Choice Architecture, Cumulative Prospect Theory and Computational Behavioural Economics of Pricing Interfaces: chapter answers
Do more options sell more or less? How far can a struck-through price raise what a customer is willing to pay? Does an unattractive option placed next to the middle of three tiers make the middle tier sell better? This book presents mathematical models for teaching and research; it is not marketing, legal or compliance advice. It covers the evidence on choice overload and its limits (in the jam study 2.8 % against 29.8 % of those who stopped bought, 1.7 % against 11.9 % of those who passed; a meta-analysis found a mean effect near zero with large heterogeneity, and a later one identified four…
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23836260 · Read the monograph · 中文版
- Chapter 1 · How Many Options: Choice Overload and the Size of Nudge Effects
The "3 % against 30 %" of the jam study is the purchase share among those who stopped; per passer-by it is 1.7 % against 11.9 %, and the 24-jam display drew more people in. Meta-analysis shows a mean choice-overload eff… - Chapter 2 · Struck-Through and Reference Prices: Transaction Utility, Credibility and Price-Indication Rules
Thaler's transaction utility explains a struck-through price as raising the reference price. The evidence checked shows that reference-price effects exist and that exaggerated reference prices lose credibility, without… - Chapter 3 · Cumulative Prospect Theory: Value Functions, Probability Weights and Rank Dependence
The value-function parameters of 1992 cumulative prospect theory, $\alpha = \beta = 0.88$ and $\lambda = 2.25$, match the author's framework, but they are medians from 25 graduate students not paid according to their ch… - Chapter 4 · Loss Aversion and Framing: From Individual Choice to a "Conversion Gap"
The meta-analytic mean of the loss-aversion coefficient is about 1.96, but estimates vary with the task, the stakes and the model specification, and some researchers dispute that losses generally outweigh gains. The pro… - Chapter 5 · Decoys and Compromises: Regularity in Discrete-Choice Models and Its Violation
The multinomial logit satisfies IIA, so adding a decoy lowers the shares of all existing options proportionally. More generally, every random utility model satisfies regularity, so the decoy effect violates all random u… - Chapter 6 · Time: Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting, Procrastination and the Friction of Forms
The quasi-hyperbolic discount function originates in Phelps and Pollak's intergenerational model; Laibson applied it to one person's dates; it and the hyperbolic function both produce preference reversals, the exponenti… - Chapter 7 · Reading the Classics: Weight and Lightness in the *Guanzi* and the Policies of Jiran
With no persistence in harvest shocks ($\rho = 0$), without a granary the mean price is 54.0 with standard deviation 22.8, and of 4,000 years 399 fall below 30 and 490 rise above 80; the granary brings the years above 8… - Chapter 8 · Practice and Pre-Registered Testing
Chapter 8 gives a four-step checklist (options, reference prices, decoys, friction and defaults) and a pre-registered online randomised experiment: on a three-tier pricing page for a fictitious product, run by independe…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote