What does COD Deposits and Prepay Screening conclude, in numbers, about “Whose Failure? Deterrence by Deposit, Fair Forfeiture and the Error Rate of a Flag Built on the Buyer's Own Record”?

Answer: Look at deterrence first. Without a deposit, casual buyers refuse in person at 0.3250 and, with the other two kinds, fail at 0.3500 in total. With the deposit of 4.111 computed in Chapter 2, personal refusals fall to 0.1638 and total failures to 0.1888; the second-to-last line shows that the personal refusals of casual buyers fall by 0.496, close to half. With a deposit of 5.000 they fall to 0.1412. The marginal effect of deterrence declines: raising the deposit beyond 4.111 buys little further reduction, while the cost borne by committed buyers keeps rising.

Scope of the numbers: No peer-reviewed estimate of refusal rates in Southeast Asia was found, so all parameters are illustrative, and all calculations are generated by the book's programs. This is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.1412, 0.1638, 0.1888, 0.3250, 0.3500, 0.496

Dqd_Lfail_Llost_H(A)lost_H(B)wrongful A
0.0000.32500.35000.00000.00000.000
2.0000.23290.25790.08580.03580.583
3.0000.19710.22210.12050.04550.622
4.0000.16690.19190.15130.05130.661
4.1110.16380.18880.15460.05180.665
5.0000.14120.16620.17930.05430.697
at D = 4.111: casual refusals fall by 0.496
rule A charges a committed buyer 2.98 times rule B
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p51: whose failure is it? Deterrence and fair forfeiture.
# A failed COD delivery has three sources: a refusal by the buyer
# (discretionary, rate qd), the buyer not reachable (qa) and a carrier
# or address error (qc). A deposit D can only deter the first: here
# qd(D) = qd0 exp(-D / THETA), a moral-hazard response. Rule A
# forfeits the deposit on any failure; rule B forfeits it only on a
# refusal by the buyer, refunds it on carrier or address errors, and
# reattempts an unreachable buyer. The table shows the casual type's
# failure rate and, for a committed buyer, the expected deposit lost
# under each rule. All rates and THETA are illustrative.
import math

THETA = 6.0
QA, QC = 0.015, 0.01
QD0 = {"H": 0.025, "L": 0.325}


def qd(t, d):
    return QD0[t] * math.exp(-d / THETA)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("  D   qd_L    fail_L  lost_H(A)  lost_H(B)  wrongful A")
    for d in (0.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 4.111, 5.0):
        fl = math.fsum([qd("L", d), QA, QC])
        la = math.fsum([qd("H", d), QA, QC]) * d
        lb = qd("H", d) * d
        wr = 0.0 if la == 0 else (la - lb) / la
        print("{:5.3f} {:7.4f} {:8.4f} {:10.4f} {:10.4f} {:10.3f}".format(
            d, qd("L", d), fl, la, lb, wr))
    d = 4.111
    cut = 1 - qd("L", d) / qd("L", 0.0)
    print("at D = {:.3f}: casual refusals fall by {:.3f}".format(d, cut))
    print("rule A charges a committed buyer {:.2f} times rule B".format(
        math.fsum([qd("H", d), QA, QC]) / qd("H", d)))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Cash-on-Delivery Refusal Games and the Trust Deficit in Southeast Asian E-Commerce: Deposit Thresholds and Prepayment-Discount Incentive Design (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Whose Failure? Deterrence by Deposit, Fair Forfeiture and the Error Rate of a Flag Built on the Buyer's Own Record. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-314 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026314,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Cash-on-Delivery Refusal Games and the Trust Deficit in Southeast Asian E-Commerce: Deposit Thresholds and Prepayment-Discount Incentive Design},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

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