What does No Perfect Arbiter conclude, in numbers, about “Four Axioms and an Empty Table: Arrow's Theorem Enumerated for Three Reviewers and Three Options”?
Answer: Chapter 1 enumerates all 262,144 rules that satisfy Pareto and independence for three reviewers and three options and finds that only dictators guarantee transitivity.
Scope of the numbers: Reviewer names and parameters are illustrative, all calculations are generated by the book's programs, and the book is general business analysis, not business advice. Chapter 6 builds a scenario of conflicting kit refusal codes with illustrative rule names, computes deadlock risks and recommends a hybrid rule that vetoes first and then compares grades in written priority order.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 262144
n = 2 reviewers, verdicts strict : 64 rules transitive on every profile: 2 survivor: reviewer 1 dictates survivor: reviewer 2 dictates n = 2 reviewers, verdicts ties allowed: 729 rules transitive on every profile: 2 survivor: reviewer 1 dictates survivor: reviewer 2 dictates n = 3 reviewers, verdicts strict : 262,144 rules transitive on every profile: 3 survivor: reviewer 1 dictates survivor: reviewer 2 dictates survivor: reviewer 3 dictates only dictators survive Pareto + IIA + ORD (Arrow, small n)
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p12: exhaustive search of all IIA + Pareto rules (small n).
# By IIA a rule is a separate verdict table for each pair {x, y}: it
# maps the reviewers' x-vs-y votes to a social verdict. Pareto fixes
# the two unanimous rows; every other row is free. We enumerate every
# such rule and keep those whose verdicts are transitive on all
# profiles of strict rankings over 3 options (Arrow's ORD axiom).
# Exact enumeration; nothing is sampled.
import itertools
OPTS = "ABC"
ORDERS = ["".join(p) for p in itertools.permutations(OPTS)]
PAIRS = [("A", "B"), ("B", "C"), ("A", "C")]
def pattern(prof, x, y):
return tuple(o.index(x) < o.index(y) for o in prof)
def survivors(n, verdicts):
pats = list(itertools.product((True, False), repeat=n))
free = [p for p in pats if any(p) and not all(p)]
profiles = list(itertools.product(ORDERS, repeat=n))
pp = [[pattern(pr, x, y) for x, y in PAIRS] for pr in profiles]
def tables():
for vals in itertools.product(verdicts, repeat=len(free)):
t = dict(zip(free, vals))
t[tuple([True] * n)] = 1
t[tuple([False] * n)] = -1
yield t
tabs = list(tables())
keep = []
for tab_ab in tabs:
for tab_bc in tabs:
need = {}
ok = True
for ab, bc, ac in pp:
a, b = tab_ab[ab], tab_bc[bc]
# A?B = a, B?C = b; transitivity pins A?C in some cases
if a >= 0 and b >= 0:
req = {1} if a > 0 or b > 0 else {0}
elif a <= 0 and b <= 0:
req = {-1} if a < 0 or b < 0 else {0}
else:
req = {1, 0, -1}
cur = need.get(ac, {1, 0, -1}) & req
if not cur:
ok = False
break
need[ac] = cur
if not ok:
continue
for tab_ac in tabs:
if all(tab_ac[k] in v for k, v in need.items()):
if check(pp, tab_ab, tab_bc, tab_ac):
keep.append((tab_ab, tab_bc, tab_ac))
return len(tabs) ** 3, keep
def check(pp, t1, t2, t3):
for ab, bc, ac in pp:
r = {("A", "B"): t1[ab], ("B", "C"): t2[bc], ("A", "C"): t3[ac]}
g = dict(r)
for (x, y), v in r.items():
g[(y, x)] = -v
for x, y, z in itertools.permutations(OPTS, 3):
a, b, c = g[(x, y)], g[(y, z)], g[(x, z)]
if a >= 0 and b >= 0 and c < 0:
return False
if a > 0 and b >= 0 and c <= 0:
return False
return True
def who_dictates(rule, n):
ds = []
for i in range(n):
if all(t[p] == (1 if p[i] else -1) for t in rule for p in t):
ds.append(i + 1)
return ds
if __name__ == "__main__":
for n, verdicts, label in ((2, (1, -1), "strict"),
(2, (1, 0, -1), "ties allowed"),
(3, (1, -1), "strict")):
total, keep = survivors(n, verdicts)
ds = [who_dictates(r, n) for r in keep]
print("n = {} reviewers, verdicts {:<12}: {:>7,} rules".format(
n, label, total))
print(" transitive on every profile: {}".format(len(keep)))
for d in ds:
print(" survivor: reviewer {} dictates".format(d[0])
if d else " survivor: no dictator")
print("only dictators survive Pareto + IIA + ORD (Arrow, small n)")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Aggregation of Multiple Reviewers: Why No Perfect Arbiter Exists When Kit Refusal Codes Conflict (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Four Axioms and an Empty Table: Arrow's Theorem Enumerated for Three Reviewers and Three Options. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-310 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026310,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Aggregation of Multiple Reviewers: Why No Perfect Arbiter Exists When Kit Refusal Codes Conflict},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · The Exact Probability of a Condorcet Cycle: 216 Profiles, Panel Size and the Number of Options
- Chapter 3 · The Borda Count and Irrelevant Options: Twenty-One Electors, Decoys and Spoilers
- Chapter 4 · Single-Peaked Preferences and Value Restriction: When Cycles Disappear
- Chapter 5 · The Lexicographic Priority Arbiter: Which Axiom It Gives Up and What It Buys
- Chapter 6 · Conflicting Kit Refusal Codes: an Illustrative Scenario, Deadlock Risk and the Priority Order
- Chapter 7 · Eastern and Western Sources Examined: First Grader, Review Grader and Arbiter in the Song History, and Borda's Equal Steps
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: Turning Multi-Reviewer Verdicts in the Kits into an Explicit Priority, with a Pre-Registered Plan of Refutation