What does Choice Architecture and Pricing Interfaces conclude, in numbers, about “Decoys and Compromises: Regularity in Discrete-Choice Models and Its Violation”?
Answer: The multinomial logit satisfies IIA, so adding a decoy lowers the shares of all existing options proportionally. More generally, every random utility model satisfies regularity, so the decoy effect violates all random utility models; correlated errors can at most stop the decoy from taking share, never make the target rise. In the Tversky–Simonson model the attraction effect appears once the weight on relative advantage passes a threshold (between 0.01 and 0.03 in the example), while the compromise effect also needs a convex disadvantage function; in MDFT both depend on lateral inhibition, the compromise effect needing broader and stronger inhibition. Empirically the attraction effect replicates in abstract choices with numerical attributes but often vanishes or even reverses with perceptual and experiential attributes, and only 11 % to 25 % notice dominance in the field. The example prices are the same as 5D Library's own, and nothing in this chapter validates them.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's models and hypotheses; all data in the book are fictional or simulated.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.01, 0.03
| attribute values (affordability, quality): | ||||||
| basic 1.000, 0.20; standard 0.524, 0.68; premium 0.200, 1.00; decoy 0.474, 0.58 | ||||||
| attraction: standard's share, three tiers -> three tiers plus decoy | ||||||
| compromise: standard/basic odds, {basic, standard} -> {basic, standard, premium} | ||||||
| theta | kappa | 3 tiers | +decoy | change | odds 2 tiers | odds 3 tiers |
| 0.00 | 0.0 | 0.333 | 0.310 | -2.3 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| 0.01 | 0.0 | 0.333 | 0.321 | -1.3 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| 0.01 | 2.0 | 0.335 | 0.325 | -1.0 | 1.000 | 1.010 |
| 0.03 | 0.0 | 0.333 | 0.342 | +0.8 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| 0.03 | 2.0 | 0.339 | 0.354 | +1.6 | 1.000 | 1.030 |
| 0.10 | 0.0 | 0.333 | 0.416 | +8.3 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| 0.10 | 2.0 | 0.351 | 0.464 | +11.2 | 1.000 | 1.105 |
| 0.30 | 0.0 | 0.333 | 0.625 | +29.1 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| 0.30 | 2.0 | 0.389 | 0.751 | +36.2 | 1.000 | 1.349 |
| 0.60 | 0.0 | 0.333 | 0.850 | +51.6 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| 0.60 | 2.0 | 0.446 | 0.949 | +50.3 | 1.000 | 1.821 |
| theta 0.3, kappa 2: decoy share 0.005; shares basic 0.105, premium 0.140 |
Show the full program
# Tversky & Simonson (1993) context-dependent model on a FICTITIOUS three-tier page.
# Attribute values v1 = affordability, v2 = quality. Relative advantage of x over y:
# A(x, y) = sum_i max(v_i(x) - v_i(y), 0)
# D(x, y) = sum_i delta(max(v_i(y) - v_i(x), 0))
# R(x, y) = A / (A + D); V(x | S) = v1(x) + v2(x) + theta * sum_{y in S} R(x, y)
# delta(t) = t + kappa t^2 is increasing and convex with delta(t) >= t (loss aversion).
# To get shares we add a logit error, P(x | S) ~ exp(V(x | S) / tau) (our choice; the
# model itself compares values). theta = 0 reduces it to a multinomial logit.
import math
def afford(price): # log-price scale between 9.99 (1.0) and 149.00 (0.2)
return 1 - 0.8 * math.log(price / 9.99) / math.log(149.0 / 9.99)
S_ = afford(49.90) # the three tiers lie on one line: v1 + v2 = 1.2
TIERS = {"basic": (afford(9.99), 0.20), "standard": (S_, 1.2 - S_),
"premium": (afford(149.0), 1.00)}
DECOY = {"decoy": (S_ - 0.05, 1.1 - S_)} # worse than standard on both attributes
def rel(x, y, kappa):
a = sum(max(p - q, 0) for p, q in zip(x, y))
d = sum(t + kappa * t * t for t in (max(q - p, 0) for p, q in zip(x, y)))
return 0.5 if a + d == 0 else a / (a + d)
def shares(opts, theta, kappa=1.0, tau=0.1):
V = {k: sum(x) + theta * sum(rel(x, y, kappa) for j, y in opts.items() if j != k)
for k, x in opts.items()}
m = max(V.values()); e = {k: math.exp((v - m) / tau) for k, v in V.items()}
s = sum(e.values()); return {k: x / s for k, x in e.items()}
print("attribute values (affordability, quality):")
ALL = {**TIERS, **DECOY}
print(" " + "; ".join(f"{k} {x[0]:.3f}, {x[1]:.2f}" for k, x in ALL.items()))
print("attraction: standard's share, three tiers -> three tiers plus decoy")
print("compromise: standard/basic odds, {basic, standard} -> {basic, standard, premium}")
print(" theta kappa 3 tiers +decoy change odds 2 tiers odds 3 tiers")
for theta in (0.0, 0.01, 0.03, 0.1, 0.3, 0.6):
for kappa in ((0.0, 2.0) if theta else (0.0,)):
s3 = shares(TIERS, theta, kappa)
s4 = shares({**TIERS, **DECOY}, theta, kappa)
two = {k: TIERS[k] for k in ("basic", "standard")}
s2 = shares(two, theta, kappa)
print(f" {theta:5.2f} {kappa:5.1f} {s3['standard']:8.3f}"
f" {s4['standard']:6.3f}"
f" {100 * (s4['standard'] - s3['standard']):+6.1f}"
f" {s2['standard'] / s2['basic']:12.3f}"
f" {s3['standard'] / s3['basic']:12.3f}")
s4 = shares({**TIERS, **DECOY}, 0.3, 2.0)
print(f"theta 0.3, kappa 2: decoy share {s4['decoy']:.3f}; shares"
f" basic {s4['basic']:.3f}, premium {s4['premium']:.3f}")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Choice Architecture, Cumulative Prospect Theory and Computational Behavioural Economics of Pricing Interfaces (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Decoys and Compromises: Regularity in Discrete-Choice Models and Its Violation. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836260
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23836260 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-047 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026047,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Choice Architecture, Cumulative Prospect Theory and Computational Behavioural Economics of Pricing Interfaces},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23836260},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836260}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · How Many Options: Choice Overload and the Size of Nudge Effects
- Chapter 2 · Struck-Through and Reference Prices: Transaction Utility, Credibility and Price-Indication Rules
- Chapter 3 · Cumulative Prospect Theory: Value Functions, Probability Weights and Rank Dependence
- Chapter 4 · Loss Aversion and Framing: From Individual Choice to a "Conversion Gap"
- Chapter 6 · Time: Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting, Procrastination and the Friction of Forms
- Chapter 7 · Reading the Classics: Weight and Lightness in the *Guanzi* and the Policies of Jiran
- Chapter 8 · Practice and Pre-Registered Testing