What does COD Deposits and Prepay Screening conclude, in numbers, about “Screening Equilibria: Carrying Rothschild and Stiglitz from the Insurance Market to the Courier's Doorstep”?
Answer: Chapter 2 solves the separating menu exactly in fractions: committed buyers post a deposit of 4.1108 while casual buyers stay with plain cash on delivery, and when casual buyers are no more than 0.1900 of the market a single pooling contract breaks the menu. The trust deficit is the price of screening: a deposit that stays within the refusal cost and still benefits committed buyers exists only inside a window of trust costs.
Scope of the numbers: No peer-reviewed estimate of refusal rates in Southeast Asia was found, so all parameters are illustrative, and all calculations are generated by the book's programs. This is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.1900, 4.1108
| phi | D* | D*/K | phi*D* | gain_H@0.25 | min share | cap |
| 0.00 | 5.1522 | 1.184 | 0.0000 | 0.4416 | 0.0000 | D*>K |
| 0.02 | 4.8453 | 1.113 | 0.0969 | 0.3447 | 0.0585 | D*>K |
| 0.05 | 4.4479 | 1.022 | 0.2224 | 0.2192 | 0.1310 | D*>K |
| 0.08 | 4.1108 | 0.945 | 0.3289 | 0.1128 | 0.1900 | ok |
| 0.12 | 3.7335 | 0.858 | 0.4480 | -0.0064 | 0.2533 | ok |
| 0.20 | 3.1544 | 0.725 | 0.6309 | -0.1893 | 0.3455 | ok |
| 0.30 | 2.6421 | 0.607 | 0.7926 | -0.3510 | 0.4222 | ok |
| fair cap D* <= K needs phi >= 0.058047 | ||||||
| committed buyers gain at share 0.25 only if phi < 0.117647 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 2. p23: the trust deficit as the price of screening.
# phi is the expected loss a buyer attaches to each unit paid in
# advance to an unfamiliar seller. It is pure deadweight: an honest
# seller gains nothing from it. For each phi the program recomputes
# the separating deposit D*, the deadweight phi D* borne by a
# committed buyer, his gain over pooled COD at a casual share of 0.25,
# and the casual share below which the menu breaks (as in p22).
# Exact fractions; parameters as in p21, phi illustrative.
from fractions import Fraction as F
P, C, SO, SR = F(20), F(13), F(9, 5), F(9, 5)
RATE, DR, DF, FEE, A = F(3, 25), 21, 10, F(3, 100), F(4, 5)
QH, QL, LAM = F(1, 20), F(7, 20), F(1, 4)
c = C + SO + FEE * P + P * RATE * DF / 365
K = SO + SR + C / 20 + (C + SO) * RATE * DR / 365
def price(q, d):
return c + (q * (K - d) + A) / (1 - q)
def util(q, p, d, phi):
return (1 - q) * (P - p) - (q + phi) * d
def deposit(phi):
d0 = price(QL, 0) - price(QH, 0)
return (1 - QL) * d0 / (QL + phi - (1 - QL) * QH / (1 - QH))
def breaks(lam, phi, ds):
ul = util(QL, price(QL, 0), 0, phi)
uh = util(QH, price(QH, ds), ds, phi)
qb = lam * QL + (1 - lam) * QH
lo, hi = F(0), K
for q, t, strict in ((QL, ul, False), (QH, uh, True)):
a = util(q, price(qb, 0), 0, phi) - t
b = util(q, price(qb, 1), 1, phi) - util(q, price(qb, 0), 0, phi)
if b == 0:
if (a <= 0) if strict else (a < 0):
return False
continue
if b > 0:
lo = max(lo, -a / b)
else:
hi = min(hi, -a / b)
return lo < hi
def threshold(phi, ds):
lo, hi = F(0), F(1)
for _ in range(50):
mid = (lo + hi) / 2
if breaks(mid, phi, ds):
lo = mid
else:
hi = mid
return hi
if __name__ == "__main__":
qb = LAM * QL + (1 - LAM) * QH
print(" phi D* D*/K phi*D* gain_H@0.25 min share cap")
for num in (0, 2, 5, 8, 12, 20, 30):
phi = F(num, 100)
ds = deposit(phi)
uh = util(QH, price(QH, ds), ds, phi)
gain = uh - util(QH, price(qb, 0), 0, phi)
cap = "ok" if ds <= K else "D*>K"
print("{:4.2f} {:7.4f} {:6.3f} {:7.4f} {:11.4f} {:10.4f} {}"
.format(float(phi), float(ds), float(ds / K),
float(phi * ds), float(gain),
float(threshold(phi, ds)), cap))
d0 = price(QL, 0) - price(QH, 0)
lowphi = (1 - QL) * d0 / K - QL + (1 - QL) * QH / (1 - QH)
lo, hi = F(0), F(1, 2)
for _ in range(50):
mid = (lo + hi) / 2
ds = deposit(mid)
g = util(QH, price(QH, ds), ds, mid) - util(QH, price(qb, 0), 0,
mid)
if g > 0:
lo = mid
else:
hi = mid
print("fair cap D* <= K needs phi >= {:.6f}".format(float(lowphi)))
print("committed buyers gain at share 0.25 only if phi < {:.6f}"
.format(float(hi)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Cash-on-Delivery Refusal Games and the Trust Deficit in Southeast Asian E-Commerce: Deposit Thresholds and Prepayment-Discount Incentive Design (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: Screening Equilibria: Carrying Rothschild and Stiglitz from the Insurance Market to the Courier's Doorstep. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-314 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026314,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Cash-on-Delivery Refusal Games and the Trust Deficit in Southeast Asian E-Commerce: Deposit Thresholds and Prepayment-Discount Incentive Design},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Ledger of One Cash-on-Delivery Order: Two Shipping Legs, Damage, Tied-Up Capital and the Arithmetic of Collection
- Chapter 3 · Deposit Thresholds: Sweeping Basket Values and Refusal Rates, and a Rule That Reads Only the Buyer's Own Record
- Chapter 4 · The Optimal Prepayment Discount: Fees Saved, Fewer Second Thoughts and Money Given Away
- Chapter 5 · Whose Failure? Deterrence by Deposit, Fair Forfeiture and the Error Rate of a Flag Built on the Buyer's Own Record
- Chapter 6 · A Fixed-Seed Order Simulation: Four Payment Policies Applied to the Same Buyers
- Chapter 7 · Classics East and West: Written Contracts in the Market Chapter of the Rites of Zhou and Montesquieu on Commerce
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: the Payment-Method Rule Table, the Deposit Threshold Calculator and a Pre-Registered Test