What does Choice Architecture and Pricing Interfaces conclude, in numbers, about “Loss Aversion and Framing: From Individual Choice to a "Conversion Gap"”?
Answer: The meta-analytic mean of the loss-aversion coefficient is about 1.96, but estimates vary with the task, the stakes and the model specification, and some researchers dispute that losses generally outweigh gains. The program shows a decision-maker with a true \(\lambda = 1.5\) estimated at 1.43, 1.13 and 0.88 by a linear model depending on the stakes. Framing effects are reliable but small to moderate overall. Cumulative prospect theory yields values, not shares; a "conversion gap" requires a link function and a scale parameter; the 1992 medians with one common scale cannot fit both shares in the Asian disease problem, and in the checkout example the framing gap ranges from 4.3 to 26.7 percentage points. The framework's "conversion gap" can only be illustrative.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's models and hypotheses; all data in the book are fictional or simulated.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.88, 1.13, 1.43, 1.5
| true: alpha 0.88, beta 0.80, lambda 1.5, w+(.5) .421, w-(.5) .454 | |
| indifference loss L* for gain G (P(accept) | 1/2), and the ratio G / L*: |
| G | 10: L* = 6.90, G / L* = 1.449 |
| G | 100: L* = 86.88, G / L* = 1.151 |
| G | 1000: L* = 1093.75, G / L* = 0.914 |
| analyst's linear-value lambda, 400 simulated choices per stake range | |
| small stakes, G in 2..20 : lambda-hat | 1.43 |
| medium, G in 20..200 : lambda-hat | 1.13 |
| large, G in 200..2000 : lambda-hat | 0.88 |
| true lambda is 1.5; only if alpha = beta and w+ = w- would G / L* equal | |
| lambda^(1/alpha) | 1.585 at every stake |
Show the full program
# What a "loss-aversion coefficient" measures depends on the model it is estimated in.
# A FICTITIOUS chooser accepts or rejects 50-50 mixed gambles (win G, lose L). Her true
# CPT parameters: alpha = 0.88 (gains), beta = 0.80 (losses), lambda = 1.5, TK (1992)
# weights w+(.5) = 0.421, w-(.5) = 0.454. An analyst fits lambda by maximum likelihood
# assuming linear value and equal weights: P(accept) = logistic((G - lam L) / s).
# Same data, different stake ranges -> different "lambda".
import math, random
AL, BE, LAM, WP, WM = 0.88, 0.80, 1.5, 0.421, 0.454
def accept_prob(G, L, tau=0.5):
u = WP * G ** AL - WM * LAM * L ** BE
return 1 / (1 + math.exp(-u / tau))
def fit(data):
best = None
for i in range(50, 401): # lam 0.50 .. 4.00
lam = i / 100
for s in (0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64):
ll = 0.0
for G, L, y in data:
z = (G - lam * L) / s * (1 if y else -1) # stable log-likelihood
ll -= math.log1p(math.exp(-z)) if z > 0 else math.log1p(math.exp(z)) - z
if best is None or ll > best[0]:
best = (ll, lam, s)
return best[1]
rng = random.Random(1992)
print("true: alpha 0.88, beta 0.80, lambda 1.5, w+(.5) .421, w-(.5) .454")
print("indifference loss L* for gain G (P(accept) = 1/2), and the ratio G / L*:")
for G in (10, 100, 1000):
Ls = ((WP * G ** AL) / (WM * LAM)) ** (1 / BE)
print(f" G = {G:5d}: L* = {Ls:7.2f}, G / L* = {G / Ls:.3f}")
print("analyst's linear-value lambda, 400 simulated choices per stake range")
for lab, lo, hi in (("small stakes, G in 2..20", 2, 20),
("medium, G in 20..200", 20, 200),
("large, G in 200..2000", 200, 2000)):
data = []
for _ in range(400):
G = rng.uniform(lo, hi); L = G * rng.uniform(0.2, 1.2)
data.append((G, L, rng.random() < accept_prob(G, L)))
print(f" {lab:26s}: lambda-hat = {fit(data):.2f}")
print(f"true lambda is {LAM}; only if alpha = beta and w+ = w- would G / L* equal")
print(f" lambda^(1/alpha) = {LAM ** (1 / AL):.3f} at every stake")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Choice Architecture, Cumulative Prospect Theory and Computational Behavioural Economics of Pricing Interfaces (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: Loss Aversion and Framing: From Individual Choice to a "Conversion Gap". 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836260
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23836260 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-047 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026047,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Choice Architecture, Cumulative Prospect Theory and Computational Behavioural Economics of Pricing Interfaces},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23836260},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836260}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · How Many Options: Choice Overload and the Size of Nudge Effects
- Chapter 2 · Struck-Through and Reference Prices: Transaction Utility, Credibility and Price-Indication Rules
- Chapter 3 · Cumulative Prospect Theory: Value Functions, Probability Weights and Rank Dependence
- Chapter 5 · Decoys and Compromises: Regularity in Discrete-Choice Models and Its Violation
- Chapter 6 · Time: Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting, Procrastination and the Friction of Forms
- Chapter 7 · Reading the Classics: Weight and Lightness in the *Guanzi* and the Policies of Jiran
- Chapter 8 · Practice and Pre-Registered Testing