Cash-on-Delivery Refusal Games and the Trust Deficit in Southeast Asian E-Commerce: Deposit Thresholds and Prepayment-Discount Incentive Design: chapter answers
Cash on delivery lets a stranger order with confidence and change his mind at the door for free. This book takes one order apart: with illustrative parameters an accepted order earns a margin of 4.5342, a refused one costs 4.3522 in two shipping legs, damage and tied-up capital, and the break-even refusal rate is 0.4202; under the cautious assumption that any payment by the buyer is voluntary, collection breaks even only when the product of reach and payment rates reaches 0.2068, which is rarely achieved. The central claim is that refusal losses cannot be recovered by chasing buyers afterward…
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- Chapter 1 · The Ledger of One Cash-on-Delivery Order: Two Shipping Legs, Damage, Tied-Up Capital and the Arithmetic of Collection
Expected profit falls fast with the refusal rate. At a rate of 0.05 the expected profit per order is 3.2899; at 0.20 it is only 1.9570; at 0.30 it is 1.0683; at 0.40 it is just 0.1797. The break-even refusal rate is 0.4… - Chapter 2 · Screening Equilibria: Carrying Rothschild and Stiglitz from the Insurance Market to the Courier's Doorstep
Chapter 2 solves the separating menu exactly in fractions: committed buyers post a deposit of 4.1108 while casual buyers stay with plain cash on delivery, and when casual buyers are no more than 0.1900 of the market a s… - Chapter 3 · Deposit Thresholds: Sweeping Basket Values and Refusal Rates, and a Rule That Reads Only the Buyer's Own Record
The first line lists six illustrative records and the second the matching posterior means. A buyer with two orders and one refusal has a posterior mean of 0.167 but fewer than five orders, so he still gets plain cash on… - Chapter 4 · The Optimal Prepayment Discount: Fees Saved, Fewer Second Thoughts and Money Given Away
Chapter 4 finds an optimal prepayment discount of 0.5556, about 0.0278 of the price. - Chapter 5 · Whose Failure? Deterrence by Deposit, Fair Forfeiture and the Error Rate of a Flag Built on the Buyer's Own Record
Look at deterrence first. Without a deposit, casual buyers refuse in person at 0.3250 and, with the other two kinds, fail at 0.3500 in total. With the deposit of 4.111 computed in Chapter 2, personal refusals fall to 0.… - Chapter 6 · A Fixed-Seed Order Simulation: Four Payment Policies Applied to the Same Buyers
Chapter 6 simulates four policies with fixed seeds; the deposit rule with appeal and review earns 3535.44 more than cash on delivery alone. - Chapter 7 · Classics East and West: Written Contracts in the Market Chapter of the Rites of Zhou and Montesquieu on Commerce
The deposit lowers personal refusals from 0.20 to 0.1131, with a loss of 0.6183 per order. Under coercion, if nothing is ever recovered, the loss is 1.9573 per order; with a recovery probability of 0.40 it is 1.2039; ev… - Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: the Payment-Method Rule Table, the Deposit Threshold Calculator and a Pre-Registered Test
Chapter 8 gives the payment-method rule table, the distilled COD Deposit Threshold Calculator and a pre-registered test. The rules use no protected trait, never treat areas differently, always offer appeal and human rev…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote