What does COD Deposits and Prepay Screening conclude, in numbers, about “The Optimal Prepayment Discount: Fees Saved, Fewer Second Thoughts and Money Given Away”?
Answer: Chapter 4 finds an optimal prepayment discount of 0.5556, about 0.0278 of the price.
Scope of the numbers: No peer-reviewed estimate of refusal rates in Southeast Asia was found, so all parameters are illustrative, and all calculations are generated by the book's programs. This is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.0278, 0.5556
| COD-only profit per order 2.6234 u | |||||
| d | take H | take L | gain/order | piP-piC H | piP-piC L |
| 0.20 | 0.0461 | 0.0000 | 0.01336 | 0.3865 | 1.6930 |
| 0.40 | 0.1103 | 0.0070 | 0.01888 | 0.1955 | 1.5380 |
| 0.50 | 0.1429 | 0.0391 | 0.02500 | 0.1000 | 1.4605 |
| 0.60 | 0.1759 | 0.0715 | 0.02532 | 0.0045 | 1.3830 |
| 0.80 | 0.2428 | 0.1374 | 0.00821 | -0.1865 | 1.2280 |
| 1.00 | 0.3112 | 0.2046 | -0.03321 | -0.3775 | 1.0730 |
| 1.50 | 0.4885 | 0.3791 | -0.24829 | -0.8550 | 0.6855 |
| optimal discount d* = 0.5556 u (0.0278 of P) | |||||
| uptake H 0.1612, L 0.0571; gain 0.02590 u per order | |||||
| casual buyers start to switch at d = 0.3780 u |
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p41: the profit-maximising prepayment discount.
# A seller keeps COD at the market price P = 20 u and offers prepay at
# P - d. Prepay saves the COD fee (0.03) and float, costs an online
# payment fee of 0.015, and a prepaid buyer who changes his mind pays
# the return leg himself (h = 1.8 u) and does so less often: rate
# rho q with rho = 0.6 (commitment, illustrative). A buyer switches
# iff d >= phi (P - d) + rho q h, with his trust cost phi uniform on
# [0, 0.16] (mean 0.08, as in p21). Gain per order:
# G(d) = sum_i w_i s_i(d) (piP_i(d) - piC_i), refusal rates qH = 0.05
# (weight 0.75) and qL = 0.35 (weight 0.25). Grid of 1/1000 u then a
# golden-section polish. Illustrative parameters.
import math
P, C, SO, SR, A = 20.0, 13.0, 1.8, 1.8, 0.8
FEE, E, RHO, H, PHIMAX = 0.03, 0.015, 0.6, 1.8, 0.16
CAP = (C + SO) * 0.12 * 21 / 365
CCOD = C + SO + FEE * P + P * 0.12 * 10 / 365
K = math.fsum([SO, SR, 0.05 * C, CAP])
TYPES = ((0.05, 0.75), (0.35, 0.25))
def pi_cod(q):
return (1 - q) * (P - CCOD) - q * K - A
def pi_pre(q, d):
cp = C + SO + E * (P - d)
kp = math.fsum([SO, 0.05 * C, CAP, E * (P - d)])
return (1 - RHO * q) * (P - d - cp) - RHO * q * kp - A
def share(q, d, phimax=PHIMAX):
s = (d - RHO * q * H) / (phimax * (P - d))
return min(1.0, max(0.0, s))
def gain(d, phimax=PHIMAX):
return math.fsum(w * share(q, d, phimax) * (pi_pre(q, d) - pi_cod(q))
for q, w in TYPES)
def best(f, lo=0.0, hi=5.0):
d0 = max(range(int(lo * 1000), int(hi * 1000) + 1),
key=lambda i: f(i / 1000)) / 1000
a, b = max(lo, d0 - 0.001), min(hi, d0 + 0.001)
g = (math.sqrt(5) - 1) / 2
for _ in range(60):
x1, x2 = b - g * (b - a), a + g * (b - a)
if f(x1) >= f(x2):
b = x2
else:
a = x1
return (a + b) / 2
if __name__ == "__main__":
base = math.fsum(w * pi_cod(q) for q, w in TYPES)
print("COD-only profit per order {:.4f} u".format(base))
print(" d take H take L gain/order piP-piC H piP-piC L")
for d in (0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.5):
print("{:5.2f} {:7.4f} {:7.4f} {:11.5f} {:10.4f} {:10.4f}".format(
d, share(0.05, d), share(0.35, d), gain(d),
pi_pre(0.05, d) - pi_cod(0.05),
pi_pre(0.35, d) - pi_cod(0.35)))
ds = best(gain)
print("optimal discount d* = {:.4f} u ({:.4f} of P)".format(
ds, ds / P))
print("uptake H {:.4f}, L {:.4f}; gain {:.5f} u per order".format(
share(0.05, ds), share(0.35, ds), gain(ds)))
print("casual buyers start to switch at d = {:.4f} u".format(
RHO * 0.35 * H))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Cash-on-Delivery Refusal Games and the Trust Deficit in Southeast Asian E-Commerce: Deposit Thresholds and Prepayment-Discount Incentive Design (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: The Optimal Prepayment Discount: Fees Saved, Fewer Second Thoughts and Money Given Away. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-314 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026314,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Cash-on-Delivery Refusal Games and the Trust Deficit in Southeast Asian E-Commerce: Deposit Thresholds and Prepayment-Discount Incentive Design},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Ledger of One Cash-on-Delivery Order: Two Shipping Legs, Damage, Tied-Up Capital and the Arithmetic of Collection
- Chapter 2 · Screening Equilibria: Carrying Rothschild and Stiglitz from the Insurance Market to the Courier's Doorstep
- Chapter 3 · Deposit Thresholds: Sweeping Basket Values and Refusal Rates, and a Rule That Reads Only the Buyer's Own Record
- Chapter 5 · Whose Failure? Deterrence by Deposit, Fair Forfeiture and the Error Rate of a Flag Built on the Buyer's Own Record
- Chapter 6 · A Fixed-Seed Order Simulation: Four Payment Policies Applied to the Same Buyers
- Chapter 7 · Classics East and West: Written Contracts in the Market Chapter of the Rites of Zhou and Montesquieu on Commerce
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: the Payment-Method Rule Table, the Deposit Threshold Calculator and a Pre-Registered Test