What does COD Deposits and Prepay Screening conclude, in numbers, about “Whose Failure? Deterrence by Deposit, Fair Forfeiture and the Error Rate of a Flag Built on the Buyer's Own Record”?
Answer: Look at deterrence first. Without a deposit, casual buyers refuse in person at 0.3250 and, with the other two kinds, fail at 0.3500 in total. With the deposit of 4.111 computed in Chapter 2, personal refusals fall to 0.1638 and total failures to 0.1888; the second-to-last line shows that the personal refusals of casual buyers fall by 0.496, close to half. With a deposit of 5.000 they fall to 0.1412. The marginal effect of deterrence declines: raising the deposit beyond 4.111 buys little further reduction, while the cost borne by committed buyers keeps rising.
Scope of the numbers: No peer-reviewed estimate of refusal rates in Southeast Asia was found, so all parameters are illustrative, and all calculations are generated by the book's programs. This is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.1412, 0.1638, 0.1888, 0.3250, 0.3500, 0.496
| D | qd_L | fail_L | lost_H(A) | lost_H(B) | wrongful A |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.000 | 0.3250 | 0.3500 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.000 |
| 2.000 | 0.2329 | 0.2579 | 0.0858 | 0.0358 | 0.583 |
| 3.000 | 0.1971 | 0.2221 | 0.1205 | 0.0455 | 0.622 |
| 4.000 | 0.1669 | 0.1919 | 0.1513 | 0.0513 | 0.661 |
| 4.111 | 0.1638 | 0.1888 | 0.1546 | 0.0518 | 0.665 |
| 5.000 | 0.1412 | 0.1662 | 0.1793 | 0.0543 | 0.697 |
| at D = 4.111: casual refusals fall by 0.496 | |||||
| rule A charges a committed buyer 2.98 times rule B |
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p51: whose failure is it? Deterrence and fair forfeiture.
# A failed COD delivery has three sources: a refusal by the buyer
# (discretionary, rate qd), the buyer not reachable (qa) and a carrier
# or address error (qc). A deposit D can only deter the first: here
# qd(D) = qd0 exp(-D / THETA), a moral-hazard response. Rule A
# forfeits the deposit on any failure; rule B forfeits it only on a
# refusal by the buyer, refunds it on carrier or address errors, and
# reattempts an unreachable buyer. The table shows the casual type's
# failure rate and, for a committed buyer, the expected deposit lost
# under each rule. All rates and THETA are illustrative.
import math
THETA = 6.0
QA, QC = 0.015, 0.01
QD0 = {"H": 0.025, "L": 0.325}
def qd(t, d):
return QD0[t] * math.exp(-d / THETA)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" D qd_L fail_L lost_H(A) lost_H(B) wrongful A")
for d in (0.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 4.111, 5.0):
fl = math.fsum([qd("L", d), QA, QC])
la = math.fsum([qd("H", d), QA, QC]) * d
lb = qd("H", d) * d
wr = 0.0 if la == 0 else (la - lb) / la
print("{:5.3f} {:7.4f} {:8.4f} {:10.4f} {:10.4f} {:10.3f}".format(
d, qd("L", d), fl, la, lb, wr))
d = 4.111
cut = 1 - qd("L", d) / qd("L", 0.0)
print("at D = {:.3f}: casual refusals fall by {:.3f}".format(d, cut))
print("rule A charges a committed buyer {:.2f} times rule B".format(
math.fsum([qd("H", d), QA, QC]) / qd("H", d)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Cash-on-Delivery Refusal Games and the Trust Deficit in Southeast Asian E-Commerce: Deposit Thresholds and Prepayment-Discount Incentive Design (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Whose Failure? Deterrence by Deposit, Fair Forfeiture and the Error Rate of a Flag Built on the Buyer's Own Record. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-314 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026314,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Cash-on-Delivery Refusal Games and the Trust Deficit in Southeast Asian E-Commerce: Deposit Thresholds and Prepayment-Discount Incentive Design},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Ledger of One Cash-on-Delivery Order: Two Shipping Legs, Damage, Tied-Up Capital and the Arithmetic of Collection
- Chapter 2 · Screening Equilibria: Carrying Rothschild and Stiglitz from the Insurance Market to the Courier's Doorstep
- Chapter 3 · Deposit Thresholds: Sweeping Basket Values and Refusal Rates, and a Rule That Reads Only the Buyer's Own Record
- Chapter 4 · The Optimal Prepayment Discount: Fees Saved, Fewer Second Thoughts and Money Given Away
- Chapter 6 · A Fixed-Seed Order Simulation: Four Payment Policies Applied to the Same Buyers
- Chapter 7 · Classics East and West: Written Contracts in the Market Chapter of the Rites of Zhou and Montesquieu on Commerce
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: the Payment-Method Rule Table, the Deposit Threshold Calculator and a Pre-Registered Test