What does No Perfect Arbiter conclude, in numbers, about “Single-Peaked Preferences and Value Restriction: When Cycles Disappear”?

Answer: With \(w\) at zero the cycle probability is zero, as Black's theorem requires. Raising \(w\) only to 0.1 gives 0.0117 for a panel of three and 0.0116 for a panel of five; at 0.5 the figures are 0.0434 and 0.0509; at one they return to the impartial-culture values of 0.0556 and 0.0694. The last two lines give an intuitive ratio: one tenth of off-axis noise brings back 0.2102 of the full no-consensus cycle risk for a panel of three, and 0.1677 for a panel of five.

Scope of the numbers: Reviewer names and parameters are illustrative, all calculations are generated by the book's programs, and the book is general business analysis, not business advice. Chapter 6 builds a scenario of conflicting kit refusal codes with illustrative rule names, computes deadlock risks and recommends a hybrid rule that vetoes first and then compares grades in written priority order.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.0116, 0.0117, 0.0434, 0.0509, 0.0556, 0.0694

wP(cycle) n=3P(cycle) n=5
0.00.00000.0000
0.10.01170.0116
0.20.02180.0229
0.30.03040.0333
0.40.03760.0427
0.50.04340.0509
0.60.04800.0576
0.70.05140.0628
0.80.05380.0665
0.90.05510.0687
1.00.05560.0694
n = 3: w = 0.1 restores 0.2102 of the full cycle risk
n = 5: w = 0.1 restores 0.1677 of the full cycle risk
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p43: a little off-axis noise brings cycles back.
# Reviewers judge three options on a strictness axis A < B < C. With
# probability 1 - w a reviewer holds a single-peaked ranking (one of
# ABC, BAC, BCA, CBA, uniformly); with probability w the reviewer
# ignores the axis and picks any of the 6 rankings uniformly. We
# compute P(no Condorcet winner) exactly for 3 and 5 reviewers by
# enumerating all 6 ** n profiles with Fraction weights. w is a free
# illustrative parameter; w = 1 is the impartial culture of chapter 2.
import itertools
from fractions import Fraction

OPTS = "ABC"
ORDERS = ["".join(p) for p in itertools.permutations(OPTS)]
SP = {"ABC", "BAC", "BCA", "CBA"}


def has_winner(prof):
    for x in OPTS:
        if all(2 * len([o for o in prof if o.index(x) < o.index(y)])
               > len(prof) for y in OPTS if y != x):
            return True
    return False


def p_cycle(n, w):
    prob = {o: (1 - w) * Fraction(1, 4) * (o in SP) + w * Fraction(1, 6)
            for o in ORDERS}
    tot = Fraction(0)
    for prof in itertools.product(ORDERS, repeat=n):
        if has_winner(prof):
            continue
        q = Fraction(1)
        for o in prof:
            q *= prob[o]
        tot += q
    return tot


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   w    P(cycle) n=3   P(cycle) n=5")
    for k in range(0, 11):
        w = Fraction(k, 10)
        print("  {:.1f}      {:.4f}         {:.4f}".format(
            float(w), float(p_cycle(3, w)), float(p_cycle(5, w))))
    for n in (3, 5):
        r = p_cycle(n, Fraction(1, 10)) / p_cycle(n, Fraction(1))
        print("n = {}: w = 0.1 restores {:.4f} of the full cycle risk".format(
            n, float(r)))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Aggregation of Multiple Reviewers: Why No Perfect Arbiter Exists When Kit Refusal Codes Conflict (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: Single-Peaked Preferences and Value Restriction: When Cycles Disappear. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-310 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026310,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Aggregation of Multiple Reviewers: Why No Perfect Arbiter Exists When Kit Refusal Codes Conflict},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book