What does Choice Architecture and Pricing Interfaces conclude, in numbers, about “Decoys and Compromises: Regularity in Discrete-Choice Models and Its Violation”?

Answer: The multinomial logit satisfies IIA, so adding a decoy lowers the shares of all existing options proportionally. More generally, every random utility model satisfies regularity, so the decoy effect violates all random utility models; correlated errors can at most stop the decoy from taking share, never make the target rise. In the Tversky–Simonson model the attraction effect appears once the weight on relative advantage passes a threshold (between 0.01 and 0.03 in the example), while the compromise effect also needs a convex disadvantage function; in MDFT both depend on lateral inhibition, the compromise effect needing broader and stronger inhibition. Empirically the attraction effect replicates in abstract choices with numerical attributes but often vanishes or even reverses with perceptual and experiential attributes, and only 11 % to 25 % notice dominance in the field. The example prices are the same as 5D Library's own, and nothing in this chapter validates them.

Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's models and hypotheses; all data in the book are fictional or simulated.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.01, 0.03

attribute values (affordability, quality):
basic 1.000, 0.20; standard 0.524, 0.68; premium 0.200, 1.00; decoy 0.474, 0.58
attraction: standard's share, three tiers -> three tiers plus decoy
compromise: standard/basic odds, {basic, standard} -> {basic, standard, premium}
thetakappa3 tiers+decoychangeodds 2 tiersodds 3 tiers
0.000.00.3330.310-2.31.0001.000
0.010.00.3330.321-1.31.0001.000
0.012.00.3350.325-1.01.0001.010
0.030.00.3330.342+0.81.0001.000
0.032.00.3390.354+1.61.0001.030
0.100.00.3330.416+8.31.0001.000
0.102.00.3510.464+11.21.0001.105
0.300.00.3330.625+29.11.0001.000
0.302.00.3890.751+36.21.0001.349
0.600.00.3330.850+51.61.0001.000
0.602.00.4460.949+50.31.0001.821
theta 0.3, kappa 2: decoy share 0.005; shares basic 0.105, premium 0.140
Show the full program
# Tversky & Simonson (1993) context-dependent model on a FICTITIOUS three-tier page.
# Attribute values v1 = affordability, v2 = quality. Relative advantage of x over y:
#   A(x, y) = sum_i max(v_i(x) - v_i(y), 0)
#   D(x, y) = sum_i delta(max(v_i(y) - v_i(x), 0))
#   R(x, y) = A / (A + D);   V(x | S) = v1(x) + v2(x) + theta * sum_{y in S} R(x, y)
# delta(t) = t + kappa t^2 is increasing and convex with delta(t) >= t (loss aversion).
# To get shares we add a logit error, P(x | S) ~ exp(V(x | S) / tau) (our choice; the
# model itself compares values). theta = 0 reduces it to a multinomial logit.
import math

def afford(price):                 # log-price scale between 9.99 (1.0) and 149.00 (0.2)
    return 1 - 0.8 * math.log(price / 9.99) / math.log(149.0 / 9.99)

S_ = afford(49.90)                 # the three tiers lie on one line: v1 + v2 = 1.2
TIERS = {"basic": (afford(9.99), 0.20), "standard": (S_, 1.2 - S_),
         "premium": (afford(149.0), 1.00)}
DECOY = {"decoy": (S_ - 0.05, 1.1 - S_)}        # worse than standard on both attributes

def rel(x, y, kappa):
    a = sum(max(p - q, 0) for p, q in zip(x, y))
    d = sum(t + kappa * t * t for t in (max(q - p, 0) for p, q in zip(x, y)))
    return 0.5 if a + d == 0 else a / (a + d)

def shares(opts, theta, kappa=1.0, tau=0.1):
    V = {k: sum(x) + theta * sum(rel(x, y, kappa) for j, y in opts.items() if j != k)
         for k, x in opts.items()}
    m = max(V.values()); e = {k: math.exp((v - m) / tau) for k, v in V.items()}
    s = sum(e.values()); return {k: x / s for k, x in e.items()}

print("attribute values (affordability, quality):")
ALL = {**TIERS, **DECOY}
print("   " + "; ".join(f"{k} {x[0]:.3f}, {x[1]:.2f}" for k, x in ALL.items()))
print("attraction: standard's share, three tiers -> three tiers plus decoy")
print("compromise: standard/basic odds, {basic, standard} -> {basic, standard, premium}")
print("   theta  kappa   3 tiers  +decoy  change   odds 2 tiers  odds 3 tiers")
for theta in (0.0, 0.01, 0.03, 0.1, 0.3, 0.6):
    for kappa in ((0.0, 2.0) if theta else (0.0,)):
        s3 = shares(TIERS, theta, kappa)
        s4 = shares({**TIERS, **DECOY}, theta, kappa)
        two = {k: TIERS[k] for k in ("basic", "standard")}
        s2 = shares(two, theta, kappa)
        print(f"   {theta:5.2f}  {kappa:5.1f}  {s3['standard']:8.3f}"
              f"  {s4['standard']:6.3f}"
              f"  {100 * (s4['standard'] - s3['standard']):+6.1f}"
              f"  {s2['standard'] / s2['basic']:12.3f}"
              f"  {s3['standard'] / s3['basic']:12.3f}")
s4 = shares({**TIERS, **DECOY}, 0.3, 2.0)
print(f"theta 0.3, kappa 2: decoy share {s4['decoy']:.3f}; shares"
      f" basic {s4['basic']:.3f}, premium {s4['premium']:.3f}")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Choice Architecture, Cumulative Prospect Theory and Computational Behavioural Economics of Pricing Interfaces (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Decoys and Compromises: Regularity in Discrete-Choice Models and Its Violation. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836260

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23836260 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-047 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026047,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Choice Architecture, Cumulative Prospect Theory and Computational Behavioural Economics of Pricing Interfaces},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23836260},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836260}
}

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