What does COD Deposits and Prepay Screening conclude, in numbers, about “Classics East and West: Written Contracts in the Market Chapter of the Rites of Zhou and Montesquieu on Commerce”?
Answer: The deposit lowers personal refusals from 0.20 to 0.1131, with a loss of 0.6183 per order. Under coercion, if nothing is ever recovered, the loss is 1.9573 per order; with a recovery probability of 0.40 it is 1.2039; even with recovery as likely as 0.80, the loss is 0.7058, still 0.0875 more than with the deposit. The last line says that coercion after the fact catches up with the deposit only if recovery succeeds with probability 0.8920. Chapter 1 explained that in cash on delivery a refusal usually creates no enforceable debt, so real recovery rates are far below that figure. Montesquieu's approach was to make up for missing trust with coercion; this book's conclusion is to replace coercion with choice.
Scope of the numbers: No peer-reviewed estimate of refusal rates in Southeast Asia was found, so all parameters are illustrative, and all calculations are generated by the book's programs. This is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.0875, 0.1131, 0.20, 0.40, 0.6183, 0.7058
| ex ante deposit D = 3.420: refusal 0.1131, loss 0.6183 u | |||
| e | refusal | loss/order | minus ex-ante |
| 0.00 | 0.2000 | 1.9573 | 1.3390 |
| 0.10 | 0.1860 | 1.7394 | 1.1211 |
| 0.20 | 0.1730 | 1.5424 | 0.9241 |
| 0.40 | 0.1496 | 1.2039 | 0.5856 |
| 0.60 | 0.1294 | 0.9286 | 0.3104 |
| 0.80 | 0.1119 | 0.7058 | 0.0875 |
| 1.00 | 0.0968 | 0.5262 | -0.0921 |
| ex post matches the deposit only if e >= 0.8920 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 7. p72: Montesquieu's coercion after the fact versus a pledge
# before it. The Spirit of the Laws (XX, 15) argues that commercial
# debts need hard enforcement because merchants must be paid on time.
# Ex post: every refusal is pursued at cost h and the refusal cost K
# is recovered with probability e; the expected penalty e K deters
# refusals, q(e) = q0 exp(-e K / THETA). Ex ante: a deposit D, with
# q(D) = q0 exp(-D / THETA) and the deposit kept on a refusal by the
# buyer. Seller loss per order counts K net of recoveries plus the
# margin m of the sale that did not happen. Basket 20 u, q0 = 0.20,
# D = D*(20, 0.20) from p71; other values illustrative.
import math
K, M, H, THETA, Q0, D = 4.3522, 4.5342, 0.9, 6.0, 0.20, 3.420
def loss_post(e):
q = Q0 * math.exp(-e * K / THETA)
return q * math.fsum([K, -e * K, H, M]), q
def loss_ante():
q = Q0 * math.exp(-D / THETA)
return q * math.fsum([K, -D, M]), q
if __name__ == "__main__":
la, qa = loss_ante()
print("ex ante deposit D = {:.3f}: refusal {:.4f}, loss {:.4f} u"
.format(D, qa, la))
print(" e refusal loss/order minus ex-ante")
for e in (0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0):
lp, qp = loss_post(e)
print("{:5.2f} {:9.4f} {:12.4f} {:15.4f}".format(e, qp, lp,
lp - la))
lo, hi = 0.0, 1.0
for _ in range(60):
mid = (lo + hi) / 2
if loss_post(mid)[0] > la:
lo = mid
else:
hi = mid
print("ex post matches the deposit only if e >= {:.4f}".format(hi))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Cash-on-Delivery Refusal Games and the Trust Deficit in Southeast Asian E-Commerce: Deposit Thresholds and Prepayment-Discount Incentive Design (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 7: Classics East and West: Written Contracts in the Market Chapter of the Rites of Zhou and Montesquieu on Commerce. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-314 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026314,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Cash-on-Delivery Refusal Games and the Trust Deficit in Southeast Asian E-Commerce: Deposit Thresholds and Prepayment-Discount Incentive Design},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Ledger of One Cash-on-Delivery Order: Two Shipping Legs, Damage, Tied-Up Capital and the Arithmetic of Collection
- Chapter 2 · Screening Equilibria: Carrying Rothschild and Stiglitz from the Insurance Market to the Courier's Doorstep
- Chapter 3 · Deposit Thresholds: Sweeping Basket Values and Refusal Rates, and a Rule That Reads Only the Buyer's Own Record
- Chapter 4 · The Optimal Prepayment Discount: Fees Saved, Fewer Second Thoughts and Money Given Away
- Chapter 5 · Whose Failure? Deterrence by Deposit, Fair Forfeiture and the Error Rate of a Flag Built on the Buyer's Own Record
- Chapter 6 · A Fixed-Seed Order Simulation: Four Payment Policies Applied to the Same Buyers
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: the Payment-Method Rule Table, the Deposit Threshold Calculator and a Pre-Registered Test