * E, 1.0 if kind == "exponential" else BETA, kind)
return day, (0.0 if day is None else (1 - Q) ** day)
c_s = BETA * Q * V / (1 - BETA * (1 - Q))
print(f"V = {V}, e = {E} per step, beta = {BETA}, q = {Q} per day, window T = {T} days")
print("acting today beats acting tomorrow iff C <= beta q V / (1 - beta (1 - q))"
f" = {c_s:.3f}")
print(" steps cost exponential naive sophisticated")
print(" (first day on which the form is done, P(done))")
for m in (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 13, 14, 21):
cells = []
for kind in ("exponential", "naive", "sophisticated"):
day, p = done(m, kind)
cells.append(f"{'never' if day is None else 'day ' + str(day):>6s} {p:5.3f}")
print(f" {m:5d} {m * E:5.1f} " + " ".join(cells))
print("sophisticated, first day by steps 1..15: "
+ " ".join("-" if d is None else str(d) for d in
(done(m, "sophisticated")[0] for m in range(1, 16))))
print("enrolment after the window, m = 6 steps, 30 % of people would rather not join:")
for kind in ("exponential", "naive", "sophisticated"):
p = done(6, kind)[1]
print(f" {kind:13s}: opt-in form {0.7 * p:.3f};"
f" opt-out form {0.7 + 0.3 * (1 - p):.3f}"
f" (target 0.700)")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Choice Architecture, Cumulative Prospect Theory and Computational Behavioural Economics of Pricing Interfaces (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Time: Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting, Procrastination and the Friction of Forms. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836260
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23836260 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-047 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026047,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Choice Architecture, Cumulative Prospect Theory and Computational Behavioural Economics of Pricing Interfaces},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23836260},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836260}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · How Many Options: Choice Overload and the Size of Nudge Effects
- Chapter 2 · Struck-Through and Reference Prices: Transaction Utility, Credibility and Price-Indication Rules
- Chapter 3 · Cumulative Prospect Theory: Value Functions, Probability Weights and Rank Dependence
- Chapter 4 · Loss Aversion and Framing: From Individual Choice to a "Conversion Gap"
- Chapter 5 · Decoys and Compromises: Regularity in Discrete-Choice Models and Its Violation
- Chapter 7 · Reading the Classics: Weight and Lightness in the *Guanzi* and the Policies of Jiran
- Chapter 8 · Practice and Pre-Registered Testing