What does COD Deposits and Prepay Screening conclude, in numbers, about “The Optimal Prepayment Discount: Fees Saved, Fewer Second Thoughts and Money Given Away”?

Answer: Chapter 4 finds an optimal prepayment discount of 0.5556, about 0.0278 of the price.

Scope of the numbers: No peer-reviewed estimate of refusal rates in Southeast Asia was found, so all parameters are illustrative, and all calculations are generated by the book's programs. This is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.0278, 0.5556

COD-only profit per order 2.6234 u
dtake Htake Lgain/orderpiP-piC HpiP-piC L
0.200.04610.00000.013360.38651.6930
0.400.11030.00700.018880.19551.5380
0.500.14290.03910.025000.10001.4605
0.600.17590.07150.025320.00451.3830
0.800.24280.13740.00821-0.18651.2280
1.000.31120.2046-0.03321-0.37751.0730
1.500.48850.3791-0.24829-0.85500.6855
optimal discount d* = 0.5556 u (0.0278 of P)
uptake H 0.1612, L 0.0571; gain 0.02590 u per order
casual buyers start to switch at d = 0.3780 u
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p41: the profit-maximising prepayment discount.
# A seller keeps COD at the market price P = 20 u and offers prepay at
# P - d. Prepay saves the COD fee (0.03) and float, costs an online
# payment fee of 0.015, and a prepaid buyer who changes his mind pays
# the return leg himself (h = 1.8 u) and does so less often: rate
# rho q with rho = 0.6 (commitment, illustrative). A buyer switches
# iff d >= phi (P - d) + rho q h, with his trust cost phi uniform on
# [0, 0.16] (mean 0.08, as in p21). Gain per order:
# G(d) = sum_i w_i s_i(d) (piP_i(d) - piC_i), refusal rates qH = 0.05
# (weight 0.75) and qL = 0.35 (weight 0.25). Grid of 1/1000 u then a
# golden-section polish. Illustrative parameters.
import math

P, C, SO, SR, A = 20.0, 13.0, 1.8, 1.8, 0.8
FEE, E, RHO, H, PHIMAX = 0.03, 0.015, 0.6, 1.8, 0.16
CAP = (C + SO) * 0.12 * 21 / 365
CCOD = C + SO + FEE * P + P * 0.12 * 10 / 365
K = math.fsum([SO, SR, 0.05 * C, CAP])
TYPES = ((0.05, 0.75), (0.35, 0.25))


def pi_cod(q):
    return (1 - q) * (P - CCOD) - q * K - A


def pi_pre(q, d):
    cp = C + SO + E * (P - d)
    kp = math.fsum([SO, 0.05 * C, CAP, E * (P - d)])
    return (1 - RHO * q) * (P - d - cp) - RHO * q * kp - A


def share(q, d, phimax=PHIMAX):
    s = (d - RHO * q * H) / (phimax * (P - d))
    return min(1.0, max(0.0, s))


def gain(d, phimax=PHIMAX):
    return math.fsum(w * share(q, d, phimax) * (pi_pre(q, d) - pi_cod(q))
                     for q, w in TYPES)


def best(f, lo=0.0, hi=5.0):
    d0 = max(range(int(lo * 1000), int(hi * 1000) + 1),
             key=lambda i: f(i / 1000)) / 1000
    a, b = max(lo, d0 - 0.001), min(hi, d0 + 0.001)
    g = (math.sqrt(5) - 1) / 2
    for _ in range(60):
        x1, x2 = b - g * (b - a), a + g * (b - a)
        if f(x1) >= f(x2):
            b = x2
        else:
            a = x1
    return (a + b) / 2


if __name__ == "__main__":
    base = math.fsum(w * pi_cod(q) for q, w in TYPES)
    print("COD-only profit per order {:.4f} u".format(base))
    print("   d    take H  take L  gain/order  piP-piC H  piP-piC L")
    for d in (0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.5):
        print("{:5.2f} {:7.4f} {:7.4f} {:11.5f} {:10.4f} {:10.4f}".format(
            d, share(0.05, d), share(0.35, d), gain(d),
            pi_pre(0.05, d) - pi_cod(0.05),
            pi_pre(0.35, d) - pi_cod(0.35)))
    ds = best(gain)
    print("optimal discount d* = {:.4f} u ({:.4f} of P)".format(
        ds, ds / P))
    print("uptake H {:.4f}, L {:.4f}; gain {:.5f} u per order".format(
        share(0.05, ds), share(0.35, ds), gain(ds)))
    print("casual buyers start to switch at d = {:.4f} u".format(
        RHO * 0.35 * H))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Cash-on-Delivery Refusal Games and the Trust Deficit in Southeast Asian E-Commerce: Deposit Thresholds and Prepayment-Discount Incentive Design (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: The Optimal Prepayment Discount: Fees Saved, Fewer Second Thoughts and Money Given Away. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-314 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026314,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Cash-on-Delivery Refusal Games and the Trust Deficit in Southeast Asian E-Commerce: Deposit Thresholds and Prepayment-Discount Incentive Design},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book