What does No Perfect Arbiter conclude, in numbers, about “Eastern and Western Sources Examined: First Grader, Review Grader and Arbiter in the Song History, and Borda's Equal Steps”?
Answer: Part A uses Borda's own twenty-one electors. With \(s\) at 1, which amounts to each elector casting only a vote against the least wanted candidate, C wins with 20 points; with \(s\) at 2, the Borda count, C wins with 26; with \(s\) at 3 and 6 C still leads, but by less and less, and at 6 the three candidates have 48, 49 and 50 points; at exactly 7 all three have 56 points and tie; at 8 A overtakes with 64. Once the weight of first place is large enough, scoring by rank degenerates into plurality and again elects A, the candidate who loses every pairwise contest.
Scope of the numbers: Reviewer names and parameters are illustrative, all calculations are generated by the book's programs, and the book is general business analysis, not business advice. Chapter 6 builds a scenario of conflicting kit refusal codes with illustrative rule names, computes deadlock risks and recommends a hybrid rule that vetoes first and then compares grades in written priority order.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 20, 26, 48, 49, 50, 56
| A. Borda's 21 electors under points (0, 1, s) | |
| s | 1: A 8 B 14 C 20 winner C |
| s | 2: A 16 B 21 C 26 winner C |
| s | 3: A 24 B 28 C 32 winner C |
| s | 6: A 48 B 49 C 50 winner C |
| s | 7: A 56 B 56 C 56 winner ABC |
| s | 8: A 64 B 63 C 62 winner A |
| s | 20: A 160 B 147 C 134 winner A |
| B. 216 profiles: winner set differs from Borda's | |
| s | 1: 96 of 216 (0.4444) |
| s | 3/2: 36 of 216 (0.1667) |
| s | 3: 18 of 216 (0.0833) |
| s | 7: 18 of 216 (0.0833) |
| s | 100: 18 of 216 (0.0833) |
Show the full program
# Chapter 7. p72: Borda's equal steps versus other point scales.
# Borda gave last, middle and first place a, a+b, a+2b: equal steps.
# Any a and any b > 0 rank options alike, so the scale is (0, 1, 2) up
# to an affine map. Here we let the top step grow: points (0, 1, s).
# s = 1 is "vote against one" (anti-plurality), s = 2 is Borda, large s
# approaches plurality. Part A: the 21-elector profile of p31. Part B:
# over all 216 profiles of 3 reviewers, how often the winner set under
# (0, 1, s) differs from Borda's. Exact Fraction arithmetic.
import itertools
from fractions import Fraction
PROFILE = [(1, "ABC"), (7, "ACB"), (7, "BCA"), (6, "CBA")]
OPTS = "ABC"
def score(prof, s):
pts = (s, Fraction(1), Fraction(0))
out = {c: Fraction(0) for c in OPTS}
for k, o in prof:
for pos, c in enumerate(o):
out[c] += k * pts[pos]
return out
def winners(prof, s):
sc = score(prof, s)
top = max(sc.values())
return "".join(c for c in OPTS if sc[c] == top)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("A. Borda's 21 electors under points (0, 1, s)")
for s in (1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 20):
sc = score(PROFILE, Fraction(s))
print(" s = {:>2}: A {:>3} B {:>3} C {:>3} winner {}".format(
s, str(sc["A"]), str(sc["B"]), str(sc["C"]),
winners(PROFILE, Fraction(s))))
print("B. 216 profiles: winner set differs from Borda's")
orders = ["".join(p) for p in itertools.permutations(OPTS)]
profs = [[(1, o) for o in pr]
for pr in itertools.product(orders, repeat=3)]
base = [winners(p, Fraction(2)) for p in profs]
for s in (1, Fraction(3, 2), 3, 7, 100):
k = len([1 for p, b in zip(profs, base)
if winners(p, Fraction(s)) != b])
print(" s = {:>4}: {:>3} of 216 ({:.4f})".format(
str(s), k, k / 216))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Aggregation of Multiple Reviewers: Why No Perfect Arbiter Exists When Kit Refusal Codes Conflict (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 7: Eastern and Western Sources Examined: First Grader, Review Grader and Arbiter in the Song History, and Borda's Equal Steps. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-310 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026310,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Aggregation of Multiple Reviewers: Why No Perfect Arbiter Exists When Kit Refusal Codes Conflict},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Four Axioms and an Empty Table: Arrow's Theorem Enumerated for Three Reviewers and Three Options
- Chapter 2 · The Exact Probability of a Condorcet Cycle: 216 Profiles, Panel Size and the Number of Options
- Chapter 3 · The Borda Count and Irrelevant Options: Twenty-One Electors, Decoys and Spoilers
- Chapter 4 · Single-Peaked Preferences and Value Restriction: When Cycles Disappear
- Chapter 5 · The Lexicographic Priority Arbiter: Which Axiom It Gives Up and What It Buys
- Chapter 6 · Conflicting Kit Refusal Codes: an Illustrative Scenario, Deadlock Risk and the Priority Order
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: Turning Multi-Reviewer Verdicts in the Kits into an Explicit Priority, with a Pre-Registered Plan of Refutation