What does Choice Architecture and Pricing Interfaces conclude, in numbers, about “Struck-Through and Reference Prices: Transaction Utility, Credibility and Price-Indication Rules”?
Answer: Thaler's transaction utility explains a struck-through price as raising the reference price. The evidence checked shows that reference-price effects exist and that exaggerated reference prices lose credibility, without reversing in those studies; Krishna and co-authors' meta-analysis shows the regular price helping large plausible deals and implausible ones, but not small plausible ones. The author's model shows that as long as credibility saturates with exaggeration, the gain in WTP is bounded (3.00, or 7.5 %, in the example); with suspicion added, very high struck-through prices lower WTP, but that is a hypothesis. The US Guides require the former price to be bona fide and regularly offered; EU Article 6a requires the prior price to be the lowest price in at least the 30 days before a reduction, which blocks "raise briefly, then cut" but cannot by itself exclude a long-standing inflated list price. "Striking through a former price raises willingness to pay without limit" therefore fails in theory, in evidence and in law.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's models and hypotheses; all data in the book are fictional or simulated.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 3.00, 30, 7.5
| author's model: WTP gain over 'no reference' (r0 = V = 40) by was-price R | ||
| R (was) | saturating | backfire |
| 40 | +0.00 | +0.00 |
| 45 | +1.39 | +1.39 |
| 50 | +2.14 | +2.14 |
| 60 | +2.75 | +2.75 |
| 70 | +2.93 | +1.99 |
| 80 | +2.98 | +1.10 |
| 100 | +3.00 | -0.75 |
| 150 | +3.00 | -5.44 |
| 200 | +3.00 | -10.13 |
| 400 | +3.00 | -28.88 |
| ceiling of the saturating gain: theta D / (1 + theta) = 3.00 (7.5% of WTP) | ||
| backfire variant peaks at R = 60.0 (1.50 x r0), gain +2.75; | ||
| its gain turns negative above R = 92.0 | ||
| price history: 39 for 45 days, 59 for 14 days, 39 for 6 days, 'sale' at 29 from day 65 | ||
| price the day before the sale | 39.0 -> announced cut | 26% |
| highest price in the 30 days before | 59.0 -> announced cut | 51% |
| lowest price in the 30 days before (Art. 6a) | 39.0 -> announced cut | 26% |
| 59 held right up to the sale: lowest in 30 days 39, announced cut 26% (not 51%) | ||
| 59 for all 65 days: lowest in 30 days 59, announced cut 51% is allowed by this rule |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Part A: THE AUTHOR'S MODEL of a struck-through ("was") price R. A buyer with internal
# reference r0 and consumption value V pays at most WTP = (V + theta * r) / (1 + theta),
# where theta * (r - p) is transaction utility (Thaler 1985), r the perceived reference.
# saturating: r = r0 + D (1 - exp(-(R - r0) / D)) -- discounted, never reversed
# backfire: the same, minus a suspicion penalty b (R - h r0) once R exceeds h r0
# Either way the gain in WTP is bounded: no struck-through price raises it without limit.
# Part B: the EU rule (Directive 98/6/EC, Art. 6a, inserted by Directive (EU) 2019/2161):
# an announced reduction is measured against the lowest price applied in the 30 days
# before it. A fictitious 90-day price history shows what each reading allows.
import math
R0, V, THETA, D, H, B = 40.0, 40.0, 0.6, 8.0, 1.5, 0.25
def ref(R, backfire=False):
r = R0 + D * (1 - math.exp(-max(R - R0, 0) / D))
if backfire and R > H * R0:
r -= B * (R - H * R0)
return r
def wtp(R, backfire=False):
return (V + THETA * ref(R, backfire)) / (1 + THETA)
base = wtp(R0)
print("author's model: WTP gain over 'no reference' (r0 = V = 40) by was-price R")
print(" R (was) saturating backfire")
for R in (40, 45, 50, 60, 70, 80, 100, 150, 200, 400):
print(f" {R:7.0f} {wtp(R) - base:+10.2f} {wtp(R, True) - base:+8.2f}")
cap = THETA * D / (1 + THETA)
print(f" ceiling of the saturating gain: theta D / (1 + theta) = {cap:.2f}"
f" ({cap / base:.1%} of WTP)")
best = max((R0 + 0.01 * i for i in range(20001)), key=lambda R: wtp(R, True))
neg = min(R0 + 0.01 * i for i in range(1, 40001) if wtp(R0 + 0.01 * i, True) < base)
print(f" backfire variant peaks at R = {best:.1f} ({best / R0:.2f} x r0), gain"
f" {wtp(best, True) - base:+.2f};")
print(f" its gain turns negative above R = {neg:.1f}")
print()
hist = [39.0] * 45 + [59.0] * 14 + [39.0] * 6 + [29.0] * 25 # days 0..89
day = 65
win = hist[day - 30:day]
print("price history: 39 for 45 days, 59 for 14 days, 39 for 6 days,"
f" 'sale' at 29 from day {day}")
for lab, r in (("price the day before the sale", hist[day - 1]),
("highest price in the 30 days before", max(win)),
("lowest price in the 30 days before (Art. 6a)", min(win))):
print(f" {lab:46s} {r:5.1f} -> announced cut {1 - 29 / r:4.0%}")
hist2 = [39.0] * 45 + [59.0] * 20 + [29.0] * 25
print(f"59 held right up to the sale: lowest in 30 days {min(hist2[day - 30:day]):.0f},"
f" announced cut {1 - 29 / min(hist2[day - 30:day]):.0%} (not {1 - 29 / 59:.0%})")
hist3 = [59.0] * 65 + [29.0] * 25
print(f"59 for all 65 days: lowest in 30 days {min(hist3[day - 30:day]):.0f},"
f" announced cut {1 - 29 / 59:.0%} is allowed by this rule")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Choice Architecture, Cumulative Prospect Theory and Computational Behavioural Economics of Pricing Interfaces (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: Struck-Through and Reference Prices: Transaction Utility, Credibility and Price-Indication Rules. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836260
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23836260 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-047 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026047,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Choice Architecture, Cumulative Prospect Theory and Computational Behavioural Economics of Pricing Interfaces},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23836260},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836260}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · How Many Options: Choice Overload and the Size of Nudge Effects
- Chapter 3 · Cumulative Prospect Theory: Value Functions, Probability Weights and Rank Dependence
- Chapter 4 · Loss Aversion and Framing: From Individual Choice to a "Conversion Gap"
- Chapter 5 · Decoys and Compromises: Regularity in Discrete-Choice Models and Its Violation
- Chapter 6 · Time: Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting, Procrastination and the Friction of Forms
- Chapter 7 · Reading the Classics: Weight and Lightness in the *Guanzi* and the Policies of Jiran
- Chapter 8 · Practice and Pre-Registered Testing